Wesley Vernon Snider, III v. Diana L.A. Snider,nka

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Frank and
Senior Judge Coleman ∗
Argued at Salem, Virginia
WESLEY VERNON SNIDER, III
MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY
v. Record No. 1539-99-3 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
JANUARY 16, 2001
DIANA LEIGH ASHWORTH SNIDER, N/K/A
DIANA LEIGH ASHWORTH
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge
Gordon H. Shapiro (Shapiro & Kurtin, on
brief), for appellant.
John S. Huntington for appellee.
Wesley Vernon Snider, III, (husband) appeals the trial
court's equitable distribution award. On appeal, he contends
the trial court erred in: 1) finding Diana Ashworth Snider's
(wife) testimony regarding the value of the Vicker Switch Honey
Company (bee business) more persuasive and awarding her a sixty
percent distributive share of the business, 2) valuing the
marital home at $78,000 by finding husband committed waste of
∗
Judge Coleman participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on
December 31, 2000 and thereafter by his designation as a senior
judge pursuant to Code § 17.1-401.
∗∗
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
$7,500 between the date of the parties' separation and the date
of the equitable distribution hearing, 3) finding the home was
marital property and awarding wife a distributive share of such
property, and 4) awarding wife the fair market rental value of
the home.
I. BACKGROUND
The parties were married on June 29, 1983. They separated
on April 6, 1994. Since the only issues before this Court are
the company and the home, we only recite the facts relevant to
those issues.
Husband founded the Vicker Switch Honey Company
approximately five years prior to the parties' divorce. He
testified the business was a national and international company.
He testified that, at one time, the business had forty hives,
which produced a ton of jarred honey. The business also had the
east coast contract to sell a swarm trap to combat killer bees.
The business had an inventory of suits, smokers, veils, hats,
and other related items.
Husband testified the business was nearly defunct at the
time of the parties' separation and had no value. He stated
that mites had attacked the bees and had caused the business to
lose "about everything."
Wife testified she was not involved in the operation of the
business but that it was not defunct at the time of the parties'
separation. Wife further testified she never had access to the
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books for the business. She stated she never knew if the
business made a profit. She never saw any of the proceeds from
the business.
When asked the value of the business at the time of the
separation, wife answered that she did not know. When her
attorney asked her to give her "best estimate" she stated,
"Fifteen thousand."
The trial court accepted wife's valuation of the business
and awarded wife a sixty percent distributive share or $9,000.
Prior to the marriage, husband's father gave him a parcel
of land. Before the parties' marriage, a basement was built on
the site, and the parties lived in the basement until the upper
house was completed. After the marriage, work began on the
house. The land remained titled in husband's name.
Husband testified he served as the general contractor for
the construction of the house and did much of the work himself.
The parties differ on the efforts each provided to the
construction of the improvements. Husband claimed he performed
sixty to eighty percent of the work. Wife maintained they both
worked on the house, as did others. Wife testified she obtained
a number of electrical fixtures through her employment and
installed them. Husband testified wife did no work on the
house.
The initial funding for the basement was a combination of
the infusion of separate property and a loan. Wife testified
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she used $6,000 of her separate funds and husband used between
$1,000 and $2,000 of his funds. Additionally, wife testified
she borrowed $15,000 for the basement because husband was not
employed at that time. This loan for the basement subsequently
was rolled into the permanent first deed of trust.
The next loan was a permanent first deed of trust for
$57,000. The monthly curtailments were paid from a joint
account. The loan balance of $48,341.93 was satisfied on April
21, 1993, from the proceeds of husband's personal injury
settlement. There is no dispute that this settlement was
husband's separate property.
After satisfying the first deed of trust, the parties
borrowed $15,000. Both parties agreed the balance of this loan
was $13,946.45 as of April 1, 1994, and $10,594.91 as of July
20, 1995. Husband paid the monthly payment of $296.95.
Wife testified her father gave her approximately $34,000
between the years 1991 and 1994, which she stated she put into
the house and marriage. All of these gifts were deposited into
a joint account.
