Commonwealth v. Victor Perry

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Clements and Felton
Argued by teleconference
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1488-03-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
OCTOBER 28, 2003
VICTOR PERRY
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
J. Leyburn Mosby, Jr., Judge
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellant.
Mark J. Peake (Caskie & Frost, on brief), for appellee.
Victor Perry (defendant) stands indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to
distribute. Pursuant to Code § 19.2-398, the Commonwealth appeals a pretrial ruling granting
defendant's motion to suppress all evidence resulting from a search of his residence. The trial
court ruled that defendant's consent was coerced and, thus, that the search was unreasonable.
The totality of the circumstances, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, supports the
trial court's finding that his consent was not voluntary. Thus, we affirm the trial court's granting
of the motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion if the
Commonwealth be so advised.
On appeal of the granting of a motion to suppress, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the defendant, the prevailing party below, granting to the evidence all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067,
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). "[W]e are bound by the trial court's findings of historical fact unless
'plainly wrong' or without evidence to support them[,] and we give due weight to the inferences
drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers." McGee v.
Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (citing Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1659, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
The Fourth Amendment requires "that a consent [to a search] not be coerced, by explicit
or implicit means . . . ." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2048, 36
L. Ed. 2d 854 (1973). In order to determine whether consent to a particular search was
"voluntary," the test is whether the search is "the product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice" or whether the consenter's "will has been overborne and his capacity for
self-determination critically impaired." Id. at 225-26, 229, 93 S. Ct. at 2047, 2049. "[T]he
question whether a consent to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or
coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances." Id. at 227, 93 S. Ct. at 2047-48. The Commonwealth bears the burden of
proving voluntariness of consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S. Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L. Ed. 2d 797 (1968). "[T]his burden is
heavier where the alleged consent is based on an implication." Walls v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 639, 645, 347 S.E.2d 175, 178 (1986).
The number of times an officer asks for consent to search may be relevant to the
determination of whether consent was coerced. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App.
680, 690, 568 S.E.2d 385, 390 (2002) (citing Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 232, 532
S.E.2d 25 (2000), in which officers asked three times for consent to search vehicle, and noting
implicitly that repeated or "persistent request[s] . . . to search" might amount to coercion), rev'd
on other grounds, 266 Va. 28, 581 S.E.2d 206 (2003). "[M]erely advising [an individual] that a
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search warrant could be obtained is not coercion," Bosworth v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 567,
571, 375 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1989), but it is a relevant factor in the totality-of-the-circumstances
analysis. The fact that a suspect is in custody or under investigative detention does not vitiate
consent, Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 430, 388 S.E.2d 659 (1990), but whether the
officers involved have made a display of authority or show of force is a factor for consideration,
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 674, 689, 496 S.E.2d 143, 150 (1998). An officer's
subjective intention to detain or arrest is "relevant to an assessment of the Fourth Amendment
implications of police conduct . . . to the extent that that intent has been conveyed to the person
confronted," Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 576 n.7, 108 S. Ct. 1975, 1981 n.7, 100
L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988), whether conveyed explicitly or implicitly, McLellan v. Commonwealth, 37
Va. App. 144, 154-55 n.1, 554 S.E.2d 699, 704 n.1 (2001).
Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, supports the trial
court's determination that the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving defendant's
implicit consent to the search of his residence was freely and voluntarily given. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Ealy, 12 Va. App. 744, 753-54, 407 S.E.2d 681, 687 (1991) (holding trial
court could properly find suspect's mother did not freely consent to search because she "may
have been under duress and felt coerced after watching the police twice come to her property,
question her daughter in the police car, and then . . . question [her] outside her house in the
police car," "[c]oupled with the fact that she did not know whether she had the right to refuse
consent and the fact that [the sheriff] gave her the impression he would simply get a search
warrant to search the garage" if she did not consent).
When the encounter began, defendant reported he had locked himself out of his
apartment but had managed to re-enter and was once again preparing to leave. When Officer
Zuidema questioned defendant about the "very strong odor of marijuana on his person,"
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defendant denied having any marijuana on his person and consented to a search of his person.
However, defendant then twice refused Zuidema's request for consent to search his residence.
In denying Zuidema's first request to search, defendant said the "cops had been harassing
him for the past week, all because of a warrant for his ex[-]roommate." Officer Zuidema
confirmed that he personally had been to defendant's residence previously while "trying to serve
a paper on" the former roommate defendant had mentioned. In denying Zuidema's second
request to search, defendant "stated that he was . . . just trying to leave with his girlfriend," which
Zuidema interpreted "to mean that he was in a hurry to be somewhere and didn't have the time
for [a search]."
After defendant had issued these two denials, the officers told him not only that they
would get a search warrant for the residence but also that "[they would] lock the place down"
while they obtained the warrant. (Emphasis added). Officer Zuidema had concluded that
defendant was not free to leave, and although he did not expressly communicate this decision to
defendant, the circumstances support a finding that a reasonable person in defendant's position
would have concluded he was not free to leave. Only then did defendant open the door and enter
his residence. Not until after the officers had followed defendant inside, without invitation, did
defendant say to the officers that "[they] might as well go ahead."
Thus, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to defendant, we conclude the trial
court was not plainly wrong in finding the Commonwealth failed to meet its burden of proving
defendant voluntarily consented to the search. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's granting
of defendant's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion if the Commonwealth be so advised.
Affirmed and remanded.
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