Donna Reid v. Loudoun County DSS

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
DONNA REID
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 3074-99-4 PER CURIAM
JULY 18, 2000
LOUDOUN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Thomas D. Horne, Judge
(Nan M. Joseph; Byrd Mische P.C., on briefs),
for appellant.
(John R. Roberts, County Attorney; John W.
White, Assistant County Attorney, on brief),
for appellee.
(Ann B. Vance; Carr & Vance, on brief),
Guardian ad litem for the minor children.
Donna Reid appeals the decision of the circuit court
terminating her parental rights to her children Charles
Armitage, Harold Reid, Jr., Natoshua Reid, and Emelia Reid.
Reid contends that the Loudoun County Department of Social
Services (DSS) failed to present sufficient evidence to support
the finding of the trial court under Code § 16.1-283.
Specifically, Reid raises the following questions on appeal:
(1) whether the trial court erred in
determining that the twelve month review
required by Code § 16.1-283(C) ran between
October 1994 and September 1995, although
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
the juvenile and domestic relations district
court (J&DR court) order setting forth the
conditions was entered in December 1993;
(2) whether the trial court erred in
considering Reid's circumstances in the
twelve months after adoption of the October
1994 foster care plan when the emergency
removal order was subsequently dismissed by
the J&DR court on April 20, 1995.
(3) whether the evidence supported the
finding of the trial court under Code
§ 16.1-283(C);
(4) whether the trial court erred in
considering marital discord as a factor
against Reid;
(5) whether the trial court erred in finding
or considering Reid's visitation time with
the children because DSS controlled her
access;
(6) whether the evidence supported the
conclusion of the trial court that
termination was in the best interests of the
children; and
(7) whether the trial court erred in
reviewing the J&DR file when it was not
tendered into evidence.
Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude
that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily
affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
"When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128,
409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). "Code § 16.1-283 embodies 'the
statutory scheme for the . . . termination of residual parental
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rights in this Commonwealth' [which] . . . 'provides detailed
procedures designed to protect the rights of the parents and their
child,' balancing their interests while seeking to preserve the
family." Lecky v. Reed, 20 Va. App. 306, 311, 456 S.E.2d 538, 540
(1995) (citations omitted). "'In matters of a child's welfare,
trial courts are vested with broad discretion in making the
decisions necessary to guard and to foster a child's best
interests.'" Logan, 13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463(citation omitted). The trial judge's findings, "'when based on
evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless
plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'" Id. (citation
omitted).
The record demonstrates that Reid and her husband had a long
history of interaction with DSS. In December 1993, the J&DR court
found Harold, Jr. and Natoshua to be neglected and awarded
temporary legal custody to their paternal grandparents. In
September 1994, the children were removed pursuant to an ex parte
emergency removal order when two of the children were burned by an
iron. DSS drafted a foster care plan dated October 24, 1994, with
the goal of returning the children home to Reid and her husband.
This plan was filed with the J&DR court without objection on
March 2, 1995. Under this plan, the parents were required to
provide [a home with] ample space for
privacy and safe play. The caregivers need
to be sober and attentive to safety factors.
The parents need to be financially able to
provide food, clothing and shelter, and be
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able to identify financial priorities. The
parents need to provide for the child's
physical, intellectual and emotional needs.
The parents need to be able to negotiate and
problem solve without physical or verbal
violence and without destructive [sic] of
property. The parents need to demonstrate
an ability to work with professionals and
others in obtaining services for their
children, and be able to recognize when
services are needed. The parents need to
maintain consistent and predictable contact
with the child and provide financial support
for his care while the child is in foster
care.
That plan also identified the services provided to the family,
including counseling and parent skill building; intensive
home-based services; mental health counseling, including treatment
for substance abuse and domestic violence; day care services;
financial assistance; food assistance; financial counseling; and
referral for educational services for Reid. On September 13,
1995, DSS filed with the J&DR court new foster care plans, dated
September 5, 1995, with the changed goal of adoption. By order
entered May 22, 1997, the Loudoun County Circuit Court found that
the four children were neglected. The circuit court remanded the
matter to the J&DR court. In the subsequent appeal de novo from
the order of J&DR court terminating Reid's parental rights, the
trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing and issued a
nineteen-page opinion letter setting out its findings of facts and
conclusions of law. The trial court found that DSS presented
clear and convincing evidence sufficient to meet the statutory
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requirements of Code § 16.1-283. The circuit court entered an
order on December 9, 1999, terminating Reid's parental rights.
At the time the children were placed in foster care, Charles
was six, Harold, Jr. was three, Natoshua was two, and Emelia was
one. The children arrived in foster care in various stages of
neglect, both physical and emotional. All of the children needed
mental health counseling to overcome the effects of emotional
abuse and neglect. The evidence presented at the termination
hearing indicated that the children felt little sense of a bond
with Reid, with the exception of Charles, who displayed sadness,
anger, and emotional turmoil arising from his relationship with
Reid. The circuit court found that the children "have suffered a
want of interest from their mother when it appears such affection
was desperately sought," but that they had developed a sense of
permanency and security from the stability of their foster homes.
Twelve-Month Period
Reid contends that the trial court erred in determining
that the twelve-month period of review required by Code
§ 16.1-283(C) ran from October 1994 and September 1995. Reid
concedes that counsel stipulated to the appropriateness of this
period at trial, and points to nothing in the record where she
preserved any objection for appeal. Therefore, we do not
consider this issue further. See Rule 5A:18; see also Lee v.
Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 404 S.E.2d 736 (1991) (en banc).