Wife testified that while the parties' non-monetary
contributions to the marriage were approximately equal, she
contributed more cash to the marriage than did husband.
Husband's appraiser, Todd Linkous, appraised the house at
$71,000 in its current condition. Mr. Linkous, however, noted
the home needed roof repair, cosmetic repair, and the interior
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and exterior of the home was in need of cleaning and sealing.
Linkous estimated the repairs at $7,500. With the repairs, he
stated the house would be worth $78,500. The property was
assessed, for tax purposes, at $71,800 for the years 1995
through 1997. Wife maintained the value of the property was
$78,000. Husband's equitable distribution submission also
showed the value as $78,000. The trial court found the fair
market value of the home to be $78,000. The trial court
included the $7,500 repair estimate, finding the repairs were
necessitated during husband's sole post-separation occupancy of
the home. The trial court further found that husband should not
benefit by his neglect of the property. Husband, in his
deposition, acknowledged the interior and exterior of the house
needed to be cleaned and sealed. He further admitted he made no
repairs to the house but stated he maintained it.
An appraisal further revealed the fair market rental value
of the home was $675 per month. Husband exclusively had lived
in the house since April 6, 1994, the date of the parties'
separation. The trial court awarded wife fifty percent of the
marital share of the fair market rental value.
The trial court found the unimproved lot was separate
property, although no evidence indicated its value. The court
found the house was hybrid property.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Valuation of the Vicker Switch Honey Company
Husband asserts the trial court erred in its valuation of
the bee business and its award of sixty percent of the valuation
to wife. We agree.
"The rule is firmly established in
Virginia that a divorce decree based solely
on depositions is not as conclusive on
appellate review as one based upon evidence
heard ore tenus, but such a decree is
presumed correct and will not be overturned
if supported by substantial, competent and
credible evidence."
Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App. 125, 127, 341 S.E.2d 827, 828
(1986) (citations omitted). 1 The evidence in this case was taken
by deposition, thus, we will not disturb the award of the trial
court if it is supported by "substantial, competent and credible
evidence."
When wife's attorney asked her the value of the Vicker
Switch Honey Company at the time of the parties' separation, she
testified that she did not know. Then, her attorney again asked
her to provide her best estimate of the value of the business
1
At issue in this case is the equitable distribution award,
which pursuant to Code § 20-107.3(A), the trial court determines
"[u]pon decreeing the dissolution of a marriage, and also upon
decreeing a divorce from the bond of matrimony, or upon the
filing with the court as provided in subsection J of a certified
copy of a final divorce decree obtained without the
Commonwealth . . . ." Code § 20-107.3(A). Because equitable
distribution occurs upon decreeing the divorce, we apply the
same standard to review the evidence in an equitable
distribution award.
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and she responded, "Fifteen thousand." Wife also testified she
was not involved in the operation of the business, never had
access to the books for the business, did not know if the
business made a profit, and never saw any proceeds from the
business. Husband testified the business was nearly defunct at
the time of the parties' separation. He testified that while
the business had been a national and international business at
one time, mites had attacked the bees, which resulted in the
business losing "about everything." Husband testified the
business had no value at the time of the parties' separation.
The trial court's acceptance of the wife's valuation of the
business was not supported by substantial, competent, and
credible evidence. Wife testified she was not involved in the
business and had no knowledge of the financial status of the
business. Further, her testimony indicated that she did not
know the value of the business at the time of the separation and
she only answered "Fifteen thousand" when again questioned by
her attorney as to her "best estimate." Therefore, we find the
trial court erred in accepting wife's valuation of the business
and remand for redetermination of the award with respect to the
business.
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B. The Marital Home 2
Husband argues the trial court erred in valuing the
parties' home at $78,000. Todd Linkous, the appraiser, valued
the home at $71,000 and noted the home needed $7,500 worth of
repairs. The trial court valued the home at $78,000, stating
the necessity of the repairs accrued during husband's
post-separation occupancy of the property. The trial court
found that husband should not benefit from his neglect of the
property. We agree with the trial court's valuation of the
property, but find the trial court was right for the wrong
reason in reaching such valuation.
