John C. Holland Enterprises v. Southeastern Pub. Service Auth.

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons, and
Agee, JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.
JOHN C. HOLLAND ENTERPRISES, INC.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 061085 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
April 20, 2007
SOUTHEASTERN PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY OF VIRGINIA, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
In this appeal, which presents a case of first impression,
we determine whether the trial court erred in determining that
Code § 15.2-5121(A) does not apply to a municipally created
waste authority that enters into a new service.
I
This matter was decided on demurrer; therefore, the facts
are as alleged in the bill of complaint as follows. Since 1979,
the plaintiff, John C. Holland Enterprises, Inc. (Holland), has
owned and operated a construction, demolition, and debris waste
(CDD) landfill in the City of Suffolk. The landfill is operated
pursuant to a permit issued by the Commonwealth of Virginia. The
defendant, Southeastern Public Service Authority (SPSA), is a
refuse collection and disposal authority created under the
provisions of the Virginia Water and Waste Authorities Act, Code
§ 15.2-5100, et seq.
In 1985, SPSA opened its regional municipal solid waste
(MSW) landfill for the purpose of providing MSW services to its
member cities and counties and to the public. MSW consists of
household garbage and other household refuse of the type
normally collected by cities and sent to a MSW landfill.
A different type of landfill handles CDD. CDD is generally
comprised of concrete, bricks, wood, drywall, wires, electrical
fixtures, shingles, and similar materials.
In 2003, SPSA made an unannounced entry into the arena of
CDD services by offering CDD services to one private company,
defendant Bay Disposal, Inc. SPSA did not offer CDD services to
the general public, and it did not put CDD services on the
public service charge list. When this unannounced activity
became known, Holland complained. Ultimately, SPSA extended the
CDD services to the general public over Holland's objections.
SPSA did not make any of the findings mandated by Code § 15.2-
5121(A) before offering this new service.
II
On April 22, 2005, Holland filed its bill of complaint,
asking the trial court to enjoin SPSA's CDD services until it
and its member localities made the requisite findings mandated
by Code § 15.2-5121(A). Code § 15.2-5121(A), in pertinent part,
provides the following:
No authority shall operate . . . a refuse
collection and disposal system for any political
subdivision . . . unless the authority, and
subsequently the locality's governing body find: (i)
that privately owned and operated refuse collection
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and disposal services are not available on a voluntary
basis by contract or otherwise, (ii) that the use of
such privately owned services has substantially
endangered the public health or has resulted in
substantial public nuisance, (iii) that the privately
owned refuse collection and disposal service is not
able to perform the service in a reasonable and cost-
efficient manner, or (iv) that operation by such
authority . . . , in spite of any potential anti-
competitive effect, is important in order to provide
for the development and/or operation of a regional
system of refuse collection and disposal for two or
more units.
SPSA filed a demurrer, contending that Holland "fails to
state a cause of action because [Code §] 15.2-5121 is not
implicated or violated under the facts alleged." The trial
court sustained SPSA's demurrer, stating the following:
It is clear to the Court from a reading of the
statute that the CDD waste program operated by SPSA is
a service, and not a system as provided for in the
statute. Otherwise, the inclusion of both terms,
"service" and "system" in [Code] § 15.2-5136 would be
unnecessarily redundant and meaningless.[ 1 ] I consider
this plain language as evincing a legislative intent
to treat the separate terms, "systems" and "services",
as describing different functions. Specifically,
therefore, I hold that the term "service" is an
included component of, and thus part and parcel of, a
"system."
Accordingly, I hold that the extension of SPSA's
waste disposal operation to include CDD waste was not
a new system requiring the [Code] § 15.2-5121
statutory findings. It was simply a new service.
SPSA was therefore free to institute the new service
without making the [Code] § 15.2-5121 findings.
1
Code § 15.2-5136 governs the fixing and revising of rates,
fees, and other charges for the services furnished or to be
furnished by various systems. Subsection F thereof permits an
authority to establish rates and charges "for the services and
facilities of . . . a refuse collection and disposal system."
