Stephen Carl Irick v. Joan Goodson Irick

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Elder and Fitzpatrick
STEPHEN CARL IRICK
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 0156-96-1 PER CURIAM
JULY 15, 1997
JOAN GOODSON IRICK
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge
(John E. Robins, Jr., on brief), for
appellant.
(Anthony S. Mulford; Davis & Brynteson, on
brief), for appellee.
Stephen Carl Irick (husband) appeals the equitable
distribution decision of the circuit court. Husband contends
that the trial court erred by accepting the recommendation of the
commissioner in chancery to award Joan Goodson Irick (wife) the
parties' jointly owned securities and $5,000. Upon reviewing the
record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of
the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
The evidence was heard by the commissioner in chancery. A
hearing was held on the parties' exceptions to the commissioner's
report, but the record on appeal contains neither a transcript
nor written order memorializing that hearing. A final decree
approving the commissioner's report, as modified pursuant to the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
hearing on the parties' exceptions, was entered on December 18,
1995.
The commissioner's report is deemed to be
prima facie correct. The commissioner has
the authority to resolve conflicts in the
evidence and to make factual findings. When
the commissioner's findings are based upon
ore tenus evidence, "due regard [must be
given] to the commissioner's ability . . . to
see, hear and evaluate the witness at first
hand." Because of the presumption of
correctness, the trial judge ordinarily must
sustain the commissioner's report unless the
trial judge concludes that it is not
supported by the evidence.
Brown v. Brown, 11 Va. App. 231, 236, 397 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990)
(citations omitted). This Court must affirm the trial court's
decision unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it. See McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 2 Va. App. 463,
466-67, 346 S.E.2d 535, 536 (1986).
The commissioner considered the statutory factors and the
evidence before making his recommendations. He noted that both
parties contributed monetarily to the welfare of the family,
although husband was the primary wage earner. All assets owned
by the parties at the time of the hearing were marital assets.
There was evidence that the marital residence needed $18,000 in
repairs, and that, while husband had maintained the house, "his
repairs were slipshod and incomplete." Wife testified that the
only source of heat for the house was a small space heater in the
wall and there was no heat in the dining room or living room.
There was evidence that husband used the proceeds from the sale
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of the parties' securities to pay off car loans and other marital
debts, as well as to provide himself with living expenses during
the post-separation period.
Husband was awarded two vehicles valued at approximately
$4,600, while wife was awarded one vehicle worth $3,000. The
parties each retained a one-half interest in the marital
residence, and wife received one-half of the marital share of
husband's retirement. Wife received the tangible personal
property in the home, valued at $3,250, and the parties'
securities, with an approximate value of $7,490. Husband also
was ordered to pay wife $5,000 within six months.
While wife received somewhat more than half the value of the
parties' personal and intangible property, that fact is not in
itself a sufficient ground to reverse an equitable distribution
award. "Virginia's statutory scheme of equitable distribution
does not have a presumption favoring an equal distribution of
assets." Alphin v. Alphin, 15 Va. App. 395, 404, 424 S.E.2d 572,
577 (1992). Based on the record before us, we cannot say that
the trial court's award was plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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