State v. Crutcher

2023 UT App 53THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
STEVEN CRUTCHER,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20180322-CA
Filed May 18, 2023
Sixth District Court, Manti Department
The Honorable Wallace A. Lee
No. 131600150
Ann M. Taliaferro, Attorney for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and David A. Simpson,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGE DAVID N. MORTENSEN and
SENIOR JUDGE RUSSELL W. BENCH concurred.1
ORME, Judge:
¶1 Steven Crutcher entered a conditional guilty plea to
first-degree aggravated murder after confessing to the
racially-motivated murder of his cellmate (Cellmate). Less than a
month later, Crutcher wrote to the district court retracting his
confession, claiming it was not made of his own free will, and
communicating his wish to withdraw his plea. Crutcher now
appeals the court’s denial of his pre-plea motion to suppress, his
post-plea motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and his counsel’s
1. Senior Judge Russell W. Bench sat by special assignment as
authorized by law. See generally Utah R. Jud. Admin. 11-201(7).
State v. Crutcher
(Counsel) post-plea motion to withdraw as Crutcher’s counsel.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 In the spring of 2013, Cellmate was found dead under
suspicious circumstances at the Central Utah Correctional Facility
(CUCF) located in Sanpete County. Following an autopsy and
further investigation, Cellmate’s cause of death was determined
to be homicide by ligature strangulation.
The Investigation and Pre-Plea Communications
¶3 After the discovery of Cellmate’s death, Crutcher was
moved from their shared cell at the CUCF Hickory housing unit
to a cell in the Dogwood housing unit to be housed alone.2 The
lead investigator (Investigator), accompanied by a CUCF
detective (First Detective), met with Crutcher. When Crutcher
invoked his Miranda rights, questioning stopped, and Investigator
and First Detective left.
¶4 About a month later, Investigator learned from First
Detective that Crutcher wished to speak with him. Investigator
and a detective from the Sanpete County Sheriff’s Office (Sanpete
County Detective) then met with Crutcher over the course of two
days. At the beginning of the first of these meetings, Investigator
advised Crutcher of his Miranda rights and provided a form for
Crutcher to sign indicating that he waived those rights, which
2. Crutcher was housed in the Dogwood housing unit throughout
the course of the investigation, but it appears he was moved to
other cells within Dogwood as a matter of course and based on
regular day-to-day assessments of inmate behavior. It is not clear
from the record whether Crutcher was housed alone for the
entirety of his time in Dogwood.
20180322-CA 2 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
Crutcher signed.3 Crutcher then told Investigator and Sanpete
County Detective that on the day of the incident, he had simply
woken up and found Cellmate dead from what he assumed to be
suicide and called for officers to respond. Not fully convinced by
Crutcher’s recounting of the event in light of the condition in
which Cellmate was found, Investigator ended the interview by
communicating as much to Crutcher, and he said that they would
be back to talk with him.
¶5 The next day, Investigator returned, again accompanied by
Sanpete County Detective, to speak with Crutcher. During this
encounter, Crutcher gave Investigator a handwritten letter, telling
them verbally and in writing that he had “not been honest” with
them the day before and that instead of waking up to find
Cellmate dead, he had watched Cellmate hang himself. Crutcher
admitted that he had lied about what happened in the first place
out of fear of punishment for watching Cellmate commit suicide
and failing to call for help. Again, Investigator communicated to
Crutcher that he was not “completely sold on even this version of
the story.”
¶6 Later that summer, on July 24, another CUCF detective
(Second Detective) informed Investigator that Crutcher had a
sealed letter that he wished to have delivered to the county
attorney. Second Detective had been speaking with Crutcher
regarding an unrelated matter when, at the end of the interview,
Crutcher handed Second Detective an envelope, telling him “that
he wanted it to go to the prosecutor” and that it was regarding
3. With the exception of his first encounter with investigators
when Crutcher invoked his Miranda rights and chose not to speak
with Investigator and First Detective, the record shows that each
time a member of law enforcement interacted with Crutcher
thereafter, Crutcher was advised of his rights, was asked if he
wished to waive those rights, and affirmatively waived those
rights. There is no assertion from Crutcher to the contrary.
20180322-CA 3 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
“what happened in Hickory.” Hearing this, Second Detective
reiterated that his involvement with Crutcher was focused on the
unrelated incident and not on the circumstances of Cellmate’s
death. But Crutcher “persisted” in his request that Second
Detective “take the letter to the prosecutor.” Second Detective
then delivered the envelope to Investigator.
¶7 After taking possession of the envelope, Investigator
attempted to deliver it to the county attorney the next day, July
25. But the envelope containing the letter was not addressed to the
county attorney, having only the words “Steven Crutcher, legal
material” written on it, so before accepting the letter, the county
attorney requested that Investigator ensure Crutcher was aware
he was prosecuting “a case in which [Crutcher was] a suspect”
and that Crutcher indeed wanted the county attorney to have the
letter. Investigator then returned the still-sealed envelope to
Second Detective with the instruction to have Crutcher address it
appropriately if he wanted it delivered to the county attorney.
