DocketNumber: 970472, 970473 and 970476
Judges: Russon, Stewart, Howe, Durham, Zimmerman, Russon'S
Filed Date: 12/29/1998
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/13/2024
concurring:
I concur with the majority in holding that the Subpoena Powers Act does not permit prosecutors to take discovery depositions after the filing of an information. I submit that a contrary construction of the Act would raise significant due process issues.
Furthermore, given the many recent revelations of oppressive prosecutorial abuses by various federal special prosecutors under the federal Independent Counsel Act,
I believe the Subpoena Powers Act (the “Act”) is unconstitutional on its face. The United States Supreme Court has observed, in language which I believe is applicable to this ■ Act, “A general, roving, offensive, inquisitorial, compulsory investigation, conducted by a commission without any allegations, upon no fixed principles, and governed by no rules of law, or of evidence, and no restrictions except its own will, or caprice, is unknown to our constitution and laws; and such an inquisition would be destructive to the rights of the citizen, and an intolerable tyranny.” Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1, 27, 56 S.Ct. 654, 662, 80 L.Ed. 1015 (1935) (quoting In re Pacific Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.Cal.1887)). This language applies in essential respects to the powers the Legislature has sought to confer on county prosecutors and the Attorney General. The Subpoena Powers Act vastly extends the compulsory inquisitorial power of state and county prosecutors over both citizens and government officials. Anglo-American history is fraught with examples of abuses of similar powers by government officials.
754 P.2d at 659-60.
. Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99.