"An appellate court may affirm the judgment of a trial
court when it has reached the right result for the wrong
reason." Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 449, 452, 417
S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (citation omitted). This rule applies in
civil cases. See id. (citation omitted). The rule, however,
does not always apply:
It may not be used if the correct
reason for affirming the trial court was not
raised in any manner at trial. Eason v.
2
The first deed of trust on the parties' marital home was
satisfied by proceeds from husband's personal injury settlement.
"Separate property does not by its express terms include
personal injury settlements." Thomas v. Thomas, 13 Va. App. 92,
94, 408 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1991). Instead, because of the
presumption favoring marital property, the party who claims the
settlement is separate property bears the burden of proving the
settlement is separate property. See id. In this case, the
parties agreed that husband's personal injury settlement was
separate property. We, therefore, do not address this issue.
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Eason, 204 Va. 347, 352, 131 S.E.2d 280, 283
(1963). In addition, the proper application
of this rule does not include those cases
where, because the trial court has rejected
the right reason or confined its decision to
a specific ground, further factual
resolution is needed before the right reason
may be assigned to support the trial court's
decision. Sateren v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
234 Va. 303, 306, 362 S.E.2d 324, 326
(1987).
Id. at 452, 417 S.E.2d 313-14.
The record established that the house was appraised at
$78,000, which also was husband's valuation of the home in his
equitable distribution submission. Wife raised the fact that
husband valued the home at $78,000 in her memorandum of law
submitted to the trial court. No further factual resolution is
needed. We find the trial court was correct in valuing the home
at $78,000 but did so for the wrong reason.
Husband next argues the trial court erred in classifying
the home as marital property. We disagree.
Our standard of review of this
particular issue is well settled. "Code
§ 20-107.3 contains no presumption favoring
equal division of marital property.
Moreover, in reviewing an equitable
distribution award, we rely heavily on the
trial judge's discretion in weighing the
particular circumstances of each case. Only
under exceptional circumstances will we
interfere with the exercise of the trial
judge's discretion." Aster v. Gross, 7 Va.
App. 1, 8, 371 S.E.2d 833, 837 (1988)
(citation omitted).
Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va. App. 558, 573, 421 S.E.2d 635, 644
(1992).
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Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(a) provides that property not owned
by both parties may be classified as marital property when the
value of separate property has increased because "marital
property or the personal efforts of either party have
contributed to such increases . . . ." In this case, the trial
court found that the parties' home, as opposed to the unimproved
lot, was marital property under Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(a) due to
wife's "certain contributions of marital property and personal
effort in contributing to appreciation of the unimproved lot,
[husband's] separate property." We find the trial court
carefully considered the factors in subsection (A) and did not
abuse its discretion in classifying the parties' home as marital
property and awarding wife a distributive share of such
property.
Husband finally contends the trial court erred in ruling
wife had a rental interest in the marital home and in making an
award of the rental value of the home. We agree.
Code § 8.01-31 states, "An accounting in equity may be had
against any fiduciary or by one joint tenant, tenant in common,
or coparcener for receiving more than comes to his just share or
proportion, or against the personal representative of any such
party."
As contemplated by Code § 8.01-31, an accounting occurs
only when there is co-ownership of the property. Thus, a party
is entitled to the fair market rental value of the property only
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when that party has joint ownership of the property. See Gaynor
v. Hird, 15 Va. App. 379, 381, 424 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1992).
In this case, the record established, and wife conceded on
brief, that wife was not a title owner of the property. The
property was deeded to husband prior to the parties' marriage,
and the property was never titled in wife's name. Therefore,
because she is not an owner of the property, wife is not
entitled to the fair market rental value.
For these reasons, we find the trial court was correct in
valuing the parties' home at $78,000 and in classifying the home
as marital property. The trial court, however, erred in
accepting wife's valuation of the bee business and in awarding
wife the fair market rental value of the home. We remand for
redetermination of the award for the bee business.
Reversed and remanded.
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