Second Detective spoke with Crutcher again on that same day,
during which time Crutcher addressed the envelope to the county
attorney, and the letter was again conveyed to the county
attorney. Investigator and the county attorney then read the
following in Crutcher’s letter:4
4. We note that, while the following language is extremely
offensive, throughout this opinion we quote the language
Crutcher used because it provides necessary context for his
belated claim that his confessions were coerced. Cf. United States
v. Porter, 928 F.3d 947, 951 n.2 (10th Cir. 2019) (“We avoid
inclusion of obscenities, racial slurs, and other offensive language
in our opinions unless the word or phrase is central to our analysis
and is a quotation from one of the parties.”).
20180322-CA 4 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
I Steven Crutcher started planning how to
kill that Cuban nigger the second day I was his cellie
he is nothing but a stupid fucking nigger thats what
was going through my head I am a wood[5] white
pride all the way 100% white power It’s time to
stand up and be proud killing that nigger earned me
my ᛋᛋ bolts[6] I killed that Cuban nigger and after I
killed him I hung him in the back of the cell like the
nigger he is . . . so yeah I choked that nigger out with
some thin braided rope out of blanket entil he
passed out then held the presser entil I knew that
nigger was dead
The whole time while choking this nigger out
I was saying in his ear white power mother fucker
over and over entil he passed out then I spit on that
fucking nigger after I knew he was dead I hung that
nigger in the back of the cell yeah white power
5. “Wood” is short for “peckerwood.” “In the second half of
the 20th century, in prison environments in Texas, California,
and possibly elsewhere, the word peckerwood, originally
used to refer to White prisoners generally, began to develop a
more specific association with members of racist prison
gangs and cliques . . . .” Peckerwood, Anti-Defamation
League, https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/peckerwo
od [https://perma.cc/TT8Z-KJG6].
6. “ᛋᛋ bolts,” also known as “SS bolts,” “are a common
white supremacist/neo-Nazi symbol derived from
Schutzstaffel (SS) of Nazi Germany,” which “maintained
the police state of Nazi Germany. . . . Following World War II,
the SS bolts symbol was adopted by white supremacists
and neo-Nazis worldwide.” SS Bolts, Anti-Defamation
League, https://www.adl.org/resources/hate-symbol/ss-bolts
[https://perma.cc/9RWF-Z8HB].
20180322-CA 5 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
mother fuckers time to make a stand and be proud
of taken that niggers life
my full confession:
Steven Crutcher ᛋᛋ
¶8 After reading the letter, Investigator returned to the prison
that same day to speak with Crutcher regarding the letter’s
contents. Investigator was accompanied by the then-sheriff of
Sanpete County. Investigator asked Crutcher, “Do you want to go
over with me a little bit of what you wrote in that letter and why
you wrote the letter?” In reply to questions posed by Investigator,
Crutcher explained:
I went back to my old skinhead ways, you know.
That’s what I am, that’s what I’m proud to be, you
know.
....
I don’t live by these laws and I don’t follow these
laws of the land, you know.
....
I do my own thing. I follow the Aryan teachings
laws.
....
You know. I just wanted to express, you know—
proud for who I am, just standing up and be proud
of what I am now.
....
20180322-CA 6 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
I let it be known in that letter.
....
It’s all true, you know.
Investigator then asked whether Crutcher had been bribed or
coerced into writing the letter, and Crutcher denied any outside
influence.
¶9 Crutcher also detailed his planning, preparation,
execution, and attempted cover-up of the murder of Cellmate.
Crutcher stated he decided to carry out the act the “second the
guy became my cellie.” Crutcher detailed his process in making
various ropes out of braided bedding material, stating, “I made a
couple different things just figuring out how to strangle his ass.”
Crutcher also narrated how he “instigated” a scuffle between
himself and Cellmate “to get an adrenaline rush,” and then
I just pushed his ass against the wall and wrapped
[the rope] around his neck and started choking him.
He started screaming.
....
I just fucking pulled like that as tight as I could
around his neck . . . to stop him from screaming . . . .
[He was] trying to fight but I just—I kept him
pushed up against the wall, and he just passed out.
¶10 Crutcher explained that after Cellmate was dead, he
moved him to his bed, placed blankets over him to avoid raising
suspicion with prison guards when they did their rounds, and
then he “sat there watching a movie with a smile on my face” until
after breakfast rounds were completed. Crutcher explained how
he later proceeded to stage Cellmate’s body and belongings to
make it look “[l]ike he hung himself.”
20180322-CA 7 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
¶11 After this recounting of the incident, Investigator asked,
“This murder . . . was just basically a racial thing, a hate thing?”
Crutcher responded, “Just hate, yeah. If he would have been
white, I probably would have never done it. . . . [A]ctually I
guarantee I would have never done it.” Finally, Investigator
repeated his inquiry about whether Crutcher had been promised
anything or been threatened by anyone to “come clean now,” and
Crutcher told him, “No. It was all on my own. . . . I murdered that
dude.”
¶12 Investigator visited Crutcher again, on July 26, and
informed him of the county attorney’s intention of entering the
letter into evidence. He also conveyed the county attorney’s desire
to know that the letter was indeed penned by him. Crutcher
confirmed that he wrote the letter, that he addressed the letter’s
envelope to the county attorney, and that no one forced him to
write the letter or asked him to write the letter. He signed a
statement of fact indicating as much. During that conversation,
Crutcher stated he “killed that mother fucker because he’s a
fucking stupid Cuban nigger.” Investigator asked, yet again, if the
contents of the letter were genuine, to which Crutcher responded,
“Everything in that letter is true.”
