Rhonda S. McLaughlin v. Dean G. McLaughlin

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and
Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
RHONDA S. McLAUGHLIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1167-99-4 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
FEBRUARY 8, 2000
DEAN G. McLAUGHLIN
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Henry E. Hudson, Judge
Timothy S. Bird (Odin, Feldman & Pittleman,
P.C., on brief), for appellant.
(Dean G. McLaughlin, pro se, on brief.)
In this domestic relations case, Rhonda S. McLaughlin
(wife) appeals the trial court's divorce decree and order
awarding equitable distribution of marital property. She
contends that, contrary to the parties' agreement and the trial
court's previous ruling, the trial court erroneously valued the
marital property as of the date of the equitable distribution
hearing as opposed to the date of separation. For the following
reasons, we reverse and remand.
On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most
favorable to husband, the prevailing party below, granting to
that evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
therefrom. See Donnell v. Donnell, 20 Va. App. 37, 39, 455
S.E.2d 256, 257 (1995) (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App.
248, 250, 391 S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990)). According to a written
statement of facts endorsed by the trial court, Dean G.
McLaughlin (husband) expended approximately $45,500 after
October 10, 1997, the date of separation of the parties. The
money was used "to pay mediation and attorneys fees, the
mortgage and improvement costs on the marital residence, and
. . . child support obligation." Because wife alleged that
husband's use of the money constituted waste or dissipation of
marital assets and that he failed to supplement his discovery
responses, she filed a pretrial motion to change the valuation
date of the marital assets. According to the written statement
of facts, the following occurred at the equitable distribution
hearing on December 8, 1998:
14. [Wife] then moved the Court to change
the date the Court valued the assets of the
parties to the date the parties separated as
opposed to the date of the hearing in this
case.
15. After hearing argument from both
parties, the Court determined that good
cause existed for the relief requested in
the [wife's] Motion To Change Valuation
Date, and as such the Court granted the
[wife's] Motion.
Additionally, according to the statement of facts, at the
commencement of the hearing "[t]he parties agreed to equally
divide between them all of their assets as of the date of
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separation, namely October 10, 1997." (Emphasis added). The
trial court "accepted the agreement of the parties."
In its final decree of divorce, for reasons undisclosed in
the stipulation of facts, the trial court valued the marital
property as of December 8, 1998, the date of the hearing. 1
Because the record fails to indicate why the trial court used a
different valuation date than that agreed to by the parties and
previously ordered by the trial court, we reverse and remand for
a proper determination. See Luczkovich v. Luczkovich, 26 Va.
App. 702, 716, 496 S.E.2d 157, 163-64 (1998) (reversing
valuation of marital property because the trial court, without
explanation, used a different valuation date than the one
previously ruled upon by the court).
Reversed and remanded.
1
For example, the trial court ordered the following: "[T]he
parties shall equally divide the $56,492.46 representing the net
proceeds received from the sale of the marital residence as of the
date of the hearing in this cause; . . . ." (Emphasis added).
The trial court also distributed various savings and retirement
accounts with values as of the hearing date.
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