DocketNumber: No. 6504.
Citation Numbers: 139 P.2d 878, 104 Utah 292
Judges: WADE, Justice.
Filed Date: 7/14/1943
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/13/2023
The core of the opinion lies in the paragraph reading
"We believe the better rule to be that a principal is not liable for the willful tort of an agent which is committed during the course of *Page 298 his employment unless it is committed in the furtherance ofhis employer's interests or unless the employment is such that the use of force could be contemplated in its accomplishment." (Italics added.)
I could better subscribe outrightly to this pronouncement without comment if it were not for the fact that the italicized phrases themselves require definition.
In my dissenting opinion in the case of Stover Bedding Co.
v. Industrial Comm.,
Those cases involved negligence rather than willful tort. A willful act in the sense that the act is not only intended but harm is intended to be inflicted by the intended act usually falls in the class of crimes. A battery is a crime. The early judges used all sorts of phrases such as "in the scope of the employment," "in the cause of the employment," "in furtherance of the master's interests or business," "for the benefit of the master," "acting for the master." These various phrases reflected several basic concepts: First, that when the master acts through another it is as if he himself was acting. This concept had the disadvantage of still leaving open the question of when under the facts was the master acting through another. This led to the second concept as the basis for the principle that even though the servant may have been acting without instructions, in fact in some cases contrary to instructions, if he had not disconnected himself from the employment but was still in its course or as some judges put it in its scope the innocent victim should not be required to assume the full consequences of the negligence but the master should at least be required to make restitution insofar as money damages would accomplish that end. The reason given for this anomaly in the law of requiring one not at fault to pay for an injury, was explained on the basis of the third concept: That the act of the servant was in the interest of the master or for his benefit or in the *Page 299
advancement of his business and for that reason he should respond. Since in many cases, the action of the servant at least the manner in which it was done, was distinctly not in the interest of the master or for the advancement of the business, this finally led to the concept that the basis of the master's liability lay in the fact that he was the actuating or moving cause of the injury because he had set the servant in motion. But here it was recognized that such concept given full range would make the master liable for acts of the servant even in some cases when he had departed from the employment because but for the employment the servant would not have been in position to commit the negligent act. It was at this point that the old tort concepts of "natural, probable and proximate cause" "reasonably to be apprehended" and "independent intervening cause" came to the rescue. The law has refused to accept the "but for" doctrine so ably expounded by Judge Andrews in Palsgraf v. Long IslandR. Co.,
Applying these principles to the above case the question arises: Could the Jewel Tea Company when it sent Davis on his course as collector reasonably apprehend that he *Page 300 would in the act of attempting to collect money due it, use force? In those cases where seizure of property or eviction of persons is contemplated, the use of force may be expected and reasonably apprehended; but not so in the business of soliciting orders or collecting bills.
But by inference says the quotation taken from the main opinion: A master is liable in cases where the agent commits awillful tort while in the course of his employment if it is done in the furtherance of his master's interests. How does this fit in with the concepts above enunciated? Certainly if the agent has departed from the employment or from its course or scope such act breaks the chain of causation between the act of the master, in sending him on his way, and the tort. Such departure is equivalent to an independent intervening cause. Such was the case in Rohrmoser v. Household Finance Corporation,
In the instant case the battery committed by Davis was not so closely integrated with the act of attempting to collect as seems to have been the situation in the cases of Matsuda v.Hammond,
If, then, we accept the thesis which seems the best justification for the doctrine of respondeat superior i.e. master as cause for the injury in that he started the servant on his course, in cases of willful tort or the willful invasion of plaintiff's person by force, the master cannot be held to be the cause where there is a departure from the employment or, if no departure, the agent is not acting for what he conceives to be for the master's interests but for the purpose of venting his spleen on the plaintiff even though the spleen arose from transactions which were in the course of the employment. Whether we think of force used for personal purposes as not being within the realm of apprehensibility or because it itself breaks the chain of causation leading back to the master makes no difference. The result is the same. Under the facts of this case Davis in his use of force was not acting to advance the interests of his master nor to accomplish objects within the line of his duties and the action of the appellant in sending him on his course was not in any sense a legal cause of the assault. I, therefore, concur. *Page 303