Joseph Johnson, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Bray, Senior Judges Duff and Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
JOSEPH JOHNSON, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0348-98-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
JUNE 22, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Benjamin N. A. Kendrick, Judge
Leo R. Andrews, Jr., for appellant.
Steven A. Witmer, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting a
copy of a prior order where the original was lost or destroyed.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in entering an
order on February 6, 1997, which vacated an earlier order. For
the following reasons, we affirm appellant's convictions.
I.
THE ORDERS IN CASES 93-321 and 93-322
A. The 1993 Charges
On March 23, 1993, appellant appeared before Arlington County
Circuit Court Judge Paul F. Sheridan on Case No. 93-321, charging
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
appellant with statutory burglary, a felony. 1 Appellant,
appellant's attorney (Evans), and the Commonwealth's attorney
presented Judge Sheridan with a "plea agreement memorandum"
under which appellant agreed to plead guilty pursuant to North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to the lesser-included
offense of misdemeanor unlawful entry. In exchange for his
Alford plea, the Commonwealth moved "to nol pros" Case No.
93-322, involving grand larceny. Without objection, Judge
Sheridan nolle prosequied Case No. 93-322.
B. The Expungement Petition and June 16, 1995 Hearing
On May 3, 1995, appellant filed a motion for expungement in
which he alleged the following:
That your petitioner, Joseph Johnson, . . .
. . . was arrested on the 11th day of
January, 1993, by the County of ARLINGTON
Sheriff's Department for "Statutory Burglary
and Grand Larceny" . . . .
2. That your petitioner, Joseph
Johnson, was innocent of any and all charges
aforesaid.
3. That on the 23th day of March,
1993, in the General Circuit Court of the
County of ARLINGTON, Virginia, the
Commonwealth of Virginia, by her Attorney
for the Commonwealth of the County of
ARLINGTON moved for a nolle prosequi of said
charges, which motion was granted by the
Court at that time.
1
The facts that follow are contained in a March 23, 1993
transcript that was made a part of the appellate record.
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There are no transcripts or orders regarding the
expungement proceeding. The only information about that
proceeding is contained in the April 29, 1996 transcript from
appellant's forgery trial. At that trial, Sheila Norman, "the
Assistant Commonwealth Attorney who handles expungements
usually," testified that, on June 16, 1995, she learned through
a circuit court judge that appellant's "expungement proceeding
was on the docket" to be heard that day. That was the first
time Norman was advised of the petition. After hearing
conflicting arguments from appellant and Norman, the trial judge
denied appellant's petition for expungement.
C. The Show Cause Hearing in Case No. 93-321
On June 16, 1995, the same date as appellant's expungement
hearing, appellant appeared before Judge Sheridan regarding "a
show cause letter dated March 9, 1995." 2 At that hearing, the
Commonwealth asserted that appellant "still owes $1,500 in
restitution." Appellant averred that his probation was
transferred "from Virginia to Maryland" where he had "been
making minimum payments of $50 to the probation officer" there.
Appellant stated, "And now that I am aware that this
probation has expired as of March 23, [1995] Your Honor, I would
2
A copy of the transcript of that hearing is contained in
the appellate record.
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be willing to – actually I'm in the position within the next 30
days to pay off whatever balance that exists."
The trial judge indicated that the Virginia probation
office requested that appellant's probation be extended. He
then ruled that he was "extend[ing] the probation to March 23,
1996 for lack of compliance" and because appellant's "probation
conditions weren't carried out within the time period."
