David J. Howell v. CW, DSS, DCSE, ex rel Fisher

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Elder and Annunziata
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
DAVID J. HOWELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0123-01-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
NOVEMBER 6, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA,
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ex rel. LINDA FISHER
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Gary A. Hicks, Judge
David J. Howell, pro se.
Nicholas S. Murphy, Special Counsel (Mark L.
Earley, Attorney General; Ashley L.
Taylor, Jr., Deputy Attorney General;
Robert B. Cousins, Jr., Senior Assistant
Attorney General; Craig M. Burshem, Regional
Special Counsel, on brief), for appellee.
David J. Howell (appellant) appeals from an order
dismissing his de novo appeal in a proceeding arising from the
efforts of the Commonwealth's Department of Social Services,
Division of Child Support Enforcement (DCSE), to collect child
support owed for the minor child of appellant and Linda Fisher.
On appeal, appellant contends the court lacked jurisdiction over
DCSE's motion for issuance of a show cause summons, due in part
to the pendency of an appeal of the June 5, 2000 dismissal of a
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
previous show cause summons. He also contends various other
prior orders of the district and circuit courts barred the
present show cause proceedings on grounds of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, due process, equal protection and double
jeopardy. We hold that appellant failed to present a sufficient
record from which we may determine whether he preserved any of
these claimed errors for appeal. 1 Thus, we consider only the
non-waivable contention that the lower courts lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter. We conclude, from the
face of the record, that the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction to award child support and to punish appellant's
failure to pay support pursuant to that award and that the
circuit court had jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of that
determination. Thus, we affirm.
A.
SUFFICIENCY OF RECORD FOR APPELLATE REVIEW
Rule 5A:8 provides that "[t]he transcript of any proceeding
is part of the record when it is filed in the office of the
clerk of the trial court within 60 days after entry of the final
judgment." A party may submit a written statement of facts in
lieu of a transcript, but only when the statement of facts has
been presented to and signed by the trial judge and filed by the
1
A defendant who elects to proceed without counsel is no
less bound by rules of procedure and substantive law than a
defendant who has counsel. Church v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 208,
213, 335 S.E.2d 823, 826 (1985).
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clerk of the trial court is it properly a part of the record for
purposes of appeal. Rule 5A:8(c).
If . . . the transcript [or statement of
facts] is indispensable to the determination
of the case, then the requirements for
making the transcript [or statement of
facts] a part of the record on appeal must
be strictly adhered to. This Court has no
authority to make exceptions to the filing
requirements set out in the Rules.
Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99, 341 S.E.2d 400, 402
(1986); see Anderson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 506, 508-09,
413 S.E.2d 75, 77 (1992) (statements of facts).
Even taking as true appellant's representation that the
circuit court clerk refused to accept his proposed statement of
facts for the January 8, 2001 proceeding and that she did so
without justification, 2 it remained appellant's responsibility to
ask this Court to issue a writ of mandamus to ensure the
statement was filed. See Richlands Med. Ass'n v. Commonwealth
2
Accepting as true appellant's allegation that the clerk
refused to file in this matter the transcripts of the district
and circuit court proceedings of November 14, 2000, the record
provides no indication that refusal was erroneous. Because the
January 8, 2001 circuit court proceeding was a de novo appeal,
the transcript of the previous district court proceeding on
November 14, 2000 was inadmissible. See Mahoney v. Mahoney, 34
Va. App. 63, 67 n.1, 537 S.E.2d 626, 628 n.1 (2000) (en banc).
The November 14, 2000 circuit court proceeding on a writ of
prohibition was assigned a different circuit court docket number
and was the subject of a separate appeal to this Court, assigned
Record No. 2846-00-2, which was transferred to the Virginia
Supreme Court by order of February 20, 2001. Thus, the only
transcript appellant could have made a part of the record in
this proceeding pursuant to Rule 5A:8 was a transcript of the
January 8, 2001 circuit court hearing if such a transcript had
been made.
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ex rel. State Health Comm'r, 230 Va. 384, 386, 337 S.E.2d 737,
739 (1985); see also Code § 17.1-404. The burden is on the
appellant to prove both the claimed error and the preservation
of that error for appeal. See Twardy v. Twardy, 14 Va. App.
651, 658, 419 S.E.2d 848, 852 (1992); Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App.
