Chesterfield County Public Schools v. Laura A. Patrick

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Alston and Decker
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHESTERFIELD COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0069-14-2 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
AUGUST 12, 2014
LAURA A. PATRICK
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Michael P. Kozak, Senior Assistant County Attorney (Chesterfield
County Attorney’s Office, on brief), for appellant.
Robert L. Flax (Robert L. Flax, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Chesterfield County Public Schools (“Chesterfield County”) appeals the decision of the
Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission (“the commission”) to award temporary partial
disability benefits to Laura A. Patrick (“Patrick”). Chesterfield County’s argument on appeal is
that the commission’s decision to award Patrick temporary partial disability benefits denied it
due process of law because the parties only litigated the issue of temporary total disability
benefits and it should have been afforded the opportunity to contest a temporary partial disability
benefits award. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision of the commission.
While working as a school bus driver for Chesterfield County, Patrick suffered a
compensable injury on May 29, 2012 from a backwards fall. The commission awarded her
medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits. On December 27, 2012, Patrick filed an
amended claim alleging her injuries were actually more severe than anticipated. On January 11,
2013, Chesterfield County filed an application for a hearing requesting that Patrick’s outstanding
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
temporary total disability award be terminated because she had been released to her pre-injury
work as of January 2, 2013. The commission suspended Patrick’s disability payments pending a
hearing before the deputy commissioner to resolve both Patrick’s amended claim and
Chesterfield County’s application.
Patrick saw several physicians from the time that she was injured until the hearing before
the deputy commissioner. As of January 2, 2013, Dr. Glick and Dr. McDermott noted that
Patrick was ready for “full release to work without restrictions as a bus driver.” However,
Patrick claimed that she was continuing to experience pain in early January 2013 despite
Dr. Glick’s opinion that there was no objective evidence that supported her complaints. After
several referrals, Patrick was treated by Dr. Valente on April 10, 2013. Dr. Valente found that
Patrick should remain out of work until May 15, 2013. Due to Patrick’s improvement resulting
from a new course of treatment, Dr. Valente released her to part-time work on May 14, 2013.
On May 20, 2013, ten days before the hearing before the deputy commissioner, Patrick returned
to work on a part-time basis.
At the May 30, 2013 hearing before the deputy commissioner, in defense against
Chesterfield County’s application, Patrick claimed that she continued to be disabled as a result of
the original injury. Chesterfield County asserted that based on Dr. Glick’s January 2, 2013
release Patrick should be back to full-duty work. At the outset of the hearing, the deputy
commissioner asked Chesterfield County, “[I]f I find that she is still disabled for a reason
causally related to the accident, do you have any objection to modifying the award to temporary
partial [disability benefits]?” Chesterfield County responded “no.” Then the deputy
commissioner asked, “[I]f I find she was released to full-duty, it’s your contention I would just
cut it off and then she would not be due any more benefits?” Chesterfield County responded,
“That’s correct.” The deputy commissioner noted, and Chesterfield County agreed, that the
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“Defendants have no objection to me awarding temporary partial as of May 20[, 2013] if the
Employer’s application fails.”
The deputy commissioner found that Chesterfield County proved that “the claimant was
released to full duty as of January 2, 2013,” and therefore granted its application. However, the
deputy commissioner additionally concluded that “Dr. Valente’s records support a finding that
[Patrick] was restricted from returning to full duty for reasons causally related to the injury as of
the day she returned to work May 20, 2013.” Although Patrick did not raise the issue of
temporary partial disability benefits in her amended claim—which was notably filed before she
returned to work—the deputy commissioner found that “the claimant’s assertion, at the hearing,
that she had returned to work was an implicit request for temporary partial disability benefits.”
Consequently, he terminated temporary total disability benefits as of January 11, 2013, but also
awarded Patrick temporary partial disability benefits as of May 20, 2013.