D. The April 26, 1996 Forgery and Uttering Trial
On August 21, 1995, appellant was indicted for forging and
uttering the order in Case No. 93-321, the order upon which
appellant relied to expunge his record and the case in which
Judge Sheridan extended probation two months earlier. The
Commonwealth alleged that appellant visited the circuit court
clerk's office on June 7, 1995, and stole the original orders
from the file and the order book for Case No. 93-321 relating to
his 1993 misdemeanor conviction. According to the Commonwealth,
appellant prepared a forged order for Case No. 93-321 indicating
that the charges were nolle prosequied. The Commonwealth
alleged that appellant then substituted a photocopied forgery
for the original conviction order when he returned the file to
the clerk. At appellant's trial, because the circuit court had
no original orders from which to make certified copies, the
Commonwealth sought to admit a copy of the conviction order
provided by appellant's probation officer.
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Prior to the introduction of evidence at appellant's April
29, 1996 trial, appellant's attorney questioned how the
Commonwealth intended to prove the contents of the original
order that was allegedly stolen and replaced with a forgery.
The Commonwealth explained that it intended to present a copy of
the original order received from the file of appellant's
probation officer, Carol Hawkins, and to establish its
authenticity through the testimony of Hawkins and two circuit
court assistants, Vickie Separis and Beth Davis. 3 In support,
the prosecutor made the following assertion:
[The copy of the original order] will be
Exhibit No. 1. It is the actual conviction
of the defendant. Our evidence would show
that circumstantially the defendant took it
and destroyed it. The way that I would
prove to – intend to introduce it is because
Vicki Separis recognizes it that this was
the actual conviction order that had been in
the file before it was given to the
defendant.
She also got a copy of – the copy that
I am using was supplied by the probation
office because they kept a file of his
actual conviction order and then since then
they have requested the book and page
photographs entered from the Supreme Court
and as I've gotten the actual conviction
order and she has compared them, it is the
same thing now. And I am going to use the
presumption of regularity as to judicial
3
On August 31, 1998, we denied part of appellant's petition
for appeal in which he presented an argument regarding the
admissibility of testimony from Separis and Davis, and ruled
that "Code § 19.2-271 was not applicable" to bar their testimony
at trial.
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proceedings which apply here and the
presumption that this is accurate and true.
The Commonwealth's attorney further asserted that she was
"not trying to prove the contents" of the order. Instead, she
merely intended to prove that appellant was convicted in Case
No. 93-321 and that the case was not nolle prosequied as
indicated in the alleged forgery.
Defense counsel objected, citing Code §§ 8.01-389(A) and
18.2-391(C) as methods and procedures by which the order might
be made admissible had the Commonwealth sought to do so. The
prosecutor explained that the order could not be authenticated
and certified because "the original has been destroyed and they
can't" certify a copy.
Defense counsel pointed out the procedure in Code
§ 8.01-394 for proving lost records and argued that the
Commonwealth chose not to follow it. Following a brief recess,
the following colloquy took place:
THE COURT: Is this the copy that you were
referring to? Have I been given –
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, I was wrong.
The defense attorney had it at the time, and
when you asked if it had been certified, I
thought that it had been. It actually had
- this is a copy that was given to the
probation officer before all of this
happened back in 1993 so that they could
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start monitoring him and that was certified
at the time – from the original. 4
THE COURT: That changes things, doesn't it?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, sir, if that order
had a date – if the certification has a
date, I would agree with this Court. But it
doesn't have –
THE COURT: But [Code § 8.01-391]C doesn't
say that. C doesn't say whether the
original is in existence or not provided
that such copy is authenticated as a true
copy by the Clerk or Deputy Clerk of such
Court and dated. It doesn't say that.
The trial judge ruled as follows:
Well, I think this document as certified 5
satisfies the statutory requirements and
your objection is overruled, Mr. King, and
your exception is noted.
The prosecutor then informed the trial court of other
documents she intended to introduce for admission. She stated:
[T]he best way we should probably settle
this issue of the exception, is I have a
document that I will put in as
Commonwealth's Exhibit No. 2, will be a
photocopy of his actual nol pros order.
That also – that is not certified. It is
missing out of the – the original is missing
out of the file I believe and so I would be
introducing it not just based on its
certification but because it is something
4
Contrary to statements in the trial transcript, the copy of
the order provided by Hawkins and admitted as Commonwealth's
exhibit 1, contained no certification, no attestation, or any
indicia that it was a copy created from the original.