¶13 That was not the end of Crutcher’s unsolicited
communications. Crutcher sent two more letters to the county
attorney in the following months, postmarked September 6 and
October 15. In the September 6 letter, Crutcher stated: “I sent you
my full confession last month. . . . Are you guys going to file
charges or not? . . . I’m guilty. I just want to plead guilty and get
this over with as soon as possible.” In the October 15 letter,
Crutcher stated that he had “no regrets for taken that Cuban
nigger’s life. . . . I killed that nigger straight out of hate for his kind.
And believe me if I have a chance to take another niggers life I will
not hesitate white power 卐,” and he again signed “Steven
Crutcher ᛋᛋ.” On October 23, Investigator met with Crutcher
20180322-CA 8 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
again, both letters in hand, and Crutcher again signed a statement
indicating that he wrote these later letters of his own free will and
confirmed that no one else had a role in the matter.
¶14 In November 2013, the State filed a charge of first-degree
aggravated murder against Crutcher, later indicating its intent to
seek the death penalty. Counsel was then appointed to represent
Crutcher.
¶15 In March 2015, Crutcher filed a motion to suppress his
confession and the statements that he made to investigators,
claiming, among other things, that he made those statements
involuntarily. Specifically, Crutcher argued that under the totality
of the circumstances, his statements were involuntary based on
his lack of formal education, his mental health issues, and his
housing situation at the time of the discussions with investigators.
The district court denied Crutcher’s motion on the ground that it
could “find no causal connection” between the change in housing
and Crutcher’s decision to confess, noting specifically that
Crutcher had not produced any evidence to show that he was
placed in the Dogwood housing unit to elicit his confession.
Crutcher sought interlocutory review of the court’s decision,
which the Utah Supreme Court denied. Shortly thereafter,
Crutcher and the State reached a plea agreement.
¶16 On May 2, 2016, the district court held a change-of-plea
hearing, during which it conducted a thorough rule 11 colloquy
with Crutcher to ascertain his state of mind, to establish his
knowledge of the rights he was waiving by proceeding with a Sery
plea,7 and to determine if Crutcher was entering into the plea
7. As has been codified for many years in rule 11(j) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure, “[a] Sery plea is a conditional plea in
which a defendant pleads guilty . . . but reserves the right to
appeal the trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress certain
(continued…)
20180322-CA 9 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
agreement voluntarily. When asked whether he had been
threatened or coerced into pleading guilty, Crutcher answered,
“No,” and when asked whether he was pleading guilty of his own
volition, he replied, “Yes, I am.” In accepting the plea, the court
specifically noted that it did so based on Crutcher’s responses
during the rule 11 colloquy, Crutcher’s indication that he
understood the factual basis for his charged crime that had been
provided to the court, and the sufficiency of the evidence the State
had previously proffered to establish the factual basis for the
guilty plea. It was anticipated that a penalty-phase jury trial
would be held in January 2017.
Post-Plea Communications and Proceedings
¶17 Twenty-nine days after his guilty plea was entered, the
district court received a pro se letter from Crutcher claiming that
his confession to Cellmate’s murder was coerced because a white
supremacist group had told him to falsely confess to the murder
or else they would kill him and his family. Crutcher further
claimed that “before all this happened I had nothing in my file
that I represented white supremace or affliated with any white
supremacy group.” Finally, Crutcher requested that his retraction
not go “public” otherwise he would be “a dead man.” Crutcher’s
letter did not identify any specific individuals who allegedly
made the threats or indicate when and where these threats were
made.
¶18 After a telephonic conference on August 17, 2016, the court
set an initial hearing for September 2 to question Crutcher about
evidence.” Kamoe v. Ridge, 2021 UT 5, ¶ 23, 483 P.3d 720. “If the
appellate court reverses the denial of that motion, the defendant’s
plea is withdrawn.” Id. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 (Utah
App. 1988). This particular Sery plea provided that Crutcher could
appeal the court’s denial of the motion to suppress his statements,
particularly in regard to their alleged involuntariness.
20180322-CA 10 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
the letter. At the hearing, Counsel represented that he needed
more time to talk to Crutcher, and another evidentiary hearing
was set for later that month. On September 29, the day before the
rescheduled hearing was to take place, Counsel again informed
the court that he needed more time to talk to Crutcher, and the
court continued the evidentiary hearing to October 26. Following
the rescheduling, the court indicated in a minute entry that if a
motion to withdraw Crutcher’s letter was not filed prior to the
October 26 hearing, the court would construe the letter to be a
motion to withdraw Crutcher’s plea, and the parties would need
to be prepared to present evidence supporting or opposing the
motion at the next hearing. The court further indicated that
Crutcher and the State “should plan on a substantive resolution
of the issues surrounding the ex parte letter at the upcoming
hearing.” The court also stated that it had given Counsel ample
“time to discuss the ex parte letter” with Crutcher, and that unless
there was a compelling reason to continue the next hearing, it
would not grant another continuance, noting that the “matter
need[s] to be resolved expeditiously in order to determine the
nature of the [pentalty-phase] trial pending in January.” Due to a
family emergency for Counsel, the evidentiary hearing was then
reset to November 23, and as no motion to withdraw Crutcher’s
letter had been filed, the letter was thereafter construed by the
court as a motion to withdraw Crutcher’s guilty plea.
