Michael Joseph Abolzadeh v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
MICHAEL JOSEPH ABOLZADEH
v. Record No. 2518-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
BY JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA JUNE 11, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Richard B. Potter, Judge
Ralph E. Kipp (Laurie E. Forbes; Lawson, Kipp
& Forbes, on briefs), for appellant.
John K. Byrum, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney
General; Robert B. Condon, Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Appellant, Michael Joseph Abolzadeh, was convicted of grand
larceny.
He argues that (1) the trial court erred in giving a grand
larceny instruction, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to
support the conviction. We disagree and affirm. On the night of
January 18, 1994, the victim visited the apartment of a friend.
Shortly after his arrival, Cornell Evans and appellant entered
the apartment. The victim testified that Evans and appellant
"started hitting [him]." Appellant took the victim's bracelet, a
watch, a chain from around the victim's neck and two earrings
from the victim's ears. Evans removed three rings from the
victim's fingers. The perpetrators also stole the victim's
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
wallet, which contained either $166 or $165.
From the view we take of the case, the dispositive question
is whether the evidence was sufficient to frame a jury issue as
to the value of the property taken. We hold that it was
sufficient.
The record showed that $165 cash was taken from the victim.
Also taken were the following items of personal property:
• 1 Gucci link chain with a cross
• 1 Polo ring
• 1 Bracelet
• 2 Other rings
• 1 Watch
• 2 Earrings
As to value, the victim testified that he paid sixty-five
dollars for the bracelet two years before the robbery and that he
paid $250 for one of the rings, but did not remember when. The
watch was in the same condition at trial as when it was taken.
The bracelet, which was apparently broken during the robbery, was
described as being in better condition when taken.
In light of the evidence showing that $165 was taken in the
offense, the narrow issue presented is whether the owner's
testimony of the price paid for the jewelry, combined with the
evidence of their condition at the time of the offense, was
sufficient to support a jury finding that the jewelry had a value
of thirty-five dollars.
"It is generally recognized that the opinion
testimony of the owner of property, because
of his relationship as owner, is competent
and admissible on the question of the value
of such property, regardless of his knowledge
of property values. It is not necessary to
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show that he was acquainted with the market
value of such property or that he is an
expert on values. He is deemed qualified by
reason of his relationship as owner to give
estimates of the value of what he owns. The
weight of such testimony is, of course,
affected by his knowledge of the value."
Hayes v. Glenn, 197 Va. 746, 750, 91 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1956)
(citation omitted). See also Walls v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 480,
482, 450 S.E.2d 363, 364 (1994).
Value, like any other fact in a case, may be proved by
circumstantial evidence. "[D]irect proof of a fact is not
essential if circumstantial evidence proves the same fact and at
the same time excludes every reasonable hypothesis to the
contrary." Veney v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 805, 806, 188 S.E.2d
80, 81 (1972). In this case we hold that it does. The jury
believed the testimony of the victim concerning the amount of
cash taken and the value of the stolen jewelry. "The weight
which should be given to evidence and whether the testimony of a
witness is credible are questions which the fact finder must
decide." Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 523, 528, 351
S.E.2d 598, 601 (1986). The victim's testimony was competent and
was not inherently incredible.
Nor do we find this case to be controlled by Dunn v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 284 S.E.2d 792 (1981). Dunn does not
establish a bright line or inflexible rule requiring evidence of
depreciation for every type of property. We hold that the
owner's evidence of the purchase price of the ring and bracelet
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combined with the evidence of the condition of the property at
the time of the taking was sufficient to allow the jury to decide
the issue.
Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to frame a
jury issue on valuation, we find no error in the trial court's
decision to grant Instruction F that defined grand larceny. It
was offered by the defendant who, nonetheless, objected to the
valuation question being submitted to the jury.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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