5
As previously explained, there is no evidence that
Commonwealth's exhibit 1 was certified. See supra note 4.
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that has been recognized by the Clerk. The
Clerk knows what it is.
Then the third thing I am going to be
submitting is the fake order, the
constructed order. And, of course, that can
never be certified. It's false. It is just
a piece of paper that was put in the file
. . . .
The following exchange ensued:
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, if you think
8.01, the section referred to was preventing
from [sic] introducing the nol pros order,
if it is not certified, I can ask that we
- I can get – now that they have gotten the
book and page from the Supreme Court, they
can use that as an original I learned during
the break from Ms. Separis. They can use
that as an original and I could produce a
certified copy and have that in my exhibits.
THE COURT: I think you should do that. 6
Separis, a court assistant in the circuit court clerk's
office, testified that her duties include "providing . . .
administrative support" and photocopying. Separis testified
that she saw appellant on June 7, 1995, when he "c[a]me into the
Clerk's office asking for copies of a file and [she] went to go
look for the file for him." Separis gave the files to appellant
who "had them for probably fifteen to twenty minutes." Because
of other activity in the office, Separis did not watch appellant
6
Despite the trial judge's belief that it should be done, at
no time during the trial did the Commonwealth's attorney
introduce or offer "the nol pros order" and "book and page" that
she presented was received from the Supreme Court and that the
trial judge agreed should be done.
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closely. According to Separis, appellant "asked for certified
copies of" the orders in the two cases, however, she "noticed
that they were Xeroxed." Separis testified as follows:
When [appellant] asked for a certified copy,
I told him that I needed to find the
original in order to give him a certified
copy because all this was was a copy and our
office policy is not to give a certified
copy of a copy.
Separis also noticed that "most of the contents of the file
were copies" and that the returned file "was pretty thin."
Appellant told Separis that "his name was Kevin Stevens," that
an attorney named Vernon Evans "needed [the copies] right away
for an expungement that was going to happen pretty soon," and
that he, appellant, could be reached at Evans' office. Separis
also testified about a "book and page" collection in which the
clerk's office maintains copies of every document. The "book
and page" collection is accessible to the public. When Separis
looked in "the book and page" compendium, the orders from the
two cases "were mysteriously missing." Separis later met with
appellant's probation officer who provided her with a photograph
of appellant and "the original that they received in the office
from our office of the court orders that were provided in those
cases." Separis identified Commonwealth's exhibit 1, the copy
of the order supplied by the probation officer, as "the original
sentencing order from case CR 93-321," and Commonwealth's
exhibit 2 as "the nol pros order that was in the case CR
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93-322." The trial judge admitted the exhibits without further
objections or comments.
Separis testified that, after viewing the photograph
provided by Hawkins, she realized that appellant was the person
who claimed to be Kevin Stevens. Separis also inspected the
judgment lien books and "observed that there were several pages
torn out," including a page containing a judgment written
against appellant.
Circuit court assistant Beth Davis testified that she was
typing an order relating to Probation Officer Hawkins' letter to
the trial judge advising him of appellant's "nonpayment of
restitution." Davis had attached Hawkins' letter to the two
files numbered 93-321 and 93-322 and placed the files on the
floor. When appellant entered the clerk's office looking for
the files, Davis provided them to Separis. When appellant
returned the files, "the probation officer's letter was gone."
Davis testified about what occurred after appellant returned the
files:
Just at that time when I was looking for the
probation officer's letter, the first thing
I did was just open the top file to see if
maybe it had been slid inside the file and
that is when I realized at the time that the
only contents of that file were all copies.
There were no original signatures of
anything that was there that I would assume
would be there before.
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Davis telephoned Probation Officer Hawkins and requested a copy
of the missing letter to the judge to attach to the order.