¶19 During the hearing on November 23, Counsel
communicated to the court that Crutcher’s demeanor was
“markedly different from the last time” Counsel had seen him and
that Crutcher had told Counsel he had been “abruptly” denied
one of his medications. Counsel then requested that another
hearing be set to allow him time to flesh out Crutcher’s allegations
regarding the medication. The court indicated that it had already
continued the matter several times and stressed the need for
20180322-CA 11 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
expeditious resolution of the issues.8 The court then scheduled a
telephone conference on November 29 and a tentative evidentiary
hearing on December 2.
¶20 Come November 29, Counsel filed a motion for leave to
withdraw as counsel, stating that he would violate several rules
of professional conduct if required to disclose information that
would be useful in determining the validity of Crutcher’s plea.
Counsel expressed a concern about the State’s inevitable intention
to call him as a witness regarding the communications
surrounding Crutcher’s guilty plea and the requested withdrawal
of that plea. Counsel also requested that, in the event the court
denied the motion to withdraw, the court “appoint independent
counsel free from these conflicts” to litigate the motion to
withdraw the plea.
¶21 During the telephonic conference that same day, the court
communicated to the parties that it would not permit the State to
call Counsel as a witness because any communications between
Counsel and Crutcher were protected by attorney–client
privilege. The court then noted the several opportunities that the
8. Scheduling a trial of this nature in Sanpete County was
logistically complicated, or so we gather from the record, and the
next available jury trial date would be at least nine months out if
the scheduled penalty-phase trial did not go forward in January
as planned. For example, cognizant of the agricultural dynamic
prevalent in the county and the possible agricultural involvement
of potential jurors, the court and parties considered the reality that
scheduling a jury trial during certain times of the year (namely
spring and fall) would put a strain on potential jurors and also
possibly eliminate a large number of potential jurors. Another
concern was the small size of the county and that in scheduling
and sending out questionnaires, and then rescheduling and
resending out new questionnaires, a potential “pollution” of the
jury pool could occur.
20180322-CA 12 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
court had offered Crutcher to show cause as to why his plea
should be withdrawn. None of those opportunities had been
utilized, and instead several hearings had been continued as
requested by Counsel for various reasons, culminating in
Crutcher’s allegedly deteriorated state at the November 23
hearing. The court concluded that Crutcher had effectively
“waived any request for an oral argument or evidentiary hearing
on the motion [to withdraw the guilty plea].”
¶22 Due to the timing and preparation needed for the
penalty-phase jury trial scheduled for January, the court then set
an accelerated briefing schedule, requesting that the parties
present their arguments regarding Crutcher’s motion to
withdraw the plea and Counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw.
At that juncture, Counsel explained that he was “over an
unethical barrel” in having to litigate Crutcher’s motion. In
response to this, the court indicated that Counsel could file a
“memorandum addressing his ethical concerns and any
privileged information in a sealed filing that the court could view
in camera.” No objections were raised to either course of action
proposed by the court. The court then addressed the claim that
Crutcher’s medication had been stopped, allegedly leading to his
mental deterioration. The State reported that after investigation
into this claim, it discovered that Crutcher had not been
prescribed that specific medication for almost three years prior to
the November 23 hearing. Counsel also explained that any
concerns he had about Crutcher in that regard had been
alleviated.
¶23 Following the telephonic conference, the State filed
objections to both Crutcher’s motion to withdraw his plea and
Counsel’s motion to withdraw, and Counsel filed corresponding
replies. Counsel did not, however, file a sealed memorandum
regarding his ethical conundrum, but again repeated his request
that independent counsel be appointed to assist Crutcher in
litigating the motion to withdraw his plea.
20180322-CA 13 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
¶24 With no sealed memorandum filed by Counsel addressing
the ethical concerns about litigating the motion to withdraw the
plea, and with no further explanation or evidence supporting
Crutcher’s claims in his motion to withdraw his plea, the court
denied both motions. In its order, the court highlighted that it had
scheduled five different hearings to discuss Crutcher's letter, four
of which were evidentiary hearings and all of which had been
unfruitful. The court noted that during the November 23 hearing,
Crutcher “fabricated circumstances in order to avoid having the
evidentiary hearing” by claiming to have been denied medication
abruptly and behaving in such a manner as to cause Counsel
concern. The court further explained that Crutcher offered no
evidence in his “self-serving” letter, or at any other time for that
matter, that would provide the court with any basis on which to
conclude that his claims of coercion were substantiated, especially
“after representing in open court” his freedom from coercion. The
court specifically noted that Crutcher’s “general allegations of
threats from white supremacists” lacked names of those who
issued threats and that Crutcher’s retraction letter “lacks the
evidentiary weight necessary to overcome his conduct at his
change of plea hearing and his representations to the court” that
his guilty plea was the result of his “own free will and choice.”
Additionally, the court explained that Crutcher’s credibility had
been undermined through the “gamesmanship he engaged in by
fabricating withdrawal symptoms” from a medication he had not
been prescribed in almost three years, in an effort to avoid the
evidentiary hearing.
