Craig Roland Browder v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CRAIG ROLAND BROWDER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1499-97-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
DECEMBER 22, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
James F. D'Alton, Jr., Judge
Mary Katherine Martin, Senior Assistant
Public Defender, for appellant.
Ruth Ann Morken, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Craig Roland Browder was convicted in a jury trial for
involuntary manslaughter, attempted murder, discharge of a
firearm within an occupied building, statutory burglary and use
of a firearm in the commission of attempted murder and burglary.
On appeal, Browder contends the evidence was insufficient to
support his convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm
the challenged convictions.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Whenever an appellant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we must view the evidence "in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Higginbotham
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).
The weight which should be given to evidence
and whether the testimony of a witness is
credible are questions which the fact finder
must decide. However, whether a criminal
conviction is supported by evidence
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is not a question of fact but one of
law.
Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598,
601 (1986).
1.
Involuntary Manslaughter
Browder contends the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for involuntary manslaughter because the death of
the man shot by Young, the store owner, was not a foreseeable
consequence of Browder's actions. Browder argues that "because
his weapon contained no ammunition," he "did not have the means
to kill anyone" and he "could not foresee that [his actions]
would lead to the death of a third party." We disagree.
As the Supreme Court previously has held:
To convict [an accused] of involuntary
manslaughter, the Commonwealth [must] . . .
prove that [the accused] committed "acts of
commission or omission of a wanton or willful
nature, showing a reckless or indifferent
disregard of the rights of others, under
circumstances reasonably calculated to
produce injury, or which make it not
improbable that injury will be occasioned,
and the offender knows, or is charged with
the knowledge of, the probable result of his
acts." The Commonwealth must also prove that
[the accused's] criminally negligent acts
were a proximate cause of the victim's death.
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Gallimore v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 441, 445-46, 436 S.E.2d 421,
424 (1993) (citation omitted).
Here, the evidence was sufficient to prove these elements.
It showed that Browder entered the store and fired a shotgun at
the store owner. Although Detective Lauter found no bullet or
pellet holes in the store, he testified that the shotgun shell
Browder fired contained gunpowder but no pellets. Lauter opined
that "[s]omeone that would take the pellets out of a shotgun
shell is really doing it to make noise and not really . . . to
shoot somebody." However, he further testified that a person
firing a shotgun could not determine, just by looking at the
shotgun, whether the shells loaded in the gun contained pellets.
That person would have to remove the shells and examine them.
Detective Lauter further testified that, if a person had
been standing close enough to the shotgun, "the [muzzle blast]
could [burn] and powder could embed in [the] skin," and the
cardboard or plastic wad "would enter [that person] just like a
bullet."
This evidence was sufficient to prove that Browder's firing
the shotgun could have killed or seriously injured a person.
Furthermore, no evidence proved that Browder knew the shotgun did
not contain ordinary ammunition. Given that Browder actually
fired the shotgun at the store owner, the evidence was sufficient
to prove Browder acted with wanton and reckless disregard of
others under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce
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injury. See id.Furthermore, the evidence proved Browder threatened "to kill
somebody" when he entered the store with a shotgun. He should
reasonably have anticipated that these actions might prompt the
store's owner or other occupants to respond in self-defense. As
the Supreme Court observed, "an intervening event, even if a
cause of the harm, does not operate to exempt a defendant from
liability if the intervening event was put into operation by the
defendant's negligent acts." Id. at 447, 436 S.E.2d at 425.
Therefore, we hold that the jury was not plainly wrong in
concluding that Young's firing in self-defense, resulting in the
death of a bystander, were foreseeable consequences of Browder's
reckless behavior.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to convict Browder
of involuntary manslaughter.
2.
Attempted Murder
"To sustain a conviction for attempted murder, the evidence
must establish both a specific intent to kill . . . and an overt
but ineffectual act committed in furtherance of the criminal
purpose." Wynn v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 283, 292, 362 S.E.2d
193, 198 (1987). "The state of mind of an accused may be shown
by his acts and conduct." Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App.
133, 137, 455 S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995).
The evidence proved that Browder entered the store, said he
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was "going to kill somebody," and fired the shotgun at the store
owner. Furthermore, no evidence proved that Browder was the
person who had removed the pellets from the shotgun shell or that
he was aware the pellets had been removed.