Carol Hawkins testified that she was appellant's probation
officer for his March 1993 conviction for which "[h]e received a
twelve-month, all suspended sentence . . . and two years of
probation with some special conditions." Hawkins identified the
letter she wrote to the trial judge. The letter referenced
appellant's name and "Case No.: CR93-321 & 322" and discussed
his March 23, 1993 sentence and the fact that he had failed to
pay court-ordered restitution. After the clerk's office
contacted her, Hawkins delivered her entire file relating to
appellant to the clerk's office.
Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Norman testified that she
represented the state in appellant's June 16, 1995 expungement
proceeding. At that proceeding, Norman disagreed with
appellant's contention that the charge was nolle prosequied.
According to Norman, the trial judge dismissed the expungement
petition after considering arguments from her and appellant.
Norman also identified Commonwealth's exhibit 7, a document
entitled "Motion to Lessen Sentence" filed on February 8, 1994,
in which appellant wrote that "[o]n or about March 23rd, 1993,
Defendant was sentenced a [sic] two (2) year probation, and with
an order of restitution to be paid."
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During the testimony of Separis, the trial court admitted
Commonwealth's exhibit 1. The jury found appellant guilty of
both charges.
E. Admissibility of Commonwealth's Exhibit 1
1. The Commonwealth's 5A:18 Argument
The Commonwealth contends that appellant is barred from
arguing against the admissibility of the exhibit because he put
forth a different argument in his reply brief at the petition
stage. In his petition, appellant contended, inter alia, that
Commonwealth's exhibit 1, the uncertified copy of the conviction
order contained in the probation officer's file, was not a true
copy pursuant to Code § 8.01-391(B) or (C). This argument
encompassed both authentication and certification. See Owens v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 309, 311, 391 S.E.2d 605, 605-06
(1990) (holding that "authenticated" and "certified" are
synonymous terms). In our order dated August 31, 1998, we
granted an appeal on the issue of whether "the trial court
err[ed] by not requiring the Commonwealth to establish the
contents of [the] missing circuit court order without
satisfying[, inter alia, Code] Sections 8.01-389 and 391."
Those code sections relate to the authentication and
certification of an official document. Because this issue was
before the trial court and argued in appellant's petition, we
will address the merits of the issue.
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2. Analysis and Discussion on the Merits
Code § 8.01-389 provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he
records of any judicial proceeding and any other official
records of any court of this Commonwealth shall be received as
prima facie evidence provided that such records are
authenticated and certified by the clerk of the court where
preserved to be a true record." "Code § 8.01-389 'codifies as
part of the official records exception to the hearsay rule
judicial "records" which are properly authenticated.'" Taylor
v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 1, 11, 502 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1998)
(citation omitted).
Code § 8.01-391(C) provides:
If any court or clerk's office of a
court of this Commonwealth, of another state
or country, or of the United States, or of
any political subdivision or agency of the
same, has copied any record made in the
performance of its official duties, such
copy shall be admissible into evidence as
the original, whether the original is in
existence or not, provided that such copy is
authenticated as a true copy by a clerk or
deputy clerk of such court.
The above-quoted statutes put forth the generally accepted
method for admitting official documents, namely, that they be
properly authenticated and/or certified as to their accuracy.
Appellant correctly asserts that, absent authentication and/or
certification, the Commonwealth was required to follow Code
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§ 8.01-392 or Code § 8.01-394 to replace the lost conviction
order. Both cited code sections offer methods for replacing a
lost original. However, if the Commonwealth was able to
sufficiently authenticate the exhibit, it did not need to rely
on Code §§ 8.01-392 or 8.01-394.
Our review of the record reveals that the record does not
contain sufficient evidence authenticating Commonwealth's
exhibit 1. Neither Separis nor Davis testified that they were
custodians of the records or that they were personally familiar
with the original order. 7 Likewise, the Commonwealth offered no
evidence that Hawkins was the custodian of the records or other
evidence through Hawkins establishing the exhibit's
authenticity.
