Marsh v. City of Richmond

POFF, J.,

dissenting.

I dissent from the decision the majority has reached. I agree that the trial court properly excluded the report of the blue ribbon committee. At trial, the central issue was what the General Assembly intended by the use of the word “extraordinary” when it added that word to section 4.01 of the City’s charter in 1975. That was four years before City Council created the blue ribbon committee, and the committee’s report is irrelevant to the dispositive issue.

I reject the defendants’ argument that the trial court “exceeded the permissible scope of judicial review”. Although the scope of judicial review of the legislative acts of a local governing body is narrowly defined, it is peculiarly the function of the courts to determine the meaning of statutory language which “is reasonably capable of being understood in two senses.” Armstrong v. Erasmo, 220 Va. 883, 890, 263 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1980). In my view, “extraordinary expenses” is such language.

I believe the trial court erred in the construction it placed upon the City’s charter. The court based its judgment on the conclusion that, when used to modify the word “expenses”, the word “extraordinary” imports a difference in kind rather than a difference in amount and only a difference in kind. Invoking a dictionary definition of the term “extraordinary expenses”, the majority reaches the same conclusion. Considering what I perceive to be the legislative purpose the General Assembly sought to achieve, I do not think it intended such a restrictive interpretation of the term. In my view, the legislative purpose was to authorize the City to reimburse public servants the costs added to their personal budgets on account of the performance of their public duties, whether such costs were different in kind or different in amount from personal expenses ordinarily incurred.

I find no evidence of record which contradicts the defendants’ claims that they incurred such expenses and that such expenses exceeded the maximum reimbursable under City Council’s resolutions. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and enter final judgment dismissing the action filed against the defendants.

COMPTON, J., joins in dissent.