In addition, Browder's own evidence provided a possible
motive for Browder to kill. The jury could have believed beyond
a reasonable doubt that Browder was so enraged by his earlier
confrontations with Young's nephew that he armed himself with a
shotgun and entered the store seeking revenge. Upon this
evidence, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt
that Browder fired his shotgun intending to kill.
3.
Discharge of a firearm within an occupied building
It is unlawful for "any person [to] maliciously discharge[]
a firearm within any building when occupied by one or more
persons in such a manner as to endanger the life or lives of such
person or persons." Code § 18.2-279. "Traditionally, a firearm
is considered to be any weapon 'from which a shot is discharged
by gunpowder.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 354, 356, 429
S.E.2d 615, 616 (citation omitted), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 17
Va. App. 233, 436 S.E.2d 192 (1993).
Browder argues that because the shells he fired from the
shotgun had no pellets or other shot, no lives were placed in
danger. We disagree. The shotgun was a firearm as contemplated
by the statute. Gunpowder residue on the damaged merchandise
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proved that Browder discharged the shotgun inside the convenience
store. Furthermore, Detective Lauter testified that despite the
absence of shot in the shells, Browder's weapon discharged a wad
that would enter a person standing nearby "just like a bullet."
We have previously ruled that the "sho[oting of a] gun into
[a] ceiling while in close proximity to . . . persons within a
confined space . . . constitute[s] a reckless act that
endanger[s] lives." Strickland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 180,
182, 428 S.E.2d 507, 508 (1993). Therefore, we hold the record
contained sufficient evidence to support Browder's conviction for
discharging a firearm in a manner that endangered the lives of
those in the store.
4.
Statutory Burglary
Browder also argues that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain the conviction for statutory burglary because (A) "the
alleged offense occurred during normal business hours and
[Browder] had never been banned from the property prior to the
offense alleged," and (B) "the evidence failed to show the
requisite specific intent to commit the crimes outlined in [Code
§ 18.2-91]." We address each of these arguments in turn.
A.
"If any person [enters any shop in the nighttime without
breaking] . . . with [the] intent to commit larceny, or any
felony other than murder, rape, robbery or arson . . . or [enters
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any shop in the nighttime without breaking] . . . with [the]
intent to commit assault and battery, he shall be guilty of
statutory burglary . . . ." Code § 18.2-91; see also Code
§ 18.2-90. Browder argues that because the store was open for
business when he entered, he cannot be convicted of burglary.
However, we rejected that argument in Clark v. Commonwealth, 22
Va. App. 673, 472 S.E.2d 663 (1996), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 24
Va. App. 253, 481 S.E.2d 495 (1997), in which we held that "under
Code § 18.2-90, a person who enters a store [during business
hours] intending to commit robbery therein, enters the store
unlawfully" and is guilty of statutory burglary. 22 Va. App. at
674, 472 S.E.2d at 663. That holding is dispositive of Browder's
claim that he could not be guilty of burglary because he entered
the store during business hours.
B.
Browder next argues that, because the jury found he had the
requisite specific intent to commit attempted murder, he could
not have had the specific intent required to commit statutory
burglary under Code § 18.2-91, which requires proof of intent to
commit "any felony other than murder, rape, robbery or arson."
Code § 18.2-91 (emphasis added). If the evidence proved that
Browder intended to commit only murder, then his argument would
be persuasive. However, the record contained sufficient evidence
to prove that Browder also intended to commit two felonies other
than murder--discharge of a firearm within an occupied building
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and criminal assault. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App.
524, 527, 414 S.E.2d 401, 402 (1992) (en banc) (defining
"[c]riminal assault . . . [as] 'any attempt or offer with force
or violence to do corporal hurt to another'" (citation omitted)).
The evidence was sufficient to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Browder had the requisite specific intent
to commit both these offenses, each of which is a crime
encompassed within Code § 18.2-91.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we conclude the evidence was sufficient
to support Browder's convictions for involuntary manslaughter,
attempted murder, discharge of a firearm within an occupied
building, statutory burglary and use of a firearm in the
attempted murder and burglary. We therefore affirm Browder's
convictions.
Affirmed.
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Benton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the opinion except for Part A of the discussion
concerning statutory burglary and the ruling upholding the
conviction for statutory burglary. For the reason stated in
Clark v. Commonwealth, 22 Va. App. 673, 678, 472 S.E.2d 663, 665
(1996) (Benton, J., dissenting), I would reverse the statutory
burglary conviction and the corresponding charge of use of a
firearm in the commission of burglary.
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