Quinton N. Washington, s/k/a Quintin N. Washington v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Huff, Judges Petty and Beales
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
QUINTON N. WASHINGTON, S/K/A
QUINTIN N. WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 2023-15-2 CHIEF JUDGE GLEN A. HUFF
MAY 30, 2017
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Richard D. Taylor, Jr., Judge
Joan J. Burroughs (The Law Office of Joan J. Burroughs, PLC, on
brief), for appellant.
Elizabeth Kiernan Fitzgerald, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Quinton N. Washington (“appellant”) appeals his convictions of second-degree murder,
in violation of Code § 18.2-32, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in
violation of Code § 18.2-53.1. Following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond (“trial court”), appellant was sentenced to twenty-one years’ incarceration. On
appeal, appellant contends that the trial court erred in four respects:
I. The trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth’s
Motion in Limine and thereby disallowing [appellant] to
present evidence regarding [Marquis] Richardson’s
[“Richardson”] prior bad acts, where such evidence was
relevant and admissible since it was offered to prove
whether or not [appellant’s] fears of Richardson were
reasonable.
II. The trial court erred by sustaining the Commonwealth’s
objections to defense counsel’s questions of LaDonah
Johnson [“Johnson”] about whether she had ever seen
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Richardson with a gun or known Richardson to own a gun,
where the answers to such questions were relevant since
they tended to prove whether or not [appellant’s] fears of
Richardson were reasonable.
III. The trial court erred by denying [appellant’s] motion to set
aside the jury’s verdict and finding the evidence sufficient
to prove that [appellant] was guilty of second-degree
murder, where [appellant] plainly showed that he was
acting in self-defense.
IV. The trial court erred by denying [appellant’s] motion to set
aside the jury’s verdict and finding the evidence sufficient
to prove that [appellant] was guilty of second-degree
murder where the facts clearly indicated that he acted
without malice and aforethought.
For the following reasons, this Court affirms appellant’s convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
The offense
On appeal, “we consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences flowing from that
evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.”
Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442, 642 S.E.2d 295, 296 (2007) (en banc)
(quoting Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666, 672, 594 S.E.2d 595, 598 (2004)).
So viewed, the Commonwealth’s evidence was that on the evening of October 3, 2013,
Johnson had driven to a pharmacy parking lot to meet appellant so that she could transfer
physical custody of their son, Q.W., to appellant. Richardson, Johnson’s boyfriend,
accompanied her and Q.W. While they waited for appellant to arrive, Richardson began
smoking a cigarette.
After appellant arrived, Johnson transferred Q.W.’s belongings to appellant’s trunk.
During this time, appellant exited his vehicle and began yelling at her, “Why the ‘f’ you got him
smoking around my son. Didn’t I tell you not to have him smoking around my son[?]”
Appellant then walked over to Richardson, who was seated in the front passenger’s seat of
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Johnson’s car, and yelled, “Didn’t I ask you not to smoke around my son. . . . Why the ‘f’ you
smoking around my son . . . I told you not to smoke around him. My son just came from the
hospital.”
Richardson calmly responded to appellant that the smoke was not bothering Q.W.
because the windows were down. Appellant replied, “I don’t give an ‘f’ about no ‘mf’n’ window
being down.” Appellant then “yanked the door open[]” with such force that the door handle
came off, and tried to pull Richardson out of the vehicle. A struggle ensued, and Richardson
pushed appellant out of the car. Johnson attempted to insert herself between appellant and
Richardson and while her back was toward Richardson, she noticed appellant holding a gun.
Johnson screamed, “Stop, no, no, no.” A witness, standing approximately fifty feet away, noted
that Richardson had a frightened expression as he attempted to “climb away” from appellant to
the driver’s side of the vehicle.
Appellant pushed Johnson out of his way, stepped closer to the vehicle, and shot
Richardson two or three times. Richardson fell back; appellant turned his back on Richardson
and walked away, saying “he pulled a gun out on me.” After walking twenty or thirty feet,
appellant turned around, walked back to Richardson’s door, and discharged another “four or
five” shots into the vehicle. After this second round of shots, appellant loudly stated, “He pulled
out a gun on me first. I was defending my son.”
Richardson died as a result of gunshot wounds to his torso and head. Appellant had
discharged a total of seven bullets, three of which were lethal, using a semi-automatic pistol that
required appellant to pull the trigger before each shot was fired.
Pretrial motions
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to admit evidence of prior bad acts and gang
affiliation/membership “to show [Richardson’s] propensity for turbulence and violence.” The
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Commonwealth responded with a motion in limine to preclude the admission of such evidence.
The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, reasoning that Richardson’s gang
affiliation, without more, was not relevant and that his prior bad acts were not sufficiently
“related in time, place, and circumstance” to the factual circumstances at issue.
