State v. Farrow

BENCH, Judge

(concurring in the result):

As indicated by the main opinion, section 77-36-2(3) (a) unambiguously provides that “when a peace officer responds to a domestic violence call and has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, the peace officer shall [1] arrest without a warrant or [2] issue a citation.” Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2(3)(a) (1995) (emphasis added). The option of issuing a citation is eliminated if “the peace officer has probable cause to believe that [a] there will be continued violence against the alleged victim, or [b] there is evidence that the perpetrator has either recently caused serious bodily injury or used a dangerous weapon in the domestic violence offense.” Id.

In the instant ease, the trial court explicitly found that the “potential for harm to her [the victim] is ongoing.” The court further found that the officer had “probable cause to believe there was continued — there could be continued violence against the victim.” Defendant does not challenge these fact-sensitive determinations. See State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 533 (Utah 1994) (stating that appellate courts afford a measure of discretion to trial court’s determination of probable cause). In view of those facts, and under the plain meaning of the statute, the officer had no choice but to arrest defendant. As pointed out by the main opinion, defendant does not challenge the statute on constitutional grounds. See main opinion at note 3.

Having held that the plain meaning of the statute mandated the arrest of this defendant, any consideration of rules of statutory construction used in interpreting ambiguous statutes is unwarranted. “When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction.” Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah 1995). Likewise, any discussion of legislative intent and public policy is both unnecessary and improper. World Peace Movement of Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 259 (Utah 1994) (“Only when we find ambiguity in the statute’s plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy considerations.”).

I therefore concur only in the result.