3
We awarded Holland this appeal, limited to one assignment
of error, which reads as follows:
The trial court erred in determining that Va.
Code § 15.2-5121(A) does not apply to a municipally-
created waste authority and its member communities
that operate a landfill and then later enter into a
new service, without making any of the findings
required by the statute.
III
"Interpretation of a statute is a pure question of law
subject to de novo review by this Court." Virginia Polytechnic
Inst. & State Univ. v. Interactive Return Serv., 271 Va. 304,
309, 626 S.E.2d 436, 438 (2006); accord Renkey v. County Bd. of
Arlington County, 272 Va. 369, 373, 634 S.E.2d 352, 355 (2006);
Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 352, 577 S.E.2d 246, 248 (2003).
When we interpret a statute, we must determine the General
Assembly's intent from the words used in the statute, unless the
language of the statute is ambiguous or would lead to an absurd
result. Cummings v. Fulghum, 261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494,
496 (2001). We also do not question whether legislation is
wise. Horner v. Department of Mental Health, 268 Va. 187, 193,
597 S.E.2d 202, 205 (2004); City of Portsmouth v. City of
Chesapeake, 232 Va. 158, 163, 349 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1986).
Additionally, when a trial court grants a demurrer, we
likewise review the court's action de novo. In so doing, we
apply the same standard the trial court applied, i.e., "whether
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the facts . . . pleaded, implied, and fairly and justly inferred
are legally sufficient to state a cause of action" against SPSA.
See Thompson v. Skate America, Inc., 261 Va. 121, 128, 540
S.E.2d 123, 126-27 (2001).
IV
Holland contends that the purpose of Code § 15.2-5121(A) is
to protect the private sector and to require a waste authority
like SPSA to make the requisite findings before entering into a
new service. Holland further contends that, if the General
Assembly did not intend to require that such findings be made,
then "there would have been no reason for" Code § 15.2-5121(E),
which, it asserts, provides for the grandfathering of services
existing as of July 1, 1983. 2
SPSA contends that Code § 15.2-5121(A) applies only to the
initial decision to operate a system, and it points out that
nowhere in the statute does the term "new service" appear. SPSA
further contends that Holland's argument regarding Code § 15.2-
5121(E) "rest[s] on its assumed meaning of [Code] § 15.2-
5121(A)" and that this Court need only interpret Code § 15.2-
5121(A).
2
Code § 15.2-5121(E) provides that the requirements and
restrictions of Code § 15.2-5121 "shall not apply in any
political subdivision wherein refuse collection and disposal
services are being operated or contracted for by any sanitary
district located therein, as of July 1, 1983."
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V
We agree with SPSA and reject Holland's contentions. Code
§ 15.2-5121(A) provides, in pertinent part, that no authority
shall "operate . . . a refuse collection and disposal system"
unless certain findings are made regarding, among other things,
the private availability of "refuse collection and disposal
services." Code § 15.2-5101 defines a "[r]efuse collection and
disposal system" as a "system, plant or facility designed to
collect, manage, dispose of, or recover and use energy from
refuse," or solid waste. Therefore, no authority can operate a
solid waste collection and disposal landfill unless the
authority determines, among other things, that the collection
and disposal services are not privately available. Neither Code
§ 15.2-5121(A) nor Code § 15.2-5101, however, distinguishes
between types of services or refuse. All Code § 15.2-5121(A)
requires is that an authority makes the findings before
undertaking to operate its system. 3
In the present case, SPSA had long been operating its
landfill when it expanded its services to include CDD. Nothing
in Code § 15.2-5121(A) required SPSA to make any findings before
doing so. Therefore, upon our de novo review, we determine that
3
Our interpretation of Code § 15.2-5121(A) is not
inconsistent with Code § 15.2-5121(E). Thus, we reject
Holland's "grandfathering" argument.
6
Holland cannot state a cause of action against SPSA.
Accordingly, the trial court's judgment will be affirmed.
Affirmed.
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