Charlie Donaldson v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Lemons
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
CHARLIE DONALDSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1956-97-1 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
SEPTEMBER 22, 1998
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
Benjamin A. Williams, Jr., Judge Designate
(Robert R. Aldinger, on brief), for
appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Charlie Donaldson (appellant) appeals his conviction of
statutory burglary in violation of Code § 18.2-91. He challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).
This case arose out of an incident between appellant and
Andrea Grewitt on April 12, 1996. The evidence proved
appellant's relationship with Grewitt had deteriorated from one
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
of affection to one of acrimony. Appellant and Grewitt formerly
engaged in a romantic relationship and had one child together.
However, they ceased dating about one-and-one-half years before
the incident in this case, and Grewitt "had [appellant] in court
three or four times" about a legal matter the nature of which is
not disclosed by the evidence. A few weeks before the incident,
appellant asked Grewitt to "forget" the legal dispute between
them.
On April 12 at about 3:00 p.m., appellant arrived at
Grewitt's house. Appellant was wearing a cast on his foot at the
time and walked with the assistance of a cane. When they met,
appellant was on the porch outside the house, and Grewitt
remained inside her front screen door. They proceeded to get
into an "argument." Appellant was holding a "swiss army"
pocketknife in one hand and "talking trash" to Grewitt. Grewitt
testified that, during their exchange, appellant mentioned "his
son either getting some shoes [or] picking up some money." The
argument continued until appellant announced his desire to enter
Grewitt's house and Grewitt informed appellant she was "getting
ready to leave." When Grewitt attempted to close her front door,
appellant pushed her aside and entered the house. Grewitt took
appellant's cane from him, exited the house carrying the cane,
and called the police from a nearby phone booth. Grewitt
testified she did not give appellant permission to enter her home
and did not want him to enter her home. Appellant was later
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discovered by a police officer hiding in an upstairs closet
holding the pocketknife with the blade in the open position.
The weight which should be given to evidence
and whether the testimony of a witness is
credible are questions which the fact finder
must decide. However, whether a criminal
conviction is supported by evidence
sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt is not a question of fact but one of
law.
Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351 S.E.2d 598,
601-02 (1986).
In order to convict appellant of the crime charged in the
indictment, the Commonwealth had to prove that appellant broke
and entered Grewitt's house "while armed with a deadly weapon,
with intent to commit larceny, assault and battery, or any felony
other than murder, rape or robbery." 1 On appeal, appellant
concedes that he "broke and entered the victim's house" and does
not argue that the Commonwealth failed to prove he was carrying a
deadly weapon. Instead, his sole contention is that the
1
Appellant was charged with violating Code § 18.2-91, which
stated at the time he was indicted:
If any person commits any of the acts
mentioned in § 18.2-90 with intent to commit
larceny, or any felony other than murder,
rape or robbery, or if any person commits any
of the acts mentioned in § 18.2-89 or
§ 18.2-90 with intent to commit assault and
battery, he shall be guilty of statutory
burglary . . . .
The acts mentioned in Code § 18.2-90 include "in the nighttime
enter[ing] without breaking or in the daytime break[ing] and
enter[ing] or enter[ing] and conceal[ing] [one]self in a dwelling
house."
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Commonwealth failed to prove he had formed a specific intent to
commit either larceny, assault and battery, or a felony other
than murder, rape or robbery when he entered Grewitt's house.
It is elementary that where, as here,
the statute makes an offense consist of an
act combined with a particular intent, proof
of such intent is as necessary as proof of
the act itself and must be established as a
matter of fact.
Intent is the purpose formed in a
person's mind which may, and often must, be
inferred from the facts and circumstances in
a particular case. The state of mind of an
alleged offender may be shown by his acts and
conduct.
Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314
(1979) (citations omitted).
In a prosecution under Code § 18.2-91, proof that the
accused made an unlawful entry into the dwelling of another
supports the reasonable inference that the entry was made for an
unlawful purpose. See Black v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 838, 840,
284 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1981) (quoting Tomkins v. Commonwealth, 212
Va. 460, 461, 184 S.E.2d 767, 768 (1971)). The specific intent
with which an unlawful entry is made may be inferred from the
surrounding facts and circumstances. See Scott v. Commonwealth,
228 Va. 519, 524, 323 S.E.2d 572, 575 (1984) (citing Tomkins, 212
Va. at 461, 184 S.E.2d at 768). "The fact finder may draw
reasonable inferences from the evidence that the perpetrator
intended to commit one felony rather than another." Black, 222
Va. at 841, 284 S.E.2d at 609; see also Scott, 228 Va. at 524,
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323 S.E.2d at 768.
We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant specifically intended to assault
Grewitt with the "swiss army" pocketknife when he broke and
entered her house. Appellant's unlawful entry into Grewitt's
house supports the inference that he entered with an unlawful
purpose. The circumstances surrounding his unlawful entry
support the inference that his intent at the time was to assault
Grewitt. The trial court reasonably could have inferred that
appellant was angry at Grewitt from the fact appellant was
arguing with and "talking trash" to Grewitt moments before his
unlawful entry and from the fact their recent relationship had
been adversarial and litigious. The fact appellant displayed a
pocketknife in his hand while arguing with Grewitt and forced his
way into her home as soon as she attempted to end their encounter
supports the inference that he had formed the intent to
physically harm her with the pocketknife.
Although appellant testified his sole intent when he entered
the house was to look for his son, the trial court apparently
rejected his account. "The fact finder need not believe the
accused's explanation and may infer that he is trying to conceal
his guilt." Black, 222 Va. at 842, 284 S.E.2d at 610. As such,
for the purposes of appellate review, this rejected testimony
does not support any reasonable hypothesis of innocence.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the conviction.
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Affirmed.
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