Robinique Scott Cruse v. Alexandria Department of Community and Human Services

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Chafin and Senior Judge Haley
UNPUBLISHED
ROBINIQUE SCOTT CRUSE
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0643-17-4 PER CURIAM
JULY 18, 2017
ALEXANDRIA DEPARTMENT OF
COMMUNITY AND HUMAN SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
Nolan B. Dawkins, Judge
(Paula M. Potoczak, on briefs), for appellant. Appellant submitting
on briefs.
(Matthew W. Greene; James L. Banks, Jr.; Jill A Schaub; Greene
Law Group PLLC; Office of the City Attorney, on brief), for
appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
(Isabel Kaldenbach, on brief), Guardian ad litem for the minor
children. Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Robinique Scott Cruse (mother) appeals the orders terminating her parental rights and
approving the goals of adoption to three of her children. Mother argues that the circuit court erred
in “finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that it was in the best interests of the children to
terminate the residual parental rights of [mother] to her 3 children . . . and to permit the goal of
adoption.” Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the circuit court
did not err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
BACKGROUND
We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant
to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of
Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).
Mother and Orlando Cruse, Sr. (father) are the biological parents to four children, born in
October 2012, December 2013, April 2015, and May 2016. Mother and father have a history of
domestic violence and substance abuse. On November 8, 2013, prior to the births of the three
youngest children who are the subject of this appeal, the City of Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic
Relations District Court (the JDR court) terminated mother and father’s parental rights to their
oldest child pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B), (C)(1), and (C)(2).1
In February 2016, mother filed for and obtained a preliminary protective order after an
incident of domestic violence. Initially, mother went to a domestic violence shelter, where she
stayed for less than forty-eight hours. Mother resumed living with father.
Subsequently, the JDR court entered another protective order that barred contact between
father and the children. On April 7, 2016, the Alexandria Department of Community and Human
Services (the Department) removed the children from the home because the social worker found the
children at home alone with father. The social worker testified that the home smelled like marijuana
and that the children were “either in diapers or naked.” Both children appeared to have
developmental problems. The two-year-old child could say just a few words, and the one-year-old
child could not sit up without support. The Department placed the children in foster care.
The Department asked mother if she was pregnant. Initially, she denied being pregnant, but
later admitted that she was pregnant. On April 7, 2016, mother would not provide the Department
1
Both parties appealed the termination order to the circuit court, but neither parent
appeared for the hearing. The circuit court dismissed their appeals.
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with any information regarding her prenatal care and due date. However, on April 8, 2016, she told
the Department that the baby was due in August and she was receiving prenatal care at the Casey
Clinic. The Department learned that mother had lied. Despite her pregnancy being a high risk,
mother did not meet with a worker at the Casey Clinic until May 16, 2016, and mother refused the
prenatal services offered to her. The baby was due in June, but was born prematurely at the end of
May. Two days after the baby was born, the Department removed the child and placed the child in
foster care.
The children were evaluated while they were in foster care. The oldest of the three children
suffered from extensive developmental delays in speech, verbal comprehension, and verbal
reasoning. This child received rehabilitative services while in foster care.
At the end of June, mother and father were involved in another fight. On July 5, 2016,
mother separated from father. She stayed at a domestic violence shelter until mid-September, 2016,
and then moved in with her former foster mother. While at the domestic violence shelter, mother
participated in group and individual domestic violence counseling.
The Department provided mother with substance abuse counseling, including individual and
group sessions. Mother started the substance abuse counseling in August 2016. At the time of the
circuit court hearing in February 2017, mother had completed two out of three modules in the group
counseling program and was expected to finish the third module on February 22, 2017. As part of
the substance abuse counseling, mother took random drug tests, all of which were negative.
The Department also arranged for supervised visitation between mother and the children.
Mother regularly visited with the children. The Department further provided mother with intensive
parenting classes that she participated in from the end of May 2016 until the beginning of January
2017. The counselor worked with mother on safety planning, nurturing parenting, bonding,
developmental stages, healthy eating, and the children’s needs. Mother completed the classes, but
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the counselor did not think that, at the time of the circuit court hearing, mother was prepared to take
the children that day. The counselor opined that mother would need another three to six months to
transition to having one or more of the children.
On September 15, 2016, the JDR court entered an order relieving the Department from
providing reunification services to mother because her parental rights to another child had been
terminated. On October 6, 2016, the JDR court terminated mother’s parental rights and approved
the goals of adoption for her three youngest children.2
On February 1, 2017, the parties appeared before the circuit court. Mother testified that she
was employed full-time as a cook. She worked thirty-five to forty hours per week, from 4:00 p.m.
to 11:00 p.m., and earned approximately $13 per hour. She acknowledged that her work hours
could be problematic and was willing to change her schedule or job, if necessary. She compiled a
list of possible babysitters, but did not have a plan for child care. She testified that she had “looked
into” housing, but had not obtained housing for herself and the children. Mother further explained
that she bought a car, but it needed repairs and was not operable. She had not purchased car seats
for the children. After hearing all of the evidence and argument, the circuit court found that it was
in the children’s best interests to terminate mother’s parental rights to her children pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-283(E)(i).3 This appeal followed.
2
The JDR court also terminated father’s parental rights. Father appealed the JDR court
ruling to the circuit court. However, he did not appear at the circuit court hearing, so the circuit
court dismissed his appeal.
3
Code § 16.1-283(E)(i) states:
The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child who is
in the custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency
may be terminated by the court if the court finds, based upon clear
and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child
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ANALYSIS
“Where, as here, the court hears the evidence ore tenus, its finding is entitled to great
weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.” Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986)
(citation omitted). When considering termination of parental rights, “the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child’s best interests.” Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d
at 463.
Mother argues that the evidence proved that it was in the children’s best interests to be
reunited with mother. She emphasizes that she separated from father, who was abusive. She
addressed her substance abuse issues, and all of her drug tests were negative. She participated in
counseling and parenting classes. She asserts that her “relationship with her children is caring,
nurturing, and very good.”
However, as mother readily acknowledges, she does not have housing or child care for
the children. She testified that she had not applied for housing at the time of the circuit court
hearing and did not have any specific plans for housing. Mother testified that she worked nights,
but might try to change her hours or find a different job with daytime hours. She also looked
online for possible daycare providers, but had not contacted any of them at the time of the circuit
court hearing. Mother could not articulate any definite plans she had for the children’s housing
or child care.
and that . . . the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a
sibling of the child have previously been involuntarily terminated
....
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After the JDR court entered the order pursuant to Code § 16.1-281(B),4 the Department was
no longer required to provide reunification services for mother. The court previously had
terminated mother’s parental rights to her oldest child. Mother had received services prior to the
termination of her parental rights to that child. Then, mother received numerous services with
respect to these three children. Despite the services offered to mother, she was unable to meet the
needs of the children and substantially remedy the situation that led to the children being placed in
and remain in foster care. One of mother’s counselors even testified that mother was not prepared
to take the children and would need more time.
“It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting
to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or her] responsibilities.”
Kaywood v. Halifax Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495
(1990).
Mother’s parental rights to her oldest child were involuntarily terminated. Contrary to
mother’s arguments, the circuit court did not err in terminating her parental rights to her three
children who are the subject of this appeal. The Department proved that it was in the children’s best
interests to terminate mother’s parental rights.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s ruling is affirmed.
Affirmed.
4
Code § 16.1-281(B) states, in pertinent part:
The local board or other child welfare agency having custody of
the child shall not be required by the court to make reasonable
efforts to reunite the child with a parent if the court finds that . . .
the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a sibling of the
child have previously been involuntarily terminated . . . .
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