Roy Duran Gravely v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, Agee and Kelsey
Argued at Salem, Virginia
ROY DURAN GRAVELY
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0430-02-3 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY
JANUARY 21, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
Charles M. Stone, Judge
Perry H. Harrold for appellant.
Margaret W. Reed, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
On appeal, Roy Duran Gravely challenges the trial court's
finding of a violation of probation and a revocation of his
suspended sentence on a conviction for driving under the influence
in violation of Code § 18.2-266. Finding no error in the trial
court's judgment, we affirm.
I.
On May 15, 2000, the trial court found Gravely guilty of
driving under the influence of alcohol, his second offense
within a five to ten-year period, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-266. Gravely received a ninety-day jail sentence, all
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
suspended on the condition that he "complete VASAP," maintain
"good behavior" for twelve months, and pay court costs and
fines. The trial court also suspended Gravely's driver's
license for three years, but gave him the opportunity to obtain
a restricted operator's license after successful completion of
the Virginia Alcohol and Safety Action Program (VASAP).
Gravely entered the VASAP program and received a restricted
license to drive only "a motor vehicle that [was] equipped with
a functioning, certified ignition interlock system." The
"Conditions of Probation" required Gravely to remain "totally
free from alcohol and/or other drugs during all appointments,
intervention sessions, or while operating a motor vehicle."
(bold and underscore in original). Gravely signed the
"Conditions of Probation" form acknowledging that he understood
"that violation of any of the above stated conditions of
probation will result in the return of my case to court."
Under the trial court's "Ignition Interlock Order," the
interlock system would "measure and record the blood alcohol
content at each attempted ignition and random rolling retest
during operation of the vehicle." The order also required
Gravely to provide, on a quarterly basis, a printout indicating
his "blood alcohol content during such ignitions, attempted
ignitions, and rolling retests, and showing attempts to
circumvent or tamper with the equipment." Gravely signed the
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"Ignition Interlock Order" next to a preprinted sentence
reading: "I have read this Order in its entirety and I
understand it completely."
In a letter dated December 12, 2001, VASAP notified the
trial court that Gravely had violated the terms of his probation
by committing three ignition interlock violations. Each time,
Gravely attempted to start the vehicle after registering
positive blood alcohol content. VASAP reported that the
violations were serious enough to find that Gravely "failed to
comply" with the requirements for further "participation" in
VASAP, thus prompting the request that he be returned to court
for "whatever action deemed appropriate."
At the revocation hearing on February 11, 2002, the trial
court found Gravely in violation of the terms of the probation
and suspended sentence. The court removed Gravely from the
VASAP program and imposed the previously suspended sentence in
full. Gravely presented no evidence at the hearing. Gravely
filed a motion to reconsider, which the court denied.
II.
After suspending a sentence, a trial court "may revoke the
suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient
that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within
the period of suspension fixed by the court." Code
§ 19.2-306(A). In revocation appeals, the trial court's
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"'findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless
there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion.'" Keselica v.
Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 35, 537 S.E.2d 611, 613 (2000)
(quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 81, 86, 402 S.E.2d
684, 687 (1991)). The revocation authority of a trial court,
while broad, "is not without limitation." Duff v. Commonwealth,
16 Va. App. 293, 297, 429 S.E.2d 465, 467 (1993). "The cause
deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a suspension
must be a reasonable cause." Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va.
325, 327, 228 S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). Reasonable cause for revoking a sentence
includes the defendant's failure "to comply with the conditions
of the suspension," Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354, 136
S.E.2d 840, 844 (1964), or the requirements of probation.
Hartless v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 172, 175, 510 S.E.3d 738,
739 (1999). 1
Gravely claims the trial court abused its discretion
because he did not violate the probation condition that he
remain "totally free from alcohol . . . while operating a motor
1
Failing to maintain "good behavior" during the suspension
period also provides reasonable grounds for revoking a sentence.
Dossola v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 444, 450, 559 S.E.2d 385,
388 (2002). The concept of good behavior is not "limited to an
avoidance of criminal behavior." Holden v. Commonwealth, 27
Va. App. 38, 42, 497 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1998). Given our ruling
in this case, however, we need not address the Commonwealth's
alternative argument that Gravely's conduct violated the "good
behavior" condition.