3. Harmless Error
Although the trial court erred in admitting the
unauthenticated document, we find such error harmless.
When improper evidence is offered to establish a fact
overwhelmingly established by other competent evidence, the
improper admission of that evidence constitutes harmless error.
See Hall v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 198, 216, 403 S.E.2d 362,
7
Although Separis identified Commonwealth's exhibit 1 as
"the original sentencing order from case CR 93-321," the
Commonwealth elicited no information establishing the basis of
her knowledge, her prior awareness that appellant was convicted
in that case, or her firsthand knowledge that the exhibit was
accurate.
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373 (1991); Williams v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 53, 74, 354
S.E.2d 79, 91 (1987). The harmless error doctrine "enables an
appellate court . . . to ignore the effect of an erroneous
ruling when an error clearly has had no impact upon the verdict
or sentence in a case." Hackney v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App.
288, 296, 504 S.E.2d 385, 389 (1998) (citation omitted). An
error is harmless when a "'reviewing court, can conclude,
without usurping the jury's fact finding function, that, had the
error not occurred, the verdict would have been the same.'"
Davies v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 350, 353, 423 S.E.2d 839,
840 (1992) (quoting Lavinder v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003,
1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991) (en banc)).
In prosecuting appellant for forging and uttering a public
record, the Commonwealth was required to prove that appellant
forged a public record, namely, the photocopy of the March 23,
1993 order for Case No. 93-321, and attempted to employ as true
that forged order. See Code § 18.2-168. Under the common law,
forgery "is defined as 'the false making or materially
altering'" of a document. Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 227 Va.
171, 173-74, 313 S.E.2d 394, 395 (1984) (quoting Bullock v.
Commonwealth, 205 Va. 558, 561, 138 S.E.2d 261, 263 (1964)). To
convict appellant, the Commonwealth merely had to prove that the
original order for Case No. 93-321 reflected appellant's
conviction and that appellant altered the photocopied order in
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Case No. 93-321 to reflect that the charge was nolle prosequied.
Thus, the precise contents of the original order were not at
issue; all the Commonwealth had to prove was an original
conviction in Case No. 93-321. This fact could be established
by circumstantial evidence.
"'Circumstantial evidence is as competent and is entitled
to as much weight as direct evidence, provided it is
sufficiently convincing to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except that of guilt.'" Patrick v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App.
655, 662, 500 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1998) (quoting Coleman v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983)). When
relying on circumstantial evidence, the Commonwealth need only
exclude hypotheses of innocence that flow from the evidence, not
those that flow from the imagination of defense counsel. See
id.The record contains a copy of the March 23, 1993 transcript
from appellant's trial in Case No. 93-321. At that proceeding,
appellant entered an Alford plea after which the trial judge
found appellant "guilty in 93-321 of the lesser included offense
of unlawful entry in an indictment originally charging him with
statutory burglary."
The record also contains a copy of the June 16, 1995
transcript from appellant's show cause hearing in Case Numbers
93-321 and 93-322. The trial judge explained on the record that
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the hearing was initiated by Probation Officer Hawkins' March 9,
1995 letter informing him that appellant had failed to pay the
court-ordered restitution. Hawkins identified Commonwealth's
exhibit 4 as a copy of the letter sent to the trial judge. At
the top of the letter, Hawkins referenced Case Numbers 93-321
and 93-322. At the hearing, appellant admitted he had not
completed the special term of his probation.
Moreover, on February 8, 1994, appellant filed a "Motion to
Lessen Sentence" in the trial court. He referenced his motion
with Case Numbers CR93-321 and CR93-322. In that motion,
appellant wrote the following:
On or about March 23rd, 1993, Defendant was
sentenced a [sic] two (2) year probation,
and with an order of restitution to be paid.
