United Airlines v. Maureen Cogburn

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2081-95-4 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
OCTOBER 1, 1996
MAUREEN COGBURN
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
M. Lynn McHale (Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer &
Boccarosse, on brief), for appellant.
Christopher Paul Schewe (Cake, Rhoades &
Schewe, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
United Airlines, Inc. (employer) appeals the commission's
decision awarding benefits to Maureen Cogburn (claimant) for her
carpal tunnel syndrome. Employer argues that the commission
erred in: (1) relying upon flawed medical opinions; and (2)
finding that claimant proved that her carpal tunnel syndrome was
caused by her employment. Based on the Virginia Supreme Court's
decision in Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d
795 (1996), we reverse the commission's award of benefits.
Claimant began working for employer as an airline
reservationist on July 24, 1989. As part of her employment,
claimant worked on a keyboard for eight to ten hours a day. In
1991, claimant began to notice problems with her hands and
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
wrists. Claimant's problems became more severe, and beginning in
June 1993, she experienced numbness, tingling, and a loss of
control over the keys on her keyboard. She began treatment with
Dr. Jimmy Chow in October 1993. He diagnosed her with carpal
tunnel syndrome, identified it as an occupational disease, and
linked her condition to the repetitive motions she made in the
course of her employment. Dr. James R. Malcolm, an independent
medical examiner, disagreed with Dr. Chow's diagnosis that the
cause of claimant's condition was work-related and found that her
symptoms could not be directly linked to her employment.
In an opinion dated August 22, 1995, the commission
acknowledged the contrary medical opinions of the physicians, but
relied upon Dr. Chow's findings and concluded that claimant had
presented clear and convincing evidence that her carpal tunnel
syndrome was caused by her employment. The commission awarded
claimant temporary disability benefits of $282 per week beginning
December 24, 1993 and continuing.
The Virginia Supreme Court's recent decision, Stenrich
Group, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795, controls the issue of
coverage under workers' compensation for carpal tunnel syndrome.
In that case, the Court found that "the evidence conclusively
establishe[d] that [claimants] Jemmott and Martin suffer from
carpal tunnel syndrome . . . which all parties agree [was]
gradually incurred." Id. at 192, 467 S.E.2d at 798. Those
claimants, like the claimant in the instant case, argued that
2
their carpal tunnel syndrome was a compensable occupational
disease. The Supreme Court responded as follows:
[J]ust because a doctor opines that a
particular impairment is a disease does not
necessarily make it so. . . . [W]hether a
claimant suffers from a disease within the
contemplation of the [Workers' Compensation]
Act is a mixed question of law and fact, and
whether a proper definition has been used to
test the authenticity of a doctor's opinion
is a strictly legal question.
Id. at 198, 467 S.E.2d at 801. The Supreme Court held that
"impairment[s] resulting from cumulative trauma caused by
repetitive motion . . . must be classified as an injury, not a
disease." Id. at 198, 467 S.E.2d at 802. The Supreme Court
concluded that "job-related impairments resulting from cumulative
trauma caused by repetitive motion, however labelled or however
defined, are, as a matter of law, not compensable under the
present provisions of the [Workers' Compensation] Act." Id. at
199, 467 S.E.2d at 802.
Thus, under Stenrich Group, carpal tunnel syndrome is not
compensable under workers' compensation either as an occupational
disease or as an injury because "gradually incurred injuries are
not compensable." Id. at 194, 467 S.E.2d at 789. Claimant
suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome, and the commission erred in
awarding her benefits.
Accordingly, the decision of the commission is reversed.
Because we reverse the commission's award of benefits, the issue
of whether the commission erred in relying on certain medical
3
opinions is moot.
Reversed.
4