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vehicle" and, thus, did not fail to "complete VASAP" as his
suspended sentence required. Gravely admits the ignition
interlock system operated properly on each of the three
occasions it detected alcohol on his breath. He denies,
however, that his violation of the zero-tolerance alcohol
condition occurred "while operating a motor vehicle." The trial
court disagreed, holding that the act of engaging the ignition
interlock system was the initial step in the process of
"operating" the vehicle. That violation of VASAP probation, the
court held, put Gravely in material breach of the condition that
he "complete VASAP."
Under settled principles, "'when construing a lower court's
order, a reviewing court should give deference to the
interpretation adopted by the lower court.'" Albert v. Albert, 38
Va. App. 284, 298, 563 S.E.2d 389, 396 (2002) (quoting Rusty's
Welding Serv., Inc. v. Gibson, 29 Va. App. 119, 129, 510 S.E.2d
255, 260 (1999) (en banc)); see also Fredericksburg Constr. Co. v.
J.W. Wyne Excavating, Inc., 260 Va. 137, 144, 530 S.E.2d 148, 152
(2000). That discretion, however, "must be exercised reasonably
and not arbitrarily or capriciously." Smoot v. Commonwealth, 37
Va. App. 495, 500, 559 S.E.2d 409, 412 (2002) (citation omitted).
These principles apply when a trial court interprets a prior
conviction order for purposes of revoking a suspended sentence.
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Leitao v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 435, 438, 573 S.E.2d 317, ___
(2002).
In determining whether to defer to the trial court's
interpretation of the term "operating" a vehicle, we consider the
term's analogous meaning in the statutes governing driving under
the influence. In that context, the verb operate "is not limited
to moving the vehicle from one place to another." Keesee v.
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 263, 267, 527 S.E.2d 473, 475 (2000).
To be operated, "a vehicle need not be functional in the sense of
being able to move from place to place." Id. at 268, 527 S.E.2d
at 476 (citation omitted). A vehicle's engine need not even be
running for the driver to be operating it. See Propst v.
Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 791, 794-95, 485 S.E.2d 657, 659 (1997)
(finding that sitting behind the wheel with keys in the ignition,
car lights on, but engine off constituted "operating"); see also
Leake v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 101, 497 S.E.2d 522 (1998).
Merely entering a vehicle and manipulating the machinery "for
the purpose of putting it in motion" constitutes operating the
vehicle "whether it moved or not." Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 205
Va. 666, 670, 139 S.E.2d 37, 39-40 (1964) (citing Commonwealth v.
Uski, 160 N.E. 305, 306 (Mass. 1928)). Stated simply, operating
"means engaging the machinery of the vehicle which alone, or in
sequence, will activate the motive power of the vehicle."
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Williams v. Petersburg & Commonwealth, 216 Va. 297, 300, 217
S.E.2d 893, 896 (1975).
Following these principles, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by interpreting "operating" a vehicle to include
engaging the ignition interlock system. Though the ignition
interlock system prevented Gravely from putting the vehicle in
motion (the very thing it was supposed to do), he still operated
it. 2 The system serves as an integral part of the vehicle's
ignition and, like turning a key, must be engaged as one of the
tasks in the sequence necessary to "activate the motive power of
the vehicle." Id. By engaging the ignition interlock system
three times with measurable alcohol on his breath, Gravely
violated the probation condition that he "be totally free from
alcohol . . . while operating a motor vehicle." (bold and
underscore in original). That violation also put Gravely in
material breach of his suspended sentence condition that he
"complete VASAP."
2
Code § 18.2-270.1 defines an "ignition interlock system"
as
a device that (i) connects a motor vehicle
ignition system to an analyzer that measures
a driver's blood alcohol content; (ii)
prevents a motor vehicle ignition from
starting if a driver's blood alcohol content
exceeds 0.025 percent; and (iii) is equipped
with the ability to perform a rolling retest
and to electronically log the blood alcohol
content during ignition, attempted ignition
and rolling retest.
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III.
The trial court properly found Gravely in violation of the
terms of his probation and the conditions of his suspended
sentence. We therefore affirm its decision to revoke the
suspended sentence.
Affirmed.
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