512, 516-17, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738-39 (1991) (en banc). Here,
because no transcript or statement of facts was properly made
part of the record for purposes of appeal, we are unable to
determine whether appellant voiced any objections at the January
8, 2001 hearing, and appellant's endorsement of the dismissal
order as "SEEN AND OBJECTED TO:" was insufficient to preserve
his objections for appeal. Mackie v. Hill, 16 Va. App. 229,
231, 429 S.E.2d 37, 38 (1993). Appellant's filing of his
objections simultaneously with his notice of appeal was
insufficient to preserve the claimed errors for review by this
Court because the filing of the notice of appeal divested the
trial court of jurisdiction to consider the alleged errors.
See, e.g., Walton v. Commonwealth, 256 Va. 85, 95, 501 S.E.2d
134, 140 (1998).
Nor does the ends of justice exception to Rule 5A:18
require us to consider the arguments appellant raises on appeal.
See Brown v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 126, 132, 380 S.E.2d 8,
10-11 (1989). Here, in regard to appellant's assignments of
error 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8, the record is not sufficiently complete
to establish an error that was "clear, substantial and material"
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as required by Brown because the record contains no order
indicating a previous stay or suspension of appellant's child
support obligation. 3 The record also fails to establish that
appellant presented to the trial court his claim that DCSE
"unlawfully" credited his support and purge payments or that the
court's rulings violated principles of res judicata, double
jeopardy, due process and equal protection or that the ends of
justice exception applies to excuse this failure to preserve the
claimed errors for appeal. Finally, the ends of justice
exception does not require us to review the merits of the trial
court's ruling dismissing appellant's present appeal based on
his failure to post a sufficient bond. An appellant may not
bifurcate a contempt determination from the related arrearage
determination for purposes of appeal. See Mahoney v. Mahoney,
34 Va. App. 63, 66-67, 537 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2000) (en banc).
B.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Although a judgment rendered by a court lacking subject
matter jurisdiction is void from its inception, see, e.g., Rook
3
Although copies of one or more of the orders appellant
references may be contained in appellant's appendix, they were
not offered into evidence in the trial court. "We are not able
to peer surreptitiously [at documents that are] not part of the
record to satisfy our curiosity. To do so defies the uniform
application of our rules." Twardy, 14 Va. App. at 658, 419
S.E.2d at 852.
We also note that appellant's assignments of error refer to
a writ of prohibition. That petition is not a part of these
proceedings. See supra note 2.
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v. Rook, 233 Va. 92, 95, 353 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1987), 4 a party
asserting a lack of subject matter jurisdiction must provide a
proper evidentiary record to support his claim, cf. Friedman v.
State, 249 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 1969); 4 C.J.S. Appeal and
Error § 38, at 111-12 (1993).
While an appeal of a child support order is pending, the
lower court may not modify but may enforce the existing order,
Decker v. Decker, 17 Va. App. 562, 564, 440 S.E.2d 411, 412
(1994); see Code § 20-68, unless execution of the award has been
suspended and an appropriate appeal bond filed, Code
§ 8.01-676.1(C), (D). Here, the record contains no indication
the support award requiring appellant to pay $75 per week was
suspended during any of these proceedings. Thus, the record
fails to establish, in the manner alleged by appellant, that the
district court lacked jurisdiction over the show cause
proceedings initiated by DCSE on August 29, 2000, from which the
instant appeal arises. The record is valid on its face in that
the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under Chapter
11 of Title 16.1, which provided it with original jurisdiction
to award child support and to punish the failure of one ordered
to provide such support to comply with that obligation. See,
e.g., Code §§ 16.1-241, 16.1-278.16. Similarly, the circuit
4
To the extent appellant's assignments of error may be
construed as a challenge to personal jurisdiction, such a
challenge is barred. See, e.g., Gilpin v. Joyce, 257 Va. 579,
581-82, 515 S.E.2d 124, 125 (1999).
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court had subject matter jurisdiction on appeal which derived
from the district court's jurisdiction. See Code § 16.1-296.
To the extent any of the orders entered in the present or any
previous proceeding may have contained errors, those errors, if
any, rendered the orders voidable only and did not deprive this
Court or the circuit or district courts of subject matter
jurisdiction. See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520,
536-37, 25 S.E.2d 352, 359 (1943).
For these reasons, we affirm the circuit court's order of
January 8, 2001 dismissing appellant's appeal.
Affirmed.
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