Finally, Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney Norman testified
that, at the June 16, 1995 expungement proceeding, she told
appellant that Case Number 93-321 had not been nolle prosequied.
At that time, she told appellant that "it is [presently] across
the hall on the court's docket for a revocation hearing."
The record contains substantial circumstantial evidence
establishing that the missing order in Case Number 93-321 was an
order of conviction, not an order of nolle prosequi. Because
sufficient evidence established that the original order was a
conviction order, the Commonwealth did not need to have the
original order admitted or recreated to prevail. Accordingly,
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the admission of the unauthenticated copy of Commonwealth's
exhibit 1 was harmless error.
II.
THE FEBRUARY 6, 1997 ORDER
A. Background
On April 29, 1996, at the conclusion of the evidence, the
jury found appellant guilty of forgery and uttering and fixed
punishment at two years for each offense. The trial judge
sentenced appellant at that time to "two years in the
penitentiary" for each conviction and ruled that "[t]hese two
sentences will run consecutive to each other." The final order
was entered on June 14, 1996 and was silent as to how the
sentences were to run.
On September 4, 1996, appellant filed a "Motion to Modify
Sentence." In his motion, appellant stated that he "has not
been transferred to the Department of Corrections as of the date
of this motion, and pursuant to section 19.2-303, Code of
Virginia, this Court maintains jurisdiction over the judgments
in the above cases to modify the terms of the sentencing
orders."
In a letter to Circuit Court Judge Newman dated December
19, 1996, and entered in appellant's circuit court file on
December 20, 1996, appellant wrote the following:
I have been transferred to the Department of
Corrections on September 11, 1996, and the
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ability to correspond with the Court has
been impaired.
(Emphasis added.)
On September 19, 1996, the trial judge entered an order
stating that the two sentences imposed for forgery and uttering
"are hereby directed to run concurrent."
On February 6, 1997, the trial judge entered an order
vacating and setting aside the September 19, 1996 order. The
trial judge explained that the "order of September 19, 1996 was
entered in error."
B. Discussion and Analysis
Code § 19.2-303 provides, in pertinent part:
If a person has been sentenced for a felony
to the Department of Corrections but has not
actually been transferred to a receiving
unit of the Department, the court which
heard the case, if it appears compatible
with the public interest and there are
circumstances in mitigation of the offense,
may, at any time before the person is
transferred to the Department, suspend or
otherwise modify the unserved portion of
such a sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
"By its explicit terms, [Code § 19.2-303] permits a trial
judge to retain jurisdiction to suspend or modify a sentence
beyond the twenty-one day limit of Rule 1:1 only if the person
sentenced for a felony has not been transferred to the
Department of Corrections." D'Alessandro v. Commonwealth, 15
Va. App. 163, 168, 423 S.E.2d 199, 202 (1992) (emphasis added).
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"[T]he burden of proving appellate jurisdiction rests upon the
appellant." Id.The record contains no documents or transcripts showing
that a hearing was conducted on either motion prior to entry of
the orders. "It is basic that an appellant has the primary
responsibility of ensuring that a complete record is furnished
to an appellate court so that the errors assigned may be decided
properly." Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 189, 194, 390
S.E.2d 782, 785, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 240 Va. ix, 396
S.E.2d 675 (1990).
Not only did appellant fail to establish that the trial
court had jurisdiction over his case on September 19, 1996, when
it entered the order, the record shows that appellant was
transferred to the Department of Corrections on September 11,
1996, eight days before entry of the first order. In the
absence of proof that appellant had not been transferred to the
custody of the Department of Corrections, and in light of proof
to the contrary, appellant failed to prove on this record that
the trial judge had authority to act on September 19, 1996. See
D'Alessandro, 15 Va. App. at 168, 423 S.E.2d at 202. Because
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the September 19,
1996 order, that order was void. Accordingly, the February 6,
1997 order vacating the void order was also void.
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For the reasons stated, appellant's convictions are
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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