Carzell Benton, etc. v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Overton
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
CARZELL BENTON, S/K/A
CARZELLE BENTON
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1510-96-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
MAY 13, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
Thomas S. Shadrick, Judge
Theresa B. Berry (Samford & Berry, P.C., on
brief), for appellant.
Daniel J. Munroe, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Following a bench trial, appellant, Carzell Benton, was
convicted of possessing a fire bomb in violation of Code
§ 18.2-85. He contends the evidence is insufficient to support
his conviction. We disagree and affirm his conviction.
I.
The pertinent facts follow. Officer Phillips approached
appellant and his companion, Eric Kennerly, in a Virginia Beach
convenience store parking lot. Phillips asked who owned the
vehicle appellant and Kennerly stood near; Kennerly responded
that it belonged to his fiancee. Kennerly informed Phillips that
he was the driver of the vehicle and that the two men were headed
to New York. Appellant, who sat on the sidewalk at the front of
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the vehicle, told Phillips that the two men had been robbed in
Norfolk earlier that evening, and he inquired of Phillips what
action to take. During the conversation, Phillips noticed a
white plastic, cylindrical object, eight or ten inches long,
resting on the vehicle's passenger side floorboard. Kennerly
became nervous when Phillips asked about the object. To
Phillips, the object appeared to be drug paraphernalia. Kennerly
retrieved the object, and Phillips placed it in his belt. Based
on information provided by Kennerly, Phillips removed the object
from his belt, placed it on the ground and contacted the bomb
squad. Sergeant Batten testified as an explosives expert that
the object was a military artillery simulator and that the
labelling and tracking number on the device had been removed.
The device was later detonated safely.
Captain Foster of the Virginia Beach Fire Department
interviewed appellant with respect to the incident. Appellant
told Foster he was aware of the presence of the device in the
vehicle. Appellant stated that Kennerly had found the object on
the ground at a Norfolk gas station earlier that evening and that
appellant believed it to be a can of hair spray or a fire
extinguisher. Appellant told Foster that he did not realize the
object was an explosive device and that the men had taken it
because they were curious. Appellant stated that the men had
been staying with friends in Norfolk for two or three days and
had gotten lost in Virginia Beach on their way back to New York.
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He also told Foster that his wallet had been stolen when the men
were robbed in Norfolk earlier that evening and that he did not
report the robbery because he did not know the location of the
police station. Foster testified that Kennerly's account of the
evening's events was inconsistent with that of appellant.
Appellant testified in his defense. He stated he had come
to Norfolk to show his line of designer clothes. He stated he
had been staying with a friend of his in Norfolk, but he could
not remember the individual's name because he knew "a lot of
people." Appellant acknowledged that he was aware of the
presence of the fire bomb in the vehicle but stated he thought it
was trash that Kennerly had picked up and put in the car.
Concerning the robbery, he testified that only Kennerly had been
robbed, that he had been a half-block away at the time. He
stated he did not take a wallet with him when he left New York.
Appellant testified he and Kennerly stopped at the convenience
store to get directions to the Chesapeake Bay Bridge, after
driving around lost for over an hour. Appellant stated that,
intending to return to New York, he and Kennerly did not attempt
to report the robbery; they were concerned with the vehicle's
malfunctioning and did not want to stop for fear of being robbed
again. Appellant stated that he intended to report the robbery
when the two men reached New York. Appellant testified that,
following the robbery, he and Kennerly had only $10 between them.
When confronted with the proposition that $10 would not get the
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men back to New York, appellant stated that $10 was enough to get
to his aunt's house in Richmond. Appellant stated he never
contacted his aunt because he panicked after the robbery.
With respect to appellant's testimony, the trial court made
the following observation:
I would venture to say that if [appellant]
had just testified on the stand and the next
witness was sitting in the courtroom
listening to his testimony, the next witness
still could not give consistent testimony
with [appellant's] testimony.
I've had lots of people give false
testimony in this courtroom; and,
[appellant], I've got to tell you that you
rank right up there with the worst. Your
testimony is totally incredible -- totally.
The court convicted appellant of possession of the fire bomb.
II.
When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal
in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in a light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). On
review, this Court does not substitute its own judgment for that
of the trier of fact. Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239,
415 S.E.2d 218, 220 (1992). The trial court's judgment will not
be set aside unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong
or without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Josephs v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 87, 99, 390 S.E.2d 491, 497 (1990) (en
banc). "It is fundamental that `the credibility of witnesses and
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the weight accorded their testimony are matters solely for the
fact finder who has the opportunity of seeing and hearing the
witnesses.'" Collins v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 177, 179, 409
S.E.2d 175, 176 (1991) (quoting Schneider v. Commonwealth, 230
Va. 379, 382, 337 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1985)). Where the court
finds a defendant's testimony to be incredible, it is entitled to
infer that the defendant lied to conceal his guilt. Speight v.
Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 83, 88, 354 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1987) (en
banc).
The Commonwealth's case was built on circumstantial evidence
of constructive possession. "Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to support a conviction as long as it excludes every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence." Price v. Commonwealth, 18
Va. App. 760, 767, 446 S.E.2d 642, 646 (1994).
"To support a conviction based upon
constructive possession, `the Commonwealth
must point to evidence of acts, statements,
or conduct of the accused or other facts or
circumstances which tend to show that the
defendant was aware of both the presence and
character of the [contraband] and that it was
subject to his dominion and control.'"
McGee v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 317, 322, 357 S.E.2d 738, 740
(1987) (quoting Drew v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 471, 473, 338
S.E.2d 844, 845 (1986)). Neither proximity to contraband nor
presence on the premises where it is found is alone sufficient to
establish constructive possession. E.g., Brown v. Commonwealth,
15 Va. App. 1, 9, 421 S.E.2d 877, 882-83 (1992). However, both
proximity and presence are factors the trial court may consider
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in evaluating the totality of circumstances. Lane v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 713, 716, 292 S.E.2d 358, 360 (1982);
Brown, 15 Va. App. at 10, 421 S.E.2d at 883; Castaneda v.
Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 574, 584, 376 S.E.2d 82, 87 (1989). An
accused's knowledge of the presence of contraband "may be proved
by evidence of acts, declarations or conduct of the accused from
which the inference may be fairly drawn that [the accused] knew
of the existence of [contraband] at the place where [it was]
found.'" Hairston v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 183, 186, 360
S.E.2d 893, 895 (1987) (quoting People v. Pigrenet, 26 Ill. 2d
224, 227, 186 N.E.2d 306, 308 (1962)).
We find sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant possessed the
fire bomb. Appellant was a passenger in Kennerly's vehicle, and
the fire bomb was found on the vehicle's passenger side
floorboard. Appellant was aware of the object's presence in the
vehicle. Although appellant denied knowledge that the object was
a fire bomb, the trial court found his testimony to be totally
incredible. That finding is supported by the record. Appellant
gave conflicting accounts concerning his belief about the nature
of the object, the alleged robbery, his presence in the Tidewater
area and the "friend" with whom he had been staying but whose
name he could not recall. Appellant also offered an
incomprehensible explanation of his and Kennerly's plan to travel
to New York when they were arrested. The trial court was
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entitled to infer from appellant's "totally incredible" testimony
that appellant had lied about his knowledge of the nature of the
fire bomb, as well as the events surrounding his arrest, to
conceal his guilt.
The decision of the trial court is accordingly affirmed.
Affirmed.
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