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Circumstances Warranting Removal
Reid argues that the trial court erred in considering the
circumstances arising in the twelve months after the approval of
the October 1994 foster care plan because the emergency removal
order authorizing the children's placement in foster care was
subsequently dismissed by order of the J&DR court entered April
20, 1995. Reid did not include this objection in her exceptions
to the decree when it was entered. Furthermore, Reid did not
preserve this issue at the places in the record indicated by the
appendix reference in her brief. See Rule 5A:20(c). Because
Reid did not preserve this objection, we do not consider it.
See Rule 5A:18.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Reid contends that the trial court erred in finding the
evidence sufficient under Code § 16.1-283(C). Under the version
of Code § 16.1-283(C) applicable to this case, the parental
rights of a parent of a child placed in foster care may be
terminated if the trial court finds it is in the best interests
of the child and that the parent, without good cause,
[has] been unwilling or unable within a
reasonable period not to exceed twelve
months to remedy substantially the
conditions which led to the child's foster
care placement, notwithstanding the
reasonable and appropriate efforts of
social, medical, mental health or other
rehabilitative agencies to such end.
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Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). 1 Proof that the parent, without good
cause, failed to "make reasonable progress towards the
elimination of the conditions which led to the child's foster
care placement in accordance with their obligations under . . .
a foster care plan" is prima facie evidence of the conditions
set out in Code § 16.1-283(C)(2).
The record demonstrates that DSS provided services to
assist Reid and her husband beginning in 1992. Despite these
services, Reid failed to make substantial progress towards
improving her parenting skills, establishing a stable home life,
or becoming financially self-sufficient. Her employment was
sporadic, in part due to periods of incarceration. She briefly
participated in individual counseling with some regularity until
January 1995. She refused to attend parenting classes. When
Reid visited with the children, the visits were often marked by
little or negative interaction. With some regularity, Reid
failed to appear for scheduled visitation, or reduced the time
allotted for visitation by arriving late or leaving early. She
failed to respond to the attempts of Charles' therapist to
contact her.
Evidence from the mental health evaluators indicated that
Reid had limited insight into the needs of her children. She
lacked the ability to place their needs above her own. In a
1
The statute was amended in 1998.
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report dated September 1996, the evaluator, Victoria Lyle,
reported that, "even after intensive in-home services and
attempts to have her attend parenting classes, and address
parenting issues in therapy, [Reid's] basic interactions with
her children and her priorities have not changed." When Lyle
attempted to meet with Reid in 1998 for further evaluation, Reid
indicated she could not meet with Lyle. Lyle noted that
[t]his type of response . . . to an issue of
such obvious importance, has been a pattern
of behavior during the past several years.
This reflects, at best, continued poor life
management skills, and poor judgment in
prioritizing.
Reid contends that there were no standards by which she
could measure her compliance. We find no merit in that
contention. Over the years, Reid refused the assistance offered
by various sources. While Reid testified that she had made
substantial progress and now had resources to turn to for
assistance, she admitted to recent thoughts of suicide. She
also had no plans to parent the children immediately and
indicated that she wanted merely to retain the ability to
petition for custody in the future. Despite the years that the
children had been in foster care, Reid testified at the
termination hearing that she now was willing to learn to provide
for their special needs, if she was given more time.
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We find no error in the determination of the trial court
that DSS presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
meet the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C).
Marital Discord
Reid contends that the trial court erred in considering the
marital discord between her and her husband as a factor in the
termination of her parental rights. Reid did not preserve this
issue at the place in the record indicated by the appendix
reference in her brief. See Rule 5A:20(c). We find no
indication that Reid raised this argument before the trial
court. We will not consider an argument raised for the first
time on appeal. See Rule 5A:18.
Limited Access to the Children
Reid contends that the trial court erred in considering her
limited time and access to her children because DSS controlled
her access. Reid did not preserve this issue in the trial
court. We therefore do not consider this argument. See Rule
5A:18.
Best Interests of the Children
Reid contends that the trial court erred by finding that
termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of
the children. Reid did not preserve this issue at the place in
the record indicated by the appendix reference in her brief.
See Rule 5A:20(c). The cited reference does not raise the issue
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of the best interests of the children. Therefore, we do not
consider this issue. See Rule 5A:18.
J&DR Court Record
Finally, Reid contends that the trial court erred by
relying on the files of the J&DR court that were not tendered
for entry into evidence. This argument is without merit. Reid
did not object at the time the trial court indicated it would
consider the J&DR file. The Court of Appeals will not consider
a claim of trial court error as a ground for reversal "where no
timely objection was made, except to attain the ends of
justice." Marshall v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 627, 636, 496
S.E.2d 120, 125 (1998) (citing Rule 5A:18). "To be timely, an
objection must be made when the occasion arises--at the time the
evidence is offered or the statement made." Marlowe v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 619, 621, 347 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1986).
While Reid noted an exception to the final order based upon this
objection, she did not object at trial when the trial court
indicated it would review the files. Moreover, the Supreme
Court of Virginia previously ruled that foster care plans
introduced into the record before a J&DR court do not need to be
refiled upon an appeal to a circuit court. See Todaro v.
Alexandria Dep't of Soc. Servs., 226 Va. 307, 309 S.E.2d 303(1983). Therefore, we do not consider this issue.
The evidence supports the conclusion of the trial court
that DSS presented clear and convincing evidence sufficient to
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meet the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C), prior to
the 1998 amendments, and that termination was in the best
interests of these children. Since their placement in foster
care in 1994, the children have gained a sense of stability and
emotional well-being. Despite the availability of services,
Reid failed over an extended period of years to take the steps
necessary to meet the needs of her children. "It is clearly not
in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of
time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be
capable of resuming . . . responsibilities." Kaywood v. Halifax
County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d
492, 495 (1990).
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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