Trial
During trial, Johnson testified that she had not seen Richardson with a gun on the day of
the shooting nor on any previous occasion. In response, defense counsel asked Johnson to
confirm that her testimony had been that “[she had] never heard of [Richardson] having a
firearm.” Johnson clarified that her testimony on direct, had been that she had never seen
Richardson with a gun. The Commonwealth objected, and the trial court sustained the objection
“because it was a different question.” The trial court suggested defense counsel rephrase the
question. Nevertheless, defense counsel continued asking questions premised on the witness’
knowledge regarding Richardson having a gun. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s
repeated objection.
After the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, appellant moved to strike, arguing that
there was no evidence of malice because the firearm could only have originated from Johnson’s
vehicle. The trial court denied the motion, and appellant presented his evidence.
In addition to testimony of another witness, appellant testified in his own defense.
Appellant stated that he and Richardson “never had no problems before” but that he became
angry because Richardson was smoking around Q.W. According to appellant, Richardson had
been “fidgeting or pulling something out” and when appellant looked into the vehicle,
Richardson was pointing a gun at him through the door. Appellant then “snatched the door
open,” and the men began to struggle over the gun. After appellant removed the gun from
Richardson’s grasp, he saw Richardson reach for the other side of the car. Appellant testified
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that he believed Richardson was reaching for “something else” so he shot Richardson.
According to appellant, “next thing you know . . . the door flew open and I shot again. I didn’t
know it happened too fast. I didn’t want to kill nobody.”
Contrary to the testimony of other witnesses, appellant stated that he never walked away
from the vehicle. Instead, appellant testified that he was frightened, did not know what
Richardson was doing, and “[he] just reacted. It won’t no time to think. It was just a reaction.”
Appellant also admitted, however, that he did not see another weapon nor did Richardson
verbally threaten him at any point. After the close of all the evidence, appellant renewed his
motion to strike, which the trial court denied.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty on the charges of second-degree murder and use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Procedural Default
The Commonwealth argues that appellant’s first assignment of error—the admissibility
of Richardson’s prior bad acts to show appellant’s reasonable apprehension—should be
procedurally defaulted. Specifically, the Commonwealth contends that contrary to appellant’s
argument on appeal, “the thrust of [appellant’s] argument to the trial court was consistently that
specific bad acts should come in to show . . . which person was the aggressor.”
Under Rule 5A:18, “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling.”
Importantly, “[t]he primary function of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial judge to possible error so
that the judge may consider the issue intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to
avoid unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524,
530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992) (quoting Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 480,
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405 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1991) (en banc)). Once this function has been achieved, “the minimum amount
of specificity necessary to fulfill the requirements of Rule 5A:18” has been met. Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303, 314 n.2, 709 S.E.2d 175, 181 n.2 (2011) (finding that Rule
5A:18 was satisfied where the appellant referenced the issue in his closing argument).
In this case, appellant’s assignment of error was sufficiently preserved. Before the trial
court, appellant argued that the prior acts were admissible to determine “who the initial aggressor
was; . . . [and] the reasonable apprehension that [appellant] may have experienced and on the
likelihood of the decedent’s aggressive behavior.” The trial court ruled that the acts were
inadmissible “in and of [themselves]” because they were too remote in time, place, and
circumstance to show “that [Richardson] was the aggressor and self-defense.” Appellant’s
argument is similar on appeal, contending again that these facts, in and of themselves, were
admissible to show Richardson’s likely behavior and appellant’s reasonable apprehension during
the altercation. Thus, this Court will consider the merits of his appeal.
B. Merits
On appeal, appellant groups his four assignments of error into two categories:
(1) Richardson’s prior bad acts, including Johnson’s testimony concerning whether Richardson
was known to have a gun, were admissible to demonstrate that appellant’s apprehensions were
reasonable; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to convict appellant of second-degree murder
when self-defense was proven and there was no evidence of malice or aforethought. This
opinion addresses each in turn.
1. Admissibility of prior bad acts
a. Standard of Review
“Decisions involving the admission of evidence are reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion.” Booker v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 35, 40, 723 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2012).
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“[T]he [trial] court has a range of choice, and . . . its decision will not be disturbed as long as it
stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Lawlor v. Commonwealth,
285 Va. 187, 212-13, 738 S.E.2d 847, 861 (2013) (omission in original) (quoting Landrum v.
Chippenham & Johnston-Willis Hosps., Inc., 282 Va. 346, 352, 717 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2011)).
b. Reasonable apprehension of appellant
As a general rule, “[e]vidence of a person’s character or character trait is not admissible
for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.” Va. R. Evid.
