Edward Hakspiel v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
EDWARD HAKSPIEL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0662-96-4 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
AUGUST 19, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
J. Howe Brown, Judge
Dwight F. Jones (Judith M. Barger; Office of
the Public Defender, on briefs), for
appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Amicus Curiae: Virginia College of Criminal
Defense Attorneys (Marvin D. Miller, on
briefs), for appellant.
Appellant, Edward Hakspiel, was convicted by a jury of
aggravated manslaughter. During sentencing deliberations, the
jury asked the court, "At what point in his sentence would he be
eligible for parole, i.e., if we sentence him for three years
when would he be eligible?" In response, the court instructed
the jury, "You should impose such punishment as you feel is just
under the evidence and within the instructions of the Court. You
are not to concern yourselves with what may happen afterwards."
The jury returned a sentence recommendation of seven years.
Appellant contends that the court erred in refusing to instruct
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the jury concerning the abolition of parole in the Commonwealth.
We disagree and affirm appellant's sentence.
The disposition of this appeal is governed by the recent
panel decisions of this Court in Mosby v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.
App. 284, 482 S.E.2d 72 (1997), and Walker v. Commonwealth, 24
Va. App. __, __ S.E.2d __ (1997). Appellant had no Due Process
right under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), to
have his jury instructed that parole has been abolished in
Virginia with respect to all felony offenses. See Mosby, 24 Va.
App. at 288-90, 482 S.E.2d at 73-74. And, under Virginia law,
except in the limited circumstances addressed in Simmons,
information concerning parole eligibility or ineligibility is not
relevant evidence to be considered by the jury. E.g., id. at
290, 482 S.E.2d at 74-75. Accordingly, we hold that the trial
court properly instructed the jury. 1
Appellant's sentence is affirmed.
Affirmed.
1
We find no support for appellant's further contention that
the jury failed to follow the trial court's instruction in the
present case. "[A] jury is presumed to follow the instructions
given to it." Pugh v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 369, 375 n.*, 355
S.E.2d 591, 595 n.* (1987). Appellant reasons that because the
jury posed a hypothetical question to the court which referenced
a three-year term, but, ultimately imposed a longer term, the
jury must have improperly and without accurate information
considered the issue of parole. The conclusion appellant urges
upon this Court rests on conjecture and speculation and is
insufficient to rebut the presumption that the jury followed the
court's instruction.
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Benton, J., dissenting.
By statute the General Assembly has mandated that "[a]ny
person sentenced to a term of incarceration for a felony offense
committed on or after January 1, 1995, shall not be eligible for
parole upon that offense." Code § 53.1-165.1. I would hold that
the trial judge erred in refusing to inform the jury, in response
to its question about the availability of parole, that parole has
been abolished in Virginia. 2 I therefore dissent.
I.
While deciding the proper sentence to impose upon Edward
Hakspiel, the jury sent to the trial judge the following written
inquiry:
1. At what point in his sentence would he be
eligible for parole, i.e., if we sentence him
for three years when would he be eligible?
2. What about time he has already served?
After the judge refused to answer the jury's question, the jury
fixed Hakspiel's sentence at seven years of imprisonment. The
jury's effort to determine Hakspiel's parole eligibility
conclusively establishes that the jury was uninformed about the
law and that the issue of parole had an impact on the jury's
decision to impose the seven year sentence.
It is error not to instruct the jury when the jury may make
2
"The essence of parole is release from prison, before the
completion of sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abide
by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972).
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findings based upon a mistaken belief of the law. See Martin v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 4, 7, 235 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1977) (per
curiam). After the jury asked about parole, the judge knew the
jury was unaware that parole has recently been eliminated in
Virginia. Under these circumstances, I would hold that the trial
judge erred in refusing to answer the jury's question. See
Walker v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___, ___, ___ S.E.2d ___,
___ (1997) (Benton, J., dissenting) ("The courts should not
permit jurors to sentence based upon the erroneous belief that
parole release still exists.").
To exacerbate matters, the trial judge responded to the
question by telling the jury "not to concern [them]selves with
what may happen" after the jury imposed its sentence. By
referring to parole as something that "may happen," the judge
implied that parole was, in fact, available. Moreover, the
jury's decision to impose seven years of imprisonment after
indicating that it was considering a three year term of
imprisonment supports the inference that the jury probably
concluded, though erroneously, that Hakspiel could be eligible
for parole.
