Shannon Michael Breitbach v. Commonwealth of VA

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Bray
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
SHANNON MICHAEL BREITBACH
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1808-00-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
JUNE 5, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY
Daniel R. Bouton, Judge
Stephen C. Harris (Graven W. Craig; Graven W.
Craig, PLLC, on brief), for appellant.
Thomas M. McKenna, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
On appeal from his conviction of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of alcohol, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-266, Shannon Michael Breitbach contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Breitbach argues
that because the arresting officer acted outside his territorial
jurisdiction, the traffic stop was unlawful and the resulting
evidence was inadmissible. We disagree and affirm the conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
In reviewing the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible
therefrom. See Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 532, 507
S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998). Although we review the trial court's
findings of historical fact only for "clear error," we review de
novo the trial court's application of defined legal standards to
the facts of the case. See id.
On August 29, 1999, Breitbach was operating a motor vehicle
heading out of the Town of Louisa into Louisa County. Before
Breitbach had passed a point one mile from the town limits,
Aubrey O. Robertson, police officer for the Town of Louisa,
using his moving radar, clocked Breitbach's speed at seventy
miles per hour in a posted fifty-five miles per hour zone. At
that time, Officer Robertson's vehicle was located outside of
one mile from the town limits, but Breitbach's speeding car was
within that limit. Turning while still outside one mile from
the town limits, Officer Robertson pursued and stopped
Breitbach. Based on his observations of Breitbach, Officer
Robertson arrested him and charged him with driving while
intoxicated.
Officer Robertson wore a Town of Louisa police uniform and
displayed a Town of Louisa police badge during the incident.
Breitbach moved to suppress all evidence obtained upon the
traffic stop, arguing that the stop was unlawful because Officer
Robertson lacked authority to act as a police officer or to
operate radar outside one mile from the Louisa town limits. The
trial court denied the motion.
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II. ANALYSIS
Code § 19.2-250 provides that, in criminal cases involving
offenses against the Commonwealth, the jurisdiction of a city or
town "shall extend within the Commonwealth one mile beyond the
corporate limits of such town or city . . . ."
In discussing the purpose of predecessor statutes
substantially similar to Code § 19.2-250, the Supreme Court of
Virginia stated:
"Code, sections 15-560 and 17-139 do not
purport to extend the effect of municipal
ordinances beyond the corporate limits of a
city. They are statutes of enforcement of
the effective law within the area specified.
Their purpose is plain, that is, to prevent
the territory contiguous to a city from
becoming a refuge for criminals and to
confer on the corporation courts of cities
power to enforce the police regulations and
law of the area involved."
Squire v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 260, 261, 199 S.E.2d 534, 536
(1973) (quoting Murray v. Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 326-27, 64 S.E.2d
804, 808 (1951)).
Inasmuch as the purpose of the statute is the effective
enforcement of the law within the extended boundary, it is
irrelevant where the arresting officer was located when he
observed the speeding violation. The relevant question is whether
the offense occurred within the Town of Louisa's jurisdiction as
defined by Code § 19.2-250.
Citing Code § 46.2-882, Breitbach contends that because
Officer Robertson was acting as a Town of Louisa officer and
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wearing a Town of Louisa uniform and badge, he was authorized to
operate radar and to make consequent arrests for speeding only
within the one-mile radius from the Town of Louisa's corporate
limit. He argues that because Officer Robertson operated the
radar while outside the one-mile limit, the resulting information
was unlawfully obtained and could not serve as the predicate for a
lawful stop. He argues that Officer Robertson's stopping him was
thus unlawful and violative of the Fourth Amendment and that all
resulting evidence should have been suppressed. We reject this
argument.
Although Officer Robertson was located outside the one-mile
limit, he employed the radar to observe events within that limit.
So acting, he perceived circumstances that gave him probable cause
to believe that Breitbach was speeding within the one-mile limit.
These observations supported Officer Robertson's hot pursuit of
Breitbach. See Neiss v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 807, 809-10,
433 S.E.2d 262, 264 (1993). The resulting stop, observations of
Breitbach, and driving while intoxicated charge were thus amply
supported and proper.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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