2:404. Under an exception to this rule, however, “[a] criminal defendant may offer evidence
regarding the victim’s character for violence, turbulence, or aggression for two purposes: (1) to
show ‘who was the aggressor’1 or (2) to show ‘the reasonable apprehensions of the defendant for
his life and safety.’” Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 629, 640, 491 S.E.2d 747, 752
(1997) (quoting Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 265, 56 S.E.2d 226, 230 (1949)). As
to the reasonable apprehension of the defendant, “[t]he true solution is to exercise a discretion,
and to admit such facts when common sense tells us that they could legitimately affect a
defendant’s apprehensions.” Randolph, 190 Va. at 265, 56 S.E.2d at 230 (quoting 2 Wigmore,
Evidence § 248 (3d ed. 1940)).
“A defendant may always act upon reasonable appearance of danger, and whether the
danger is reasonably apparent is always to be determined from the viewpoint of the defendant at
the time he acted.” McGhee v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 560, 562, 248 S.E.2d 808, 810 (1978)
(emphasis added). “[F]acts . . . not known to the defendant at the time of the shooting . . . could
not have affected his state of mind or the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to him at
that crucial time.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 226, 229, 228 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1976).
1
Appellant concedes that he was the initial aggressor.
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In order for Richardson’s character for violence to have affected appellant’s
apprehensions, appellant must have known of this character for violence at the time he acted.
Instead, appellant testified that until October 3, 2013, he had not had any problems with
Richardson and appellant did not otherwise indicate that he was aware of Richardson’s gang
affiliation, reputation for possessing a firearm, or other prior bad acts. Without some indication
that appellant was aware of Richardson’s character for violence, “common sense tells us that
[these facts] could [not have] legitimately affect[ed] [appellant’s] apprehensions” at the time he
shot Richardson. See Randolph, 190 Va. at 265, 56 S.E.2d at 230. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in excluding evidence of Richardson’s character for violence offered to prove that
appellant had a reasonable apprehension for his life and safety.
2. Sufficient evidence of malice
a. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the Court will
affirm the judgment unless the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.”
Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008). “[T]he relevant
question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193, 677 S.E.2d
280, 282 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). This deferential
standard requires this Court to “discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the
Commonwealth, and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and
all fair inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132, 137, 82
S.E.2d 603, 606 (1954).
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b. Malice aforethought
The law is well-established in Virginia that proof of malice is required to sustain a
murder conviction.
Criminal homicides in Virginia are classified as follows:
1. Capital murder,
2. First-degree murder,
3. Second-degree murder,
4. Voluntary manslaughter, and
5. Involuntary manslaughter.
Malice, a requisite element for murder of any kind, is unnecessary
in manslaughter cases and is the touchstone by which murder and
manslaughter cases are distinguished.
Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 280, 322 S.E.2d 216, 219-20 (1984).
Malice may be either express or implied by conduct. Whether the
defendant acted with malice is a question for the trier of fact.
“Express malice is evidenced when ‘one person kills another with
a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design.’ . . . . Implied malice
exists when any purposeful, cruel act is committed by one
individual against another without any, or without great
provocation; . . . .”
Id. at 280, 322 S.E.2d at 220 (emphasis removed) (omissions in original) (quoting Pugh v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 663, 668, 292 S.E.2d 339, 341 (1982)).
“Moreover, ‘malice is implied by law from any deliberate, willful, and cruel act against
another, however sudden.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 240, 251-52, 767 S.E.2d
252, 258 (2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Epperly v. Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 231, 294
S.E.2d 882, 892 (1982)). “It is the will and purpose to kill, not necessarily the interval of time,
which determine the grade of the offense.” Epperly, 224 Va. at 231, 294 S.E.2d at 892 (quoting
Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 700-01, 261 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1980)).
Finally,
[t]he jury [is] not required to accept the defendant’s statement as to
how the killing occurred simply because the defendant said it
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happened that way and no witnesses testified to the contrary. If
from the improbability of his story and his manner of relating it, or
from its contradictions within itself, or by the attending facts and
circumstances, the jury are convinced that he is not speaking the
truth, they may reject his testimony, even though his reputation for
truth is not attacked and he is not contradicted by other witnesses.
Randolph, 190 Va. at 263, 56 S.E.2d at 229. “In its role of judging witness credibility, the fact
finder is entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the
accused is lying to conceal his guilt.” Marable v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500
S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998).
In this case, the evidence was sufficient to find that appellant acted maliciously. Even if
the firearm originated from Richardson as appellant suggests, the fact that appellant shot
Richardson two or three times after disarming him, walked twenty to thirty feet away, then
turned and shot Richardson four or five more times within a close range, could lead a reasonable
fact finder to conclude that appellant’s conduct was that of a “sedate, deliberate mind” or at least
“a purposeful, cruel act . . . committed . . . without great provocation.” See Essex, 228 Va. at
280, 322 S.E.2d at 220 (quoting Pugh, 223 Va. at 668, 292 S.E.2d at 341). Furthermore, the fact
finder was entitled to disbelieve appellant’s self-serving account of events and was free to
believe that appellant’s version was designed to conceal his guilt. Accordingly, the trial court
did not err in denying appellant’s motion to set aside the verdict.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms appellant’s convictions.
Affirmed.
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