It is true, as the State points out, that
the trial court admonished the jury that "you
are instructed not to consider parole" and
that parole "is not a proper issue for your
consideration." Far from ensuring that the
jury was not misled, however, this
instruction actually suggested that parole
was available but that the jury, for some
unstated reason, should be blind to this
fact. . . . While juries ordinarily are
presumed to follow the court's instructions,
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we have recognized that in some circumstances
"the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human
limitations of the jury system cannot be
ignored."
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170-71, 114 S. Ct. 2187,
2197 (1994) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). The trial
judge's response to the jury's question did not aid in
alleviating the confusion, and in fact, it may have misled the
jury. Thus, I would hold that the trial judge erred by providing
a jury instruction that was misleading. Cf. Blevins v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 622, 628, 166 S.E.2d 325, 330 (1969).
II.
The majority opinion essentially relies upon this Court's
recent decision in Mosby v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 284, 482
S.E.2d 72 (1997), and cases decided upon proceedings that arose
under recently abandoned sentencing procedures and before parole
was abolished. Although this Court in Mosby held "that in
noncapital felony cases a trial judge is not required to instruct
the jury that the defendant, if convicted, will be ineligible for
parole," id. at 286, 482 S.E.2d at 72, I believe that decision
fails to take into account the effect of the dramatic statutory
changes in Virginia law.
In addition to abolishing parole, the General Assembly
revised jury sentencing procedures to provide for bifurcated jury
trials in non-capital felony prosecutions. See Code
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§ 19.2-295.1. The new procedure under Code § 19.2-295.1
fundamentally changed the way sentencing proceedings are now
conducted before juries in prosecutions for non-capital offenses.
As a result, the reasons that previously justified depriving the
jury of information concerning parole no longer exist.
Under the previous jury sentencing scheme, juries in
non-capital cases would both determine guilt and impose a
sentence after a single unitary trial. The only criteria juries
could consider in sentencing were the range of punishment for the
offense and the facts germane to the commission of the offense.
"The theory of our [previous] unitary jury trial [procedure was]
that the jury [was] to sentence the offense rather than the
offender." Smith v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 721, 725-26, 292
S.E.2d 362, 365 (1982) (Russell, J., dissenting). Thus, evidence
of aggravating and mitigating factors was not admissible before
the jury at the trial of a non-capital criminal offense. See
Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460, 476, 450 S.E.2d 379, 389-90
(1994); Duncan v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 342, 345-47, 343
S.E.2d 392, 394-95 (1986). By contrast, under the new procedure,
"the Commonwealth shall present the defendant's prior criminal
convictions," Code § 19.2-295.1, and the defendant may introduce
relevant mitigating evidence. See Pierce v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.
App. 581, 466 S.E.2d 130 (1996). The new bifurcated procedure
therefore permits an inquiry that is significantly broader in
scope.
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In addition, within the context of the former unitary trial
procedure, the Supreme Court enunciated the rule that in a
non-capital jury sentencing "the trial [judge] should not inform
the jury that its sentence, once imposed and confirmed, may be
set aside or reduced by some other arm of the State." Hinton v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 492, 495, 247 S.E.2d 704, 706 (1978).
Significantly, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he aim of the
rule . . . [was] to preserve, as effectively as possible, the
separation of [the] functions [of the judicial and executive
branches] during the process when the jury is fixing the penalty,
in full recognition of the fact that the average juror is aware
that some type of further consideration will usually be given to
the sentence imposed." Id. at 496, 247 S.E.2d at 706. In
crafting the new sentencing scheme, however, the General Assembly
eliminated parole -- the mechanism utilized by the executive
branch to reduce juries' sentences. Thus, the need to separate
the sentencing function of the judiciary from the role of the
executive branch in granting parole is no longer a consideration.
The Supreme Court also reasoned in Jones v. Commonwealth,
194 Va. 273, 72 S.E.2d 693 (1952), that a jury should not be
informed of parole eligibility because "[s]uch a practice would
permit punishments to be based on speculative elements, rather
than on the relevant facts of the case, and would lead inevitably
to unjust verdicts." Id. at 279, 72 S.E.2d at 697. However,
because the law today is unambiguous -- parole is completely
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unavailable to all convicted felons -- the jury's consideration
of that fact would not be speculative. On the contrary,
informing the jury of the now certain fact that parole has been
abolished would eliminate the very speculation that previously
concerned the Supreme Court.
In view of the legislature's abolition of the long standing
tradition of parole and the new bifurcated jury sentencing
procedure, we mislead jurors and prejudice defendants when we
fail to inform jurors that parole is no longer available and
cannot be used to temper whatever sentence the jury opts to levy.
I dissent.
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