¶25 In one last attempt to allow Crutcher to explain his
position, the court noted that it might “reconsider its ruling
denying [Crutcher’s] motion to withdraw his guilty plea” in
conjunction with the decision to not set a “fifth evidentiary
hearing” if, and only if, Crutcher “provide[d] the court with an
offer of proof.” Such an offer would include “what evidence he
would present at a hearing if granted another opportunity,”
20180322-CA 14 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
including witness names and summaries of what testimony those
witnesses would give, as well as a summary of Crutcher’s own
testimony. Despite being given this one last opportunity, Crutcher
provided nothing to the court. Crutcher’s guilty plea remained in
place, and he was later sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole.9 Crutcher now appeals.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶26 Crutcher first argues that the district court erroneously
denied his motion to suppress statements he made during the
investigation. “We review a district court’s ultimate
determination of the voluntariness of a confession for correctness.
But we defer to the court’s underlying factual findings unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Glasscock, 2014 UT App 221, ¶ 10,
336 P.3d 46 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah
2015). “A trial court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous only
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if we
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has
been made.” State v. Apodaca, 2018 UT App 131, ¶ 31, 428 P.3d 99(quotation simplified), aff’d, 2019 UT 54, 448 P.3d 1255.
9. Though beyond the scope of this appeal, an event occurred that
cannot go unnoted. In advance of the scheduled penalty-phase
trial, it was discovered that the Department of Corrections had
failed to provide over 1,500 pages of Crutcher’s medical file to
Counsel for use in preparing Crutcher’s defense, despite his
requests and the district court’s orders. After this discovery, the
State withdrew the death penalty from consideration and
recommended that Crutcher receive a life sentence instead—a
recommendation to which Crutcher stipulated. The district
court’s expressed frustration with this turn of events is entirely
understandable.
20180322-CA 15 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
¶27 Next, Crutcher argues that the district court erroneously
denied Counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel and Counsel’s
alternative request that the court appoint independent counsel to
assist Crutcher in litigating his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. “A trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw is
discretionary, but the court abuses its discretion if its denial of the
motion violates the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel.”
State v. Williams, 2013 UT App 101, ¶ 8, 300 P.3d 788, cert. denied,
312 P.3d 619 (Utah 2013). See also State v. Alvarez-Delvalle, 2012 UT
App 96, ¶ 2, 275 P.3d 279 (“We review whether the trial court’s
refusal to appoint substitute counsel violated [a defendant’s] Sixth
Amendment right for correctness.”), cert. denied, 285 P.3d 1229(Utah 2012).
¶28 Crutcher also contends that the district court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first
holding an evidentiary hearing to address the validity of
Crutcher’s claims. “We review a trial court’s decision to rule on a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea without first holding an
evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” State v. Walker,
2013 UT App 198, ¶ 9, 308 P.3d 573.
¶29 Finally, Crutcher claims that, due to his guilty plea and the
limitations under Utah law regarding plea withdrawals, he has
forgone the ability to raise several other claims, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel or discovery violations, thereby violating “a
number of fundamental state and federal constitutional rights.” In
his reply brief, Crutcher’s argument in this regard is distilled to a
request that, as there are cases addressing this specific issue
currently before the Utah Supreme Court, this court should
“consider staying this appeal pending the Utah Supreme Court’s
determination of what procedural avenue” will be established for
20180322-CA 16 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
similarly situated individuals.10 Because Crutcher’s request for a
stay appears for the first time in his reply brief, we do not address
this issue further.11 See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, ¶ 8, 194 P.3d 903(“It is well settled that issues raised by an appellant in the reply
brief that were not presented in the opening brief are considered
waived and will not be considered by the appellate court.”)
(quotation simplified).12
10. Crutcher points to State v. Rippey, Appellate Case No.
20200917-SC, and indicates that a number of other cases are
stayed pending the decision in Rippey.
11. To his credit, Crutcher correctly acknowledges that because of
the current state of the law, we are indeed prevented from
addressing claims raised in this final argument. We are bound by
our jurisprudence as it currently exists and, even if this request
had been raised in a timely fashion, under the law we do not have
the jurisdiction to consider these issues. See State v. Badikyan, 2020
UT 3, ¶ 15, 459 P.3d 967 (affirming the “court of appeals’
conclusion that the Plea Withdrawal Statute bars appellate review
of all unpreserved claims, even those made on appeal of timely
motions to withdraw”). See also State v. Sundara, 2021 UT App 85,
¶ 60, 498 P.3d 443 (“[T]his court lacks the authority to overrule
Utah Supreme Court precedent.”), cert. denied, 502 P.3d 271 (Utah
2021).
12. Additionally, at the end of his opening brief, Crutcher requests
that if we do not remand on the above-argued issues, we should
order that independent counsel be appointed to assist Crutcher
“in filing a post-conviction petition if he so chooses.” That request
is not within our prerogative to grant because under Utah Code
section 78B-9-109, which authorizes the appointment of counsel
to assist with post-conviction proceedings, “the ultimate decision
about whether to appoint counsel rests with the district court.”
