State v. Zolantakis

When the execution of a sentence is suspended, it is not vacated. The judgment itself is not impaired or limited. The time for its execution is merely deferred. While under a suspended sentence, a duly convicted person is not freed from the legal consequences of his guilt. He is merely enjoying a conditional favor, postponing his punishment, which may be withdrawn. When the suspension is revoked the convict is punished for the crime of which he was convicted, and not for violating the terms of his parole. The suspension of a sentence can never be demanded as a matter of legal right. It is granted at the mere will of the court. When granted, it is not held as a vested right, but as a matter of favor or grace. The statute confers upon courts a discretionary power designed to aid in the reformation and reclamation of convicted persons. By impressing upon the convicted person that he is enjoying a contingent favor, which may be withdrawn or revoked at any time, it is sought to induce or coerce him to amend his ways. The whole force and virtue of the expedient lies in the reserved power of the court to revoke the favor and inflict the penalty. And if this is hedged about with limitations which substantially destroy it, the whole scheme is defeated. The suspension of the sentence is not a fixed and final adjustment amounting to a right to be revoked only upon a violation of the condition upon which it is granted, because the statute expressly declares that "the court may subsequently increase or decrease the probation period and may revoke or modify any condition of probation." Clearly, this precludes the claim that the judgment is unenforceable until, after due process of law, it is adjudged that the condition of probation has been violated. The power of the court to revoke is not limited to when the conditions have been violated, but extends to the modification or revocation of the condition itself.

There is nothing in the statute suggesting that the compliance with any condition, or the proof of any grounds, are necessary to authorize the revocation of an order suspending sentence. From the nature of the subject, the whole matter of granting and revoking suspensions must rest in the discretion of the court. This view of the matter finds support in ex rel., etc., v.Court of Sessions, etc., 141 N.Y. 288, 36 N.E. 386, 23 L.R.A. 856, where O'Brien, J., speaking for the court, says:

"The power to suspend the judgment during good behavior, if understood as expressing a condition, upon the compliance with which the offender would be absolutely relieved from all punishment and freed from the power of the court to pass sentence, is open to more doubt. The Legislature cannot authorize the courts to abdicate their own powers and duties or to tie their own hands in such a way that after sentence has been suspended they cannot, when deemed proper, and in the interest of justice, inflict the proper punishment in the exercise of a sound discretion. Nor can the free and untrammeled exercise of this power or the right to pass sentence according to the discretion of the court be made dependent upon compliance with some condition that would require the court to try a question of fact before it could render the judgment which the law prescribed. The statute must not be understood as conferring any new power. The court may suspend sentence as before, but it can do nothing to preclude itself or its successor from passing the proper sentence whenever such a course appears to be proper. This, we think, is all that the statute intends, and that was the only effect of the judgment. It is a power which the court should possess in furtherance of justice, to be used wisely and discreetly, and it is perhaps creditable to the administration of justice in such cases that while the power has always existed no complaint has been heard of its abuse."

In 16 C.J. 1335, it is said:

"When sentence has been suspended during good behavior of the defendant, either with or without statutory authority, the court has power to revoke such order and to impose the sentence without granting defendant a trial as to whether or not he has violated such condition."

In People v. Goodrich (Sup.) 149 N.Y.S. 406, the court, in dealing with a revocation of a suspended sentence, and after holding that the trial court did not err in not trying as an issue of fact the question whether the defendant has violated the condition of her discharge, said:

"I think the suspension of judgment in this case was a matter of grace, not of right, to the defendant, that she thereby acquired no vested rights, and the court had the right in its discretion to cancel and revoke the same. In any event, all that was required was to call to its attention facts that satisfied the conscience of the court that the defendant had violated the terms of her parole."

In People v. Trombly, 173 A.D. 497, 160 N.Y.S. 67, the suspension of a sentence was revoked when the court "received information" that the conditions of the suspension had not been complied with. In sustaining the revocation the court said:

"It was proper at any time to revoke the order suspending the execution of the sentence, and neither the Legislature nor the courts have ever attempted to limit this power, except to the discretion of the court."

In State v. Miller, 122 S.C. 468, 115 S.E. 742, it was decided in a proceeding similar to this that the fact that a rule to show cause was issued without information under oath to support it did not affect the court's jurisdiction to enforce the original sentence, when defendant made formal return and was heard by counsel, and that the order suspending sentence might be revoked without granting the defendant a trial.

In the case before us it is not claimed that the court abused its discretion or acted capriciously or arbitrarily by making the order complained of without sufficient grounds, nor that on the merits the defendant has suffered any substantial injustice. In view of the facts proved, which were not even denied by the appellant, that claim could not be successfully made. The complaint is merely that the court committed error in its procedure.

In exercising the powers conferred by the statute in question from the nature of the subject, courts must necessarily have a large discretion not only in respect of the grounds upon which they act, but in the method or procedure by which they ascertain facts and arrive at conclusions. They are not dealing with specific legal rights and are not bound by the standards of legal procedure which usually control judicial proceedings. This is comprehended within the very generally approved rule that an order suspending sentence may be revoked without granting the defendant a trial upon the facts. It logically follows that courts may ascertain facts upon which to act in any manner they see fit, and act upon them, provided only that their proceedings and conduct on the whole are not capricious or arbitrary or a manifest abuse of discretion. I think the orders appealed from should be affirmed.