The commission affirmed the deputy commissioner’s decision to terminate Patrick’s
temporary total disability benefits as of January 11, 2013 because it found no error in the finding
that she was released to pre-injury work as of January 2, 2013. With respect to Patrick’s
temporary partial disability benefits award, Chesterfield County requested that the commission
reverse and remand and allow it to be heard on the issue of partial disability because it had only
agreed to temporary partial disability benefits if the existing temporary total disability benefits
were reinstated. The commission found that remanding on the issue of temporary partial
disability benefits was “not necessary,” because Patrick “defended the employer’s application for
hearing by asserting she remained disabled, an implicit request for ongoing disability benefits.”
Relying on the opinion of Dr. Valente, the commission found that the deputy commissioner did
not err in finding that Patrick met her burden of proving causally related partial disability as of
the date she returned to work part-time.
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On appeal before this Court, Chesterfield County argues that the commission’s decision
to award Patrick temporary partial disability benefits denied it due process of law because
Patrick never requested temporary partial disability benefits and the parties only litigated the
issue of temporary total disability benefits. Specifically it argues that the commission’s decision
to treat the fact that Patrick had returned to work as an implicit request for partial disability was a
“post-hearing sua sponte amendment of Patrick’s claim,” which denied it due process of law.
Chesterfield County asserts that at the hearing before the deputy commissioner, the parties
stipulated that if the employer’s application to terminate total disability benefits was denied, and
total benefits were reinstated, only then did it have no objection to the deputy commissioner
modifying Patrick’s award to temporary partial disability benefits effective the day Patrick
returned to part-time work.1 Chesterfield County thus asserts that the only issue that was “fully
litigated” was whether Patrick was entitled to total disability benefits and, therefore, it lacked fair
notice and opportunity to defend the claim for temporary partial disability benefits.
The issue before this Court is very narrow. The sole question this Court must resolve is
whether Chesterfield County was denied due process of law by the commission’s decision to
award temporary partial disability benefits. While the commission’s factual determinations are
binding on this Court, Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227, 229, 409 S.E.2d 824,
826 (1991), whether the commission’s decision to award Patrick partial disability benefits denied
Chesterfield County due process presents a question of law which this Court reviews de novo.
See Nelson Cnty. Sch. v. Woodson, 45 Va. App. 674, 677, 613 S.E.2d 480, 482 (2005).
“Pleading requirements in administrative proceedings . . . are traditionally more informal
than judicial proceedings.” Sergio’s Pizza v. Soncini, 1 Va. App. 370, 376, 339 S.E.2d 204, 207
1
Patrick disputes that there was a “stipulation.” It appears from the record that rather
than a stipulation between the parties, Chesterfield County simply responded as indicated to a
question posed by the deputy commissioner.
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(1986). Thus, “‘while some degree of formality or the use of standardized uniform procedures
and forms may be more conducive to an orderly and expeditious process, rigid or technical rules
of pleading . . . shall not apply so long as the procedures adopted protect the substantial rights of
the parties.’” Nelson Cnty. Sch., 45 Va. App. at 679, 613 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Sergio’s Pizza,
1 Va. App. at 376, 339 S.E.2d at 207); see also Henrico Pub. Utils. v. Taylor, 34 Va. App. 233,
243, 540 S.E.2d 501, 506-07 (2001) (“In the context of a workers’ compensation proceeding, due
process ‘is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation
demands.’” (quoting Duncan v. ABF Freight Sys., Inc., 20 Va. App. 418, 422, 457 S.E.2d 424,
426 (1995))). “In other words, ‘the procedure utilized [need only] afford the parties minimal due
process safeguards.’” Nelson Cnty. Sch., 45 Va. App. at 679, 613 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting
Sergio’s Pizza, 1 Va. App. at 376, 339 S.E.2d at 207). “To satisfy minimal due process
safeguards, the challenged procedure must provide ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.’” Id. at 680-81, 613 S.E.2d at 483 (quoting Schwab
Constr. v. McCarter, 25 Va. App. 104, 111, 486 S.E.2d 562, 565 (1997)). Thus, “as long as the
employee’s application for benefits provides an employer with notice ‘of the potential issues in a
case,’ the claim will satisfy ‘minimal due process safeguards.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Paul
Johnson Plastering, 37 Va. App. 716, 723, 561 S.E.2d 40, 44 (2002), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 265 Va. 237, 576 S.E.2d 447 (2003)).
