First Security Bank of Utah N. A. v. Demiris

CROCKETT, Chief Justice.

James C. Demiris died testate on January 23, 1957, and left surviving him his wife, Iphegenea P. Demiris, and four brothers and a sister. He left no issue surviving him. At the time of his death he was 74 years of age and had been committed to the hospital for acute senile dementia some 33 days prior to his death.

During his lifetime he had accumulated an estate consisting of some $73,000 in bank accounts, $9,700 in United States savings bonds, and an interest in a note in the amount of approximately $16,000.

Certain of the bank accounts had been in joint tenancy with his wife for some considerable period of time while other of the accounts had been in his private bank account and were transferred over' into joint tenancy with his wife on December 5, 1956. The bonds were held in joint tenancy, and the note was in his own name.

Just before Mr. Demiris’ death, between December 21, 1956, and January 23, 1957, his wife withdrew all of the funds above mentioned, cashed the United States savings bonds, and deposited all of these funds in her own separate account. The inter-venor brothers and sister contend that James Demiris was not mentally competent to deal with his funds on December 5, 1956; that he was under undue influence of his wife; and that the attempted transfer of $38,404.15 from his personal account to a purported joint tenancy account, did not give her ownership of that fund. .

The decedent and his wife had been married for about 31 years, and during which she resided separate and apart from him for some 13 years. It seems that she had a greater love for their native country, Greece, than did her husband, and the separations were while she was making visits to Greece. A number of years were spent by her in Greece due to the outbreak of World War II, when she could not return to the United States. There is much evidence tending to show that defendant and her husband did not get along together. The husband drew several wills, the last of which was admitted to probate, wherein he left each of his brothers and sister a legacy in the amount of $10,000.

Upon the trial the court refused to find in accordance with the plaintiff’s contention that on December 5,1956, James C. Demiris was incompetent or acting under undue influence. It concluded that the withdrawals from the joint bank accounts and the cashing of savings bonds by the defendant and depositing the moneys to her own account did not destroy the joint tenancies, and that she took them as the survivor.

It is to be recognized that in reviewing the findings of fact we should indulge considerable latitude to the findings of the trial court and not disturb them unless the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary.¹ However, it is our prerogative and duty under the Constitution to review the evidence in equity cases and to modify or make new findings if the record compels it.²

In regard to the $38,404.45 account which was changed from the decedent’s name to a joint account with the defendant on December 5, 1956, we do not say that the evidence so preponderates against the trial court’s refusal to find that the decedent was incompetent or a victim of undue influence that the finding should be reversed. But there is another question to consider: in view of the circumstances disclosed by the evidence as to the creation of the account, and the fact that the defendant withdrew the money for her own purposes prior to the decedent’s death, where was the ownership of that money?

In that connection it should be stated that we are not here disagreeing with the ruling in the case of Holt v. Bayles,³ but it is significantly different from this case. It dealt with money remaining in a joint account after the death of one of the parties. The presumption was applied that such money passed to the surviving joint tenant, which seems sound in view of the necessity of some certainty in dealing with such accounts. It is to be recognized that the bank or other depository is normally protected in permitting withdrawal by either signator. But as between the parties themselves, the situation may be different.

We are in- accord with the doctrine that when the wife withdrew all of the funds from the account in the lifetime of her husband, obviously for the purpose of getting possession for herself, with the intention of wrongfully depriving him of his rights therein, her action was inimical to the relationship that exists between joint tenants and this act violative of the relationship rendered the question as to the true ownership open to determination. Such a rule, which we believe to be sound and to comport with fundamental principles of equity and justice, was applied by the surrogate court of New York in the case of In re Kelley’s Will.⁴ The decedent had maintained a bank account in her own name in which she had $20,000. On June 13, 1929, the funds were withdrawn and redeposited in the names of herself and her husband for the credit of, “either or survivor.” A month later, July 10, 1929, the husband withdrew the entire amount and deposited it in an account of his own. She died the next day. The court stated that under those circumstances the following rule should be applied:

“The withdrawal of moneys from a joint account does not destroy a joint tenancy, if one was created. It merely opens the door to competent evidence, if available, that no joint tenancy was originally created or intended.”

and concluded that it was manifest that the joint account had been opened for the convenience of the decedent and held that the fund belonged to her estate.

The above rule and the reason supporting it are applicable to the instant case. Looking at the matter through the eyes of equity it seems indisputable that defendant’s act of grabbing the money at the earliest opportunity was for the purpose of getting it for herself and excluding the cotenant therefrom; and that this was a wrongful act which should not be rewarded. Under such circumstances the court should look beyond the superficiality of the form in which the money was held and determine the true facts as to its ownership.

The evidence points unerringly to the fact that insofar as the purpose, desire, and intent of the decedent was concerned, the transfer of December S, 1956, was for his convenience in the face of the exigency that he had to go to the hospital. Except for the bare fact that a joint tenancy account was opened there is no circumstance in this case which suggests any intent on his part to make a gift or a transfer of ownership of this fund to his wife. On the contrary, their marital history and attitudes, as disclosed by the record, would negative any such intent. Her own testimony to the effect that his purpose in putting the account in her name was because he was going to the hospital, coupled with her subsequent conduct of grasping the fund practically as soon as she could get her hands on it argue persuasively that he had no intent to endow her with the money, and that she fully realized that fact. We think that the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts shown is that the ownership of the $38,404.45 remained in James P. Demiris and belongs to his estate.

In regard to the other bank accounts and the war bonds, the record indicates that they had existed in joint tenancy for various, but considerable, lengths of time prior to the transaction discussed above. The circumstance with respect to them was sufficiently different that the determination of the trial court that they were held in joint tenancy with the rights of survivorship and that these funds passed to the defendant by operation of law finds support in the evidence.

The $38,404.45 bank account is directed to be included in the estate of James P. Demiris, and in all other respects the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs to appellants.

WADE and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur.

1 . In re Crandall’s Estate, 1959, 9 Utah 2d 161, 340 P.2d 760.

2 . Utah Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 9 (1896); Nokes v. Continental Mining & Milling Co., 1957, 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P.2d 954.

3 . 1934, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.2d 715.

4 . 1933, 146 Misc. 353, 263 N.Y.S. 661, 667; see also Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 130 N.J.Eq. 176, 21 A.2d 743, where the New Jersey court held that wrongful invasion destroyed a joint tenancy and in that instance regarded the status as being converted to that of tenancy in common.