(continued…)
20180322-CA 17 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
ANALYSIS
I. Motion to Suppress
¶30 The first issue before this court is whether the district court
incorrectly denied Crutcher’s motion to suppress the statements
he made during the course of the investigation. Abandoning his
story about coercion by white supremacists, Crutcher now argues
that his statements were involuntarily made as a result of being
moved to a housing unit with fewer privileges and being placed
in solitary confinement following Cellmate’s death. Crutcher
claims that the housing conditions he experienced in the
Dogwood housing unit during the time he was conversing with
investigators were “highly psychologically coercive” and
“punitive” and that it was only after being subject to these
conditions that he initiated contact with the county attorney. In
response, the State argues that the district court expressly found
“no causal connection between Crutcher’s new prison
accommodations and his later confessions” that would suggest
that Crutcher’s statements were the product of coercion. We agree
with the State that the evidence supports the district court’s
conclusion that Crutcher’s statements were voluntary.
¶31 “The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution protect individuals from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.” State v. Glasscock,
2014 UT App 221, ¶ 15, 336 P.3d 46 (quotation simplified), cert.
denied, 343 P.3d 708 (Utah 2015). “For a court to find that a
confession is involuntary, evidence to support that finding must
reveal some physical or psychological force or manipulation that
is designed to induce the accused to talk when he otherwise
would not have done so.” State v. Werner, 2003 UT App 268, ¶ 15,
76 P.3d 204 (quotation simplified). In other words, “the ultimate
Zaragoza v. State, 2017 UT App 215, ¶ 19, 407 P.3d 1122, cert. denied,
417 P.3d 579 (Utah 2018).
20180322-CA 18 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
goal of analyzing whether a confession was coerced and therefore
involuntary is to determine whether, considering the totality of
the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.”
State v. Apodaca, 2019 UT 54, ¶ 28, 448 P.3d 1255 (quotation
simplified). A totality-of-the-circumstances analysis includes
consideration of “both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.” State v. Rettenberger, 1999 UT 80, ¶ 14,
984 P.2d 1009 (quotation simplified). Even if the evidence does
reveal that there was force designed to induce statements, “there
must also be a causal relationship between the coercion and the
subsequent confession.” Werner, 2003 UT App 268, ¶ 15 (quotation
simplified).
¶32 Crutcher’s argument is wholly unpersuasive given the
totality of the circumstances surrounding his statements and
confession. Put simply, the act of moving Crutcher from his
original cell to a new cell in the prison, even with the change in
privileges and the lack of a cellmate, was not in and of itself
coercive. In fact, it appears that quite the opposite was true here,
for several reasons.
¶33 First and foremost, there were the letters. The contents of
the July 24 letter and the events that occurred leading up to the
letter making its way to the county attorney are particularly
damning and stand in stark contrast to Crutcher’s coercion claims.
Crutcher has not presented any evidence to suggest, nor is there
any evidence in the record that might indicate, that he was forced
to write to the county attorney confessing to Cellmate’s murder or
to continue discussing the incident further with investigators. On
the contrary, the record demonstrates that he wrote the letter of
his own volition, when quite alone, intentionally brought that
letter to an interview in an unrelated matter, and willingly handed
it to Second Detective, who otherwise had no awareness of its
existence. Even after being assured that Second Detective was not
there to discuss the circumstances surrounding Cellmate’s death,
Crutcher still insisted that Second Detective deliver the letter to
20180322-CA 19 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
the county attorney. At any point during that conversation,
Crutcher could have decided to forgo mentioning—let alone
delivering—the letter. But he did not. Then, when the letter was
later returned to Crutcher unopened for the purposes of adding
an addressee to the envelope and confirming his intention for the
county attorney to receive the letter, he again opted to have it
delivered. He did so even with an intervening period of some
twenty-four hours, during which time he could have evaluated
the letter and the advisability of transmitting it. Crutcher could
have halted the process he began then and there, but he continued
to forge ahead, sending the two additional letters claiming
responsibility for Cellmate’s death, unequivocally and
unremorsefully explaining why and how he murdered Cellmate.
¶34 Next, Crutcher’s behavior during his interactions with law
enforcement exhibited anything but the effects of coercion.
Second Detective and Investigator both testified at a 2015
evidentiary hearing that during their meetings with Crutcher, he
was calm, clear, and reasoned. The court also heard testimony
from Second Detective that Crutcher was upset at the prospect
that he might be getting a cellmate, further weakening Crutcher’s
contention that the solitary nature of the housing unit was causing
him psychological strain sufficient to prompt him to confess to a
murder he did not commit.
¶35 Also relevant to our consideration of the totality of the
circumstances is the fact that Crutcher was familiar with the
judicial system, as he was already incarcerated at the time of
Cellmate’s murder and told Investigator that he had been in
prison for fifteen years. Further, Crutcher was made aware of his
Miranda rights each time Investigator or Second Detective spoke
with him and so was fully aware that he could stop
communicating with investigators at any time. Indeed, he had
done so at the very first meeting with Investigator immediately
following the discovery of Cellmate’s body.
20180322-CA 20 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
¶36 The factual context and circumstances discussed thus far
do not alone support a conclusion that Crutcher was susceptible
to any alleged coercion, and our totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis leads us to next consider the landscape of
communications among Crutcher, Investigator, and Second
Detective.
¶37 From the outset, Investigator and Second Detective
conducted their questioning in a constitutionally proper manner.