Chesterfield County relies on WLR Foods, Inc. v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 494 S.E.2d
147 (1997), to support its proposition that the commission denied it due process of law by
treating Patrick’s hearing testimony as an implicit request for temporary partial disability
benefits. In WLR Foods, Inc., the claimant’s application requested wage benefits beginning on
February 1, 1996—the application was never amended to encompass any greater amount of time
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and the claimant’s pleadings and testimony only focused on his condition after February 1, 1996.
Id. at 228, 494 S.E.2d at 151. The commission awarded the claimant wage benefits pre-dating
February 1, 1996. Id. at 226, 494 S.E.2d at 150. The “[e]mployer had no notice of a potential
award of wage benefits concerning any earlier time period until the commission rendered its
decision.” Id. at 228, 494 S.E.2d at 151. This Court found that the “commission’s procedure
‘precluded an adequate opportunity to defend [against an award for this time period] since it was
litigated only as [a claim for benefits beginning February 1, 1996].’” Id. (quoting Sergio’s Pizza,
1 Va. App. at 376, 339 S.E.2d at 208). “Had employer been on notice that it would be required
to defend against a claim for wage benefits during this time, it could have addressed this period
in detail and obtained additional information.” Id. at 228-29, 494 S.E.2d at 151. Therefore this
Court concluded that “[t]he commission’s sua sponte award of unrequested benefits denied
employer this opportunity and ‘fails to comport with due process notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’” Id. at 229, 494 S.E.2d at 151(quoting Sergio’s Pizza, 1 Va. App. at 376,
339 S.E.2d at 208).
This case is easily distinguishable from WLR Foods, Inc. Chesterfield County argues
that the only issue actually litigated was whether Patrick was entitled to total disability benefits;
however, given the assignment of error as framed by Chesterfield County, the only question
before this Court is whether Chesterfield County had “notice of a potential [temporary partial
disability] award.” Id. at 227-28, 494 S.E.2d at 151 (emphasis added). Unlike WLR Foods, Inc.,
where the commission awarded unrequested benefits for a period of time never contemplated by
either party, Chesterfield County cannot claim it was surprised by an award of temporary partial
disability benefits. As her employer, Chesterfield County knew that Patrick had returned to work
part-time prior to the hearing before the deputy commissioner. Patrick did not dispute that she
was able, and in fact had returned to work part-time. The nature of what Chesterfield County
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characterizes as a “stipulation” demonstrates that if the deputy commissioner terminated her
existing total disability award, Patrick was necessarily seeking a partial disability award as of the
date she returned to work part-time.
Moreover, Chesterfield County was not prejudiced by the commission’s decision to treat
Patrick’s testimony as an implicit request for on-going disability benefits. See id. at 227, 494
S.E.2d at 151 (“Where the commission modifies a claim at the hearing or review stage without
advising the employer in advance, ‘the dispositive issue . . . is whether the employer was
prejudiced’ by the lack of notice.” (quoting Crystal City Oil Co. v. Dotson, 12 Va. App. 1014,
1018, 408 S.E.2d 252, 253-544 (1991))). Patrick’s entire defense to Chesterfield County’s
application to terminate her temporary total disability benefits was that she was in fact still
disabled and was only able to return to work part-time as of May 20, 2013 due to the medical
treatment provided by Dr. Valente. Consequently, Chesterfield County’s evidence disputing this
defense, or alternatively disputing a claim for partial disability, are necessarily the same.
Furthermore, at the hearing before the deputy commissioner, both Patrick and Chesterfield
County’s counsel extensively questioned Patrick regarding the post-January 2013 treatment she
received for her injury.
In sum, Chesterfield County’s mistaken assumption that the commission’s decision to
grant its application to terminate Patrick’s temporary total disability benefits precluded an
additional finding that Patrick was partially disabled as of May 20, 2013, does not amount to
circumstances that offend due process notions of fair play and substantial justice. Chesterfield
County was on notice of the possibility of a partial disability award and had a fair opportunity to
present evidence that disputed her claim that as of May 20, 2013 she was only released to
part-time duty. Chesterfield County was not denied due process by the commission’s decision to
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award Patrick temporary partial disability benefits, and we therefore affirm the commission’s
judgment.
Affirmed.
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