Ashley Jefferson Grissette v. Commonwealth of VA

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Willis and
Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
ASHLEY JEFFERSON GRISSETTE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0409-00-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
JANUARY 23, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
Donald M. Haddock, Judge
J. Amy Dillard, Deputy Public Defender
(Office of the Public Defender, on brief),
for appellant.
Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Ashley Grissette (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial
of breaking and entering with the intent to commit larceny, in
violation of Code § 18.2-91 and petit larceny, in violation of
Code § 18.2-96. On appeal, he contends (1) the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress out-of-court and in-court
identifications and (2) the evidence was insufficient to find him
guilty of the crimes charged. We disagree and affirm his
convictions.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I. Background
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party below, granting to that evidence all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).
So viewed, the evidence established that on July 6, 1999, Gloria
Burke-Vitalis (Vitalis) was working as a secretary in a second
floor office on North Washington Street. Richard Martin (Martin)
owned the only other office on the floor. Martin was away on
vacation and had left a key with Vitalis so that she could collect
his mail and place it in his office while he was away.
On July 6, 1999, Vitalis heard a loud thump in the hallway.
She opened the office door and observed appellant, carrying a
backpack, on his knees next to Martin's office doorway. Vitalis
asked appellant why he was in the hallway. Appellant stated that
he was a "personal injury client" of a lawyer with an office in
the building. Appellant was not in fact a client of Vitalis'
employer, the only attorney in the building. Vitalis told
appellant that the attorney she worked for would be back later and
asked appellant for his name. Appellant gave Vitalis a name, but
not "Ashley Grissette." The conversation lasted between a minute
and ninety seconds, and Vitalis returned to her office and called
the building owner to check the hallway to see if appellant had
left. Appellant was gone when the building owner arrived.
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The next day, as Vitalis was taking Martin's mail to his
office, she noticed that the transom window above Martin's office
door was missing and that the door was unlocked. The window was
found in Martin's office. Prior to being removed, the window was
located above the office door, approximately seven feet off the
ground at the bottom, extending another eighteen inches above the
door. Appellant's fingerprint was found on the outside surface
(the hallway side) of the window in the upper left-hand corner.
When Martin returned from vacation he discovered that several
bottles of alcohol and four blank checks were missing from the
office. Martin did not know appellant and had not given him
permission to enter his office.
Detective Robert Hickman (Hickman), obtained a photo of
appellant after his arrest. Hickman created a photo lineup by
choosing photos that looked similar to appellant. He chose all
African-American men of the same age, with similar head shape,
hair and facial hair. None of the photographs depicted an
extremely light-skinned man and four, including appellant, wore a
white or light-colored t-shirt. Prior to showing her the photo
spread, Hickman informed Vitalis that the person she observed in
the hallway might not be present. Vitalis concentrated on two of
the photos and concluded by choosing appellant. She had no doubt
that appellant was the man she observed on July 6. Vitalis also
identified appellant as the man she observed when she testified in
court.
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Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the out-of-court
identification and any in-court identification as impermissibly
suggestive because appellant was the darkest colored man in the
lineup and was the only one wearing a white t-shirt. The trial
court denied appellant's motion finding that the lineup was not
unduly suggestive, at least four of the individuals were "dark"
and three wore white t-shirts.
II. Identification of Appellant
Appellant first contends that the out-of-court identification
was inadmissible as unduly suggestive because appellant was the
only dark-skinned black male wearing a white t-shirt. "An
out-of-court identification is admissible if either (1) the
identification was not unduly suggestive; or (2) the procedure was
unduly suggestive, but the identification was so reliable that
there is no substantial likelihood of misidentification." Charity
v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 258, 261, 482 S.E.2d 59, 60 (1997)
(emphasis in original). A valid photo lineup does not require
"'that all the suspects or participants be alike in appearance and
have the same description, as long as there is nothing to single
out the accused from the rest.'" Id. at 261-62, 482 S.E.2d at 60(quoting Williamson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 57, 59, 175 S.E.2d
285, 287 (1970)). In the instant case, the photo lineup is
clearly neutral and includes six photos of individuals who
possessed "similar hair, facial hair, obviously black males
roughly the same age." All six have a similar "shape of the
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head." At least four of the men are wearing t-shirts, four of
which are light colored. None of the men has exceptionally
light-colored skin.
When Hickman presented the photo lineup to Vitalis he told
her that "[j]ust because I [am] showing [you] the sheet of
photographs [does not] necessarily mean that the person who did
the crime [is] on that sheet." Vitalis initially narrowed the
choice to two men pictured in the photo sheet and then chose
appellant after 10 seconds. Based on the record before us, we
cannot say that the out-of-court identification was unduly
suggestive.
Appellant next contends that the in-court identification
should have been suppressed because it was based upon the unduly
suggestive out-of-court identification. Since we hold that the
out-of-court identification was admissible and not unduly
suggestive, the trial court did not err in allowing the in-court
identification of appellant.
III. Sufficiency
Appellant next contends that the evidence was insufficient
to convict him of breaking and entering with the intent to
commit larceny and petit larceny. Appellant concedes that the
Commonwealth established that a burglary took place and items
were taken from Martin's office. Thus the only issue is whether
the evidence was sufficient to prove appellant was the criminal
agent. "The Commonwealth bears the burden of 'proving beyond a
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reasonable doubt each and every constituent element of a crime
before an accused may stand convicted of that particular
offense.'" Bruce v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 264, 268, 469
S.E.2d 64, 67 (1996) (citation omitted).
[Appellant's] fingerprint found at the scene
of the crime may be sufficient under the
circumstances to show [appellant] was there
at some time, nevertheless in order to show
defendant was the criminal agent, such
evidence must be coupled with evidence of
other circumstances tending to reasonably
exclude the hypothesis that the print was
impressed at a time other than that of the
crime. Such "other circumstances," . . .
"need not be circumstances completely
independent of the fingerprint, and may
properly include circumstances such as the
location of the print, the character of the
place or premises where it was found and the
accessibility of the general public to the
object on which the print was impressed."
Those attendant circumstances may
demonstrate the accused was at the scene of
the crime when it was committed. And if
such circumstances do so demonstrate, a
rational inference arises that the accused
was the criminal agent.
Tyler v. Commonwealth, 254 Va. 162, 166, 487 S.E.2d 221, 223
(1997) (second and third emphasis added) (quoting Turner v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 141, 146-47, 235 S.E.2d 357, 360 (1977)).
In the instant case, Vitalis heard a thump in the hallway.
Upon investigating the noise Vitalis observed appellant, on his
hands and knees carrying a backpack, on the second floor of an
office building which had only two offices on the floor. After
being confronted, appellant gave a fake name and claimed he was
there to see a lawyer. Appellant had no legitimate reason for
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being on the second floor of the building, nor for being in the
hallway outside of Martin's office. Appellant's fingerprint was
found in the upper corner of an eighteen inch high transom
window located almost eight feet high. The mode of entry into
the office was through the same transom window. The height of
the window indicates that it was not readily accessible to the
general public passing by the office. It could be reached and
touched only by "conscious and deliberate effort." The
identification of appellant coupled with the fingerprint found
on the transom window provides sufficient evidence to establish
appellant as the criminal agent in the burglary and larceny.
See Avent v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 474, 480-81, 164 S.E.2d 655,
659-60 (1968). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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