In Investigator’s first meeting with Crutcher, Crutcher invoked
his Miranda rights, after which no one questioned him further
until Crutcher requested to speak with Investigator again. During
each interaction with Investigator and other detectives after that,
Crutcher was read his Miranda rights, and he was repeatedly
provided opportunities to halt communications. But he did not.
¶38 Notably, nothing in the record indicates that Investigator
or Second Detective had to entreat or persuade Crutcher to relay
what he did, nor does Crutcher present any evidence of untoward
actions or abuse committed by Investigator or Second Detective.
In fact, each time investigators spoke with Crutcher about his
confession, and in response to simple questions about his
involvement, within a matter of minutes Crutcher volunteered
why and how he killed Cellmate. Crutcher’s statements were
devoid of regard for Cellmate or remorse for his actions, and his
lack of inhibition serves to further illustrate how freely and
comfortably Crutcher was expressing himself both during
interviews with Investigator and Second Detective and in his
letters.
¶39 In conclusion, the district court correctly concluded that
Crutcher presented no evidence of force or coercion and that his
actions and statements were voluntary. The court also correctly
concluded that Crutcher did not show a connection between his
housing situation and his prolific confessions and graphic
explanations of his role in Cellmate’s death. We therefore see no
20180322-CA 21 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
error in the district court’s conclusions and its denial of Crutcher’s
motion to suppress his statements.
II. Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw
¶40 The second issue before us requires us to determine
whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied
Counsel’s motion to withdraw and his alternative request that, at
the very least, the court appoint independent counsel to represent
Crutcher in litigating his motion to withdraw his plea. Crutcher
has not persuaded us that the court abused its discretion.
¶41 Crutcher contends that the court’s request that Counsel
elaborate on his ethical concerns, even in a sealed filing, was
inappropriate because it placed a burden on Counsel to
potentially violate rules of professional conduct. Further,
Crutcher argues that the denial of the request for appointed
independent counsel was in error because, for example, there may
have been discussions and differing opinions between Counsel
and Crutcher about Crutcher’s desire to withdraw his plea that
“could not be disclosed to the court in the first instance but could
have been explored by independent counsel,” and denying such
an appointment effectively denied Crutcher his right to
conflict-free representation. The State argues that the district court
correctly denied the motion because Counsel failed to offer any
proof that a conflict actually existed, instead offering conclusory
statements and references to various rules. The State also
highlights that the court had a reasonable interest in moving the
case along in an expeditious manner. Again, we agree with the
State.
¶42 “An attorney’s motion to withdraw as counsel prior to the
entry of judgment in a criminal case is subject to the approval of
the court.” State v. Wadsworth, 2012 UT App 175, ¶ 2, 282 P.3d
1037, cert. denied, 293 P.3d 376 (Utah 2012). See also State v. Scales,
946 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (“Whether to allow an
20180322-CA 22 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
indigent defendant’s attorney to withdraw after the attorney has
expressed concern about his or her relationship with the
defendant is a matter committed to the trial court’s sound
discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.”).
We have also explained that replacing defendant’s counsel is
required when a defendant can show “good cause, such as a
conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or
an irreconcilable conflict with his or her attorney.” State v.
Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). A defendant’s
constitutional right to counsel is violated when the defendant is
“forced to stand trial with the assistance of an attorney with
whom he has become embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict.” Id.(quotation simplified). Crutcher has not met the required
threshold showing of good cause that would require the
replacement of Counsel.
¶43 Here, in its denial of Counsel’s motion to withdraw, the
court highlighted that it had offered Counsel the opportunity to
enlighten the court in a confidential filing as to the concerns about
continuing to represent Crutcher in the motion to withdraw his
plea, a course of action to which Counsel did not object. The court
also noted that if it were to allow withdrawal in circumstances
where trial counsel asserted they could not continue in
representing a client with an unsupported, general statement of
“ethically, I cannot continue,” it would inevitably create a rule
with potential “dangers,” including “abuse by defendants seeking
to have new counsel appointed or a delay of trial proceedings.”
¶44 On appeal, Crutcher has not shown that Counsel’s
continued representation created a conflict to the extent that
Crutcher’s constitutional right to counsel was violated. We can
make assumptions as to why at that particular juncture Counsel
wished to withdraw, and an appreciation of that circumstance is
no doubt what prompted the court to suggest that Counsel share
his concerns with the court confidentially. But Counsel did not
take that opportunity, and Crutcher has not demonstrated on
20180322-CA 23 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
appeal that this procedure, not objected to below, constituted
plain error. Cf. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 569, 574 (1989)
(explaining that the Supreme Court “has approved the practice of
requiring parties who seek to avoid disclosure of documents to
make the documents available for in camera inspection” and that
“in camera review may be used to determine whether allegedly
privileged attorney-client communications fall within the
crime-fraud exception”); Sabre Int’l Sec. v. Torres Advanced Enter.
Sols., LLC, 219 F. Supp. 3d 155, 159 (D.D.C. 2016) (“Numerous
courts have reviewed similar affidavits under seal to ascertain the
basis of the motion to withdraw without upsetting the
attorney-client privilege.”) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the
district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Counsel’s
motion to withdraw.
