Automotive Indust., Inc v. Mary Ann Jenkins

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES, INC.
AND
EMPLOYERS INSURANCE OF WAUSAU
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0273-95-4 PER CURIAM
JUNE 27, 1995
MARY ANN JENKINS
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Cathleen P. Welsh; Wharton, Aldhizer & Weaver, on
brief), for appellants.
(Nikolas E. Parthemos; Prosser, Parthemos & Bryant, on
brief), for appellee.
Automotive Industries, Inc. and its insurer contend that the
Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that Mary Ann
Jenkins proved that her right-sided carpal tunnel syndrome is a
disease within the meaning of "disease" under the Workers'
Compensation Act (the Act). Upon reviewing the record and the
briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without
merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's
decision. Rule 5A:27.
The facts in this case are not in dispute. Jenkins worked
for Automotive Industries, Inc. beginning in July 1986. She
began to experience problems with her right hand in 1993 when she
started using a spraypaint gun at work. Prior to using the
spraypaint gun, Jenkins worked on the assembly line, putting
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
together automobile visors. In October 1993, she was assigned
the job of cleaning armrests. This job involved paring off
excess foam rubber with a small knife. All of these jobs
involved repetitive activities requiring Jenkins to use her right
hand.
On February 7, 1994, Dr. Janet M. Dougherty informed Jenkins
that the numbness and pain in her hand was caused by right-sided
carpal tunnel syndrome which was job-related. Dr. Dougherty
referred Jenkins to Dr. Stephen H. Martenson, an orthopedic
surgeon. Dr. Martenson agreed with Dr. Dougherty's diagnosis,
and he also concluded that Jenkins' carpal tunnel syndrome was
job-related. Based upon the medical evidence, the commission
found that Jenkins proved that her carpal tunnel syndrome was an
occupational disease caused by her employment.
In Merillat Indus., Inc. v. Parks, 246 Va. 429, 436 S.E.2d
600 (1993), the Supreme Court held that the Act "requires that
the condition for which compensation is sought as an occupational
disease must first qualify as a disease." Id. at 432, 436 S.E.2d
at 601. This Court defined "disease" as:
"any deviation from or interruption of the
normal structure or function of any part,
organ, or system (or combination thereof) of
the body that is manifested by a
characteristic set of symptoms and signs and
whose etiology, pathology, and prognosis may
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be known or unknown."
Piedmont Mfg. Co. v. East, 17 Va. App. 499, 503, 438 S.E.2d 769,
772 (1993) (quoting Sloane-Dorland Ann. Medical-Legal Dictionary
209 (1976)). The commission has adopted a similar definition of
disease. See Commonwealth, Dep't of State Police v. Haga, 18 Va.
App. 162, 164, 442 S.E.2d 424, 425 (1994) (citing Fletcher v. TAD
Technical Servs. Corp., VWC file 150-41-13 (March 12, 1992)).
"[T]he word 'disease' has a well-established meaning, and . . .
no significant disparity exists among the definitions of that
term promulgated by various authorities." Haga, 18 Va. App. 165,
442 S.E.2d at 426.
Credible evidence supports the commission's finding that
Jenkins suffered from a compensable occupational disease. In her
June 9, 1994 letter, Dr. Dougherty reported that, based upon
diagnostic tests and examinations, the claimant suffered from
carpal tunnel syndrome "which is a disease involving compression
of the median nerve causing weakness and paresthesias of the
hand." In response to a question posed to her by Jenkins'
attorney, Dr. Dougherty, using a definition consistent with the
definition of "disease" approved in Piedmont, opined that
Jenkins' carpal tunnel syndrome was a disease. Dr. Martenson
also diagnosed Jenkins' carpal tunnel syndrome as a disease.
Accordingly, the commission's decision is affirmed. See id.
at 166, 442 S.E.2d at 426.
Affirmed.
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