Michael Wayne Stallings v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judge Humphreys and Senior Judge Bumgardner
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Salem, Virginia
MICHAEL WAYNE STALLINGS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1687-14-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
NOVEMBER 10, 2015
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
Joseph W. Milam, Jr., Judge
M. Lee Smallwood, II, Senior Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
Christopher P. Schandevel, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Michael Wayne Stallings (“Stallings”) appeals his conviction from the Circuit Court of
the City of Danville (the “circuit court”) of felony possession of oxycodone in violation of Code
§ 18.2-250. Stallings claims the circuit court erred in convicting him of possession of oxycodone
because the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he was aware of the nature and character of
the item possessed as a controlled substance.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, this Court “must examine
the evidence that supports the conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.” Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668
S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (2008). The relevant inquiry is whether “‘any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Kelly v.
Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 250, 257, 584 S.E.2d 444, 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Jackson
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). This Court’s deference to the fact finder “applies not
only to findings of fact, but also to any reasonable and justified inferences the fact-finder may
have drawn from the facts proved.” Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 672, 676, 701 S.E.2d
61, 63-64 (2010). “‘Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled to as much weight as
direct evidence, provided it is sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except that of guilt.’” Holloway v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 658, 665, 705 S.E.2d 510, 513
(2011) (en banc) (quoting Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876
(1983)). “Circumstantial evidence is not viewed in isolation.” Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265
Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003). “While no single piece of evidence may be sufficient,
the ‘combined force of many concurrent and related circumstances, each insufficient in itself,
may lead a reasonable mind irresistibly to a conclusion.”’ Derr v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 413,
425, 410 S.E.2d 662, 669 (1991) (citations omitted).
Code § 18.2-250 makes it unlawful “for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess
a controlled substance unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid
prescription or order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional practice.”
Therefore, “[i]n a prosecution for possession of a controlled substance, the Commonwealth must
produce evidence sufficient to support a conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant’s possession of the drug was knowing and intentional.” Young v. Commonwealth,
275 Va. 587, 591, 659 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2008). “[T]he plain language of Code § 18.2-250
requires a defendant to know that the substance he possesses is in fact a controlled substance, but
that it does not require him to know precisely what controlled substance it is.” Sierra v.
Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 770, 775, 722 S.E.2d 656, 658 (2012). “A defendant’s knowledge
of the presence and character of a drug may be shown by evidence of the acts, statements, or
conduct of the accused, as well as by “other facts or circumstances” tending to demonstrate the
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accused’s guilty knowledge of the drug.” Ervin v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 495, 506-07,
704 S.E.2d 135, 140-41 (2011) (internal citations omitted).
It is undisputed that Stallings possessed oxycodone on his person. Therefore, the only
issue before this Court is whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that Stallings had
knowledge of the nature and character of the pills as a controlled substance. In support of his
argument that he was unaware of the nature and character of the pills he had in his possession,
Stallings relies on his own testimony at trial that he did not know the pill bottle in his pocket
contained prescription pills. However, “[t]he credibility of a witness and the inferences to be
drawn from proven facts are matters solely for the fact finder’s determination.” Marable v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998). “In its role of judging
witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the
accused and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Id. at 509-10, 500 S.E.2d
at 235. In this case, there is ample evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s finding
that Stallings’s testimony was not credible.
First, Stallings admitted to providing Officer Dixon with fraudulent identification, which
could reasonably lead the fact finder to conclude that Stallings was attempting to conceal his
guilt. See Christian v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 603, 613, 721 S.E.2d 809, 814 (2012)
(holding that the trial court “could infer appellant’s consciousness of guilt” as it related to his
possession of crack cocaine in his pocket from the false identification he had provided to police).
Additionally, Stallings’s testimony at trial was controverted by the testimony of Officers
Merrill and Dixon. Stallings claimed that Officer Dixon only asked for his name once,
approximately fifteen to twenty minutes after Stallings’s uncle fraudulently provided Officer
Merrill with Stallings’s name and birth date. However, both Officers Merrill and Dixon testified
that they had asked Stallings’s uncle and Stallings for their names and birth dates when they first
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approached the vehicle at “the same time.” Officer Dixon explained that Stallings had been
asked about his identity three separate times—when Officer Dixon first approached the car, after
Officer Dixon discovered the pill bottle from his search of Stallings, and after Officer Merrill had
run the name “Michael Wayne Stallings” through the DMV system. The circuit court explicitly
credited Officer Dixon’s testimony that Stallings had falsely identified himself again after
Officer Dixon had found the pills in Stallings’s pocket.
Finally, Stallings’s contradictory testimony at trial undermined his explanation about how
he came to have the pills in his possession. On brief, Stallings claims that he could have thought
that the pills had come from a pharmacy, but were not “controlled substances.” At trial, Stallings
testified first that he was unaware of what was in the bottle. Later in his testimony, Stallings
explained that he had concluded that the pills “were okay” because he had seen a list of eight to
ten different medications and their usages and dosages posted in the back of his uncle’s truck and
had concluded, based on the list, that his uncle must have had “medical issues.” The circuit court
could have reasonably concluded that if Stallings was truly ignorant to the bottle’s contents, it
would not have been necessary for him determine the pills “were okay” before retrieving them
for his uncle and carrying them on his person. Therefore, finding Stallings’s testimony to not be
credible, the circuit court was entitled to conclude that Stallings testified falsely “in an effort to
conceal his guilt.” Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696, 604 S.E.2d 79, 82 (2004). The
circuit court could also “‘consider whatever [it] concluded to be perjured testimony as
affirmative evidence of guilt.’” Morris v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 127, 134, 607 S.E.2d 110,
114 (2005) (quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992)).
The circuit court was also presented with other evidence indicating Stallings was aware
of the nature and character of the pills. First, the seven pink pills were packaged inside a plastic
baggie and stuffed inside a pill bottle that did not have a label. The circuit court could
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reasonably conclude that such packaging would make it obvious to an observer that the pills had
not been packaged by a pharmacist pursuant to a prescription or doctor’s order. Further, the
circuit court heard evidence that a “visual examination of the physical characteristics [of the
pills], including shape, color and manufacturer’s markings” was consistent with the
pharmaceutical preparation of oxycodone. Therefore, the circuit court could soundly infer that it
would be obvious to Stallings that the pills were prescription medication, as opposed to other
over the counter medicines, and that those pills had not been prepared by a pharmacy.
Moreover, the circuit court noted that no explanation was offered as to why Stallings had
continued to have the pills in his possession if they belonged to his uncle, who was sitting right
next to him in the vehicle. See Ronald J. Bacigal, Virginia Practice Series: Criminal Offenses &
Defenses, 180 (2015-16) (“When the drugs are found in the actual, physical possession of the
accused . . . such possession is also evidence that the accused knew what he possessed.”).
Notably, there was no evidence that Stallings’s uncle, or anyone else for that matter, had a valid
prescription for oxycodone. Accordingly, the circuit court found that Stallings knew he was in
possession of a controlled substance. Concluding there was sufficient evidence in the record for
a reasonable fact finder to find Stallings did knowingly or intentionally possess a controlled
substance in violation of Code § 18.2-250, we affirm Stallings’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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