III. Crutcher’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
¶45 Finally, Crutcher argues that the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
without first holding an evidentiary hearing. On this final issue,
Crutcher does not contest the voluntariness of his guilty plea so
much as the fact that there was no evidentiary hearing held to
determine the validity of the claim that his plea was not
voluntary. Crutcher’s argument can be summed up in his
contention that “the court should have explored Crutcher’s claims
rather than refusing to listen unless the defendant complied with
onerous conditions that could not be met.” We disagree with
Crutcher’s characterization that the district court refused to listen
to him before denying the motion without first holding an
evidentiary hearing.
¶46 “It is the responsibility of the district court to ensure that
defendants enter pleas knowingly and voluntarily.” State v.
Candland, 2013 UT 55, ¶ 14, 309 P.3d 230. When a defendant moves
to withdraw a guilty plea, “an evidentiary hearing must
ordinarily be held unless the record of a prior hearing shows
20180322-CA 24 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
petitioner is clearly not entitled to relief.” Summers v. Cook, 759
P.2d 341, 345 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In those instances where the
record clearly provides the court with a basis for “factual
determinations and credibility assessments,” we have concluded
that it is not an abuse of the court’s discretion to proceed without
an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Walker, 2013 UT App 198,
¶¶ 48–49, 308 P.3d 573. We have reasoned that the same is true
when an appellant fails to provide “additional evidence he would
have presented had he been afforded an evidentiary hearing,” id.
¶ 49, as the responsibility lies with a defendant to show “good
cause” as to why a guilty plea should be withdrawn, see State v.
Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, ¶ 10, 79 P.3d 960 (“A defendant can
show good cause by putting forth evidence that the plea was in
fact involuntary.”).
¶47 In Walker, a defendant appealed the denial of his request
for an evidentiary hearing in conjunction with his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. 2013 UT App 198, ¶ 9. Prior to the
court’s denial, the defendant had provided affidavits from
recanting witnesses in support of his motion to withdraw. Id. ¶ 7.
In concluding an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, the
district court explained, among other things, that the evidence
that would have been presented at the hearing would have merely
reiterated what was already contained in the affidavits. Id. ¶ 47.
On appeal, the defendant argued that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing under Summers and Humphrey. Id. ¶ 48. We
determined that the defendant’s reliance on those cases was
misplaced because the “documentary evidence accomplished the
same purpose as would an evidentiary hearing,” id., and because
the court made that decision in a detailed manner, listing its
“factual determinations and credibility assessments” of the
defendant and others, id., differentiating that case from the
circumstances in Summers and Humphrey. See Summers, 759 P.2d
at 345 (establishing the requirement for an evidentiary hearing
“unless the record of a prior hearing shows petitioner is clearly
20180322-CA 25 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
not entitled to relief”); Humphrey, 2003 UT App 333, ¶¶ 11, 13
(remanding to the district court due to a lack of “necessary
credibility assessment[s] and factual determinations” “to support
its ruling on [the defendant’s] motion to withdraw his plea”). We
noted in Walker that the defendant also failed to detail any
additional evidence he could have provided other than what was
already submitted to the court and concluded that the court did
not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to
withdraw without an evidentiary hearing. 2013 UT App 198, ¶ 49.
¶48 While this case is unlike Walker given the fact that Crutcher
has not provided any evidence to support his claim of
involuntariness, the reasoning in Walker is helpful. Here, like in
Walker, the district court had sufficient information in the
record—specifically the testimony of Second Detective and
Investigator about what Crutcher told them and what
Investigator saw in his first visit to the crime scene—and from the
rule 11 colloquy it conducted, to conclude that Crutcher had
affirmatively communicated to the court that he was admitting
his guilt of his own free will. Further, and perhaps more
importantly in this case, like in Walker, Crutcher has not identified
“what additional evidence he would have presented had he been
afforded an evidentiary hearing,” id., and has not “identif[ied]
any additional witnesses,” id., who would be able to corroborate
his coercion claims, even after the court gave Crutcher several
specific opportunities to do so.
¶49 This case would be very different if the district court
denied an evidentiary hearing at the first request for a
continuance, perhaps even at the second. But that is not what
happened here. The court scheduled at least five different
proceedings to address Crutcher’s letter, deemed by the court to
be a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and Crutcher took
advantage of none of them. The court reasonably concluded that
Crutcher had effectively waived his opportunity to present his
case at an evidentiary hearing. This conclusion is further
20180322-CA 26 2023 UT App 53State v. Crutcher
supported by the fact that, in a final effort to assure that Crutcher
had every opportunity to provide supporting evidence, the court
allowed him one more bite at the apple, provided that Crutcher
could produce any information about witnesses that would
support his claims that his confession was the product of threats
of harm to himself and others. As previously noted, Crutcher
provided nothing.
CONCLUSION
¶50 Crutcher has not demonstrated that the events that
occurred following Cellmate’s death were intended to put him in
a position of vulnerability that would result in him making
involuntary incriminating statements. Further, Crutcher has not
shown how the denial of Counsel’s motion to withdraw and
related request for independent counsel constituted an abuse of
discretion under all the circumstances. Finally, Crutcher has not
shown that the court abused its discretion when it denied his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first holding an
evidentiary hearing. We therefore conclude that the district court
appropriately exercised its discretion in denying Crutcher’s and
Counsel’s motions.
¶51 Affirmed.
20180322-CA 27 2023 UT App 53