Charles E. McIntyre v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
CHARLES E. McINTYRE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1720-00-1 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
JULY 17, 2001
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Randolph T. West, Judge
Edward I. Sarfan (Sarfan and Nachman, L.L.C.,
on brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Charles E. McIntyre (appellant) was convicted, in a bench
trial, of robbery, in violation of Code § 18.2-58, and use of a
firearm in the commission of a felony, in violation of Code
§ 18.2-53.1. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erred
in finding the evidence was sufficient to convict him. Finding no
error, we affirm the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 22, 1998, Anthony Armstrong was washing his car at
a self-serve car wash in the City of Newport News when a dark
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Honda Accord twice circled the car wash. Armstrong testified
that "instead of leaving, they were getting suspicious."
Appellant was the driver of the Honda Accord and pulled into
the car wash bay next to Armstrong. There were brick walls
between each bay, and Armstrong was not able to see the vehicle
once it pulled into the bay next to his. A short male walked
around the back side of the car wash and asked Armstrong a
question. He then pulled a gun and pointed it at Armstrong's
head. Armstrong backed up and bumped into a tall male behind him
who pointed a gun to Armstrong's hip and said, "Give it up."
Armstrong did not get a good look at the tall male and was only
able to describe him as taller than himself and weighing
approximately 150-160 pounds. The assailants took a watch,
bracelet, work identification and cash from Armstrong. They
struck Armstrong with a pistol as they left.
Once the suspects' car left, Armstrong walked across the
street to the hotel to meet his girlfriend, got into his car and
followed the suspects. At this time, he was able to see that
appellant was the driver. Armstrong followed the car, but he
could not catch it because of its speed. Armstrong followed the
vehicle into a neighborhood where a "couple of guys" blocked
appellant's vehicle long enough for Armstrong to obtain the
license number. Armstrong told the individuals blocking
appellant's car that the occupants were armed and "let them go."
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Officer Collins of the Newport News Police Department stated
that on August 22, 1998 at approximately 10:17 p.m., he received a
"B.O.L." (be on the lookout) concerning a robbery for a dark green
Honda with Virginia license plates RAK-5112. The vehicle was
occupied by three black males. Just as the transmission ended,
Officer Collins saw a vehicle that matched the description. The
officer activated his emergency equipment, and the vehicle
accelerated through an apartment complex. The vehicle stopped
abruptly in the middle of the road. The two front doors and a
rear door opened, and three suspects fled the vehicle. Officer
Collins chased appellant after he saw him exit the vehicle,
maintaining visual contact the entire time. The area was well
lit, and the officer was never more than twenty-five feet behind
appellant. The officer never saw appellant make any throwing
motions. Officer Collins caught appellant and immediately
searched him. He did not locate any weapons nor did he locate the
bracelet and watch belonging to Armstrong. Appellant had an
identification card on him but no operator's license. Appellant
spontaneously said that he ran because his license was suspended
and he did not want to go back to jail.
Officer McArthur impounded the vehicle driven by appellant.
A Pep Boys identification badge in the name of Armstrong was found
in the back seat of the vehicle behind the front passenger seat.
None of Armstrong's other property was recovered.
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Curtis Davis, the second defendant in this robbery, was
apprehended in a vacant storage shed and had a gun on his person.
The third suspect was never apprehended.
Appellant testified that on August 22, 1998, his cousin,
Curtis Davis, picked him up around 5:00 p.m. to go "riding
around." Leroy Gardner, a friend of his cousin, was driving the
car. They stopped at a Red Barn convenience store, and appellant
began to drive the car. Approximately one hour later, Davis told
appellant to pull into a car wash. Davis said he had to "ask the
guy something" so appellant thought maybe Davis knew him.
Appellant pulled into the bay next to Armstrong. Davis and
Gardner got out of the car. Appellant stayed in the car and
listened to music. Appellant testified the others never said
anything to him about a robbery. Once Davis and Gardner walked
around the brick wall to the other bay, appellant could not see
them. After a few minutes, Davis and Gardner walked back and got
in the car and said, "Come on." Appellant drove off. Davis then
told appellant to go to his grandmother's house.
When asked about Armstrong's car chasing him, appellant
responded, "I mean I didn't pay attention to nobody chasing or
nothing. I was just driving." When asked about his car being
blocked, appellant denied that his car was blocked in. On
cross-examination, appellant was unable to explain why he pulled
into the adjoining bay and not behind Armstrong's car.
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Appellant admitted fleeing from the police vehicle because he
did not have an operator's license. He was on probation and was
fearful that his probation would be revoked.
Michael Odum testified that he shared a cell with Davis for
approximately two months at the beginning of 1999 and that
appellant was in the same cell block. During this time, Davis had
numerous conversations with Odum and conversations with other
individuals, which Odum overheard. Davis told Odum that appellant
"had no knowledge of the robbery or what they were going to do,
because if he had, he wouldn't have went along with them." At the
conclusion of the Commonwealth's case and at the conclusion of all
the evidence, appellant moved to strike the evidence. The trial
court denied both motions and convicted appellant of both charges.
II. ANALYSIS
Appellant contends the evidence only shows he drove the
perpetrators to the scene of the robbery and that he did not have
knowledge of the robbery and did not participate in the crime.
When the sufficiency of the evidence is
challenged on appeal, we determine whether
the evidence, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party, and the
reasonable inferences fairly deducible from
that evidence support each and every element
of the charged offense. See Moore v.
Commonwealth, 254 Va. 184, 186, 491 S.E.2d
739, 740 (1997); Derr v. Commonwealth, 242
Va. 413, 424, 410 S.E.2d 662, 668 (1991).
"In so doing, we must discard the evidence of
the accused in conflict with that of the
Commonwealth, and regard as true all the
credible evidence favorable to the
Commonwealth and all fair inferences that may
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be drawn therefrom." Watkins v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 349, 494
S.E.2d 859, 866 (1998). The jury's verdict
will not be set aside unless it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it. See
Code § 8.01-680; Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25
Va. App. 629, 644, 491 S.E.2d 747, 754
(1997).
Griffin v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 413, 417-18, 533 S.E.2d 653,
655 (2000).
One who is "present, aiding and
abetting, and intend[s] his or her words,
gestures, signals, or actions to in some way
encourage, advise, urge, or in some way help
the person committing the crime to commit it"
is a principal in the second degree. McGill
v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 728, 733, 485
S.E.2d 173, 175 (1997). "[M]ere presence and
consent will not suffice." Underwood v.
Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1045, 1048, 243 S.E.2d
231, 233 (1978). The person "must share the
criminal intent of the party who actually
committed the [crime] or be guilty of some
overt act in furtherance thereof." Augustine
v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 120, 124, 306 S.E.2d
886, 889 (1983).
Rankins v. Commonwealth, 31 Va. App. 352, 372, 523 S.E.2d 524, 534
(2000).
[Circumstantial evidence] "is as
competent and is entitled to as much weight
as direct evidence, provided it is
sufficiently convincing to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt."
Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307
S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). However, "the
Commonwealth need only exclude reasonable
hypotheses of innocence that flow from the
evidence, not those that spring from the
imagination of the defendant." Hamilton v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 751, 755, 433
S.E.2d 27, 29 (1993). Whether a hypothesis
of innocence is reasonable is a question of
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fact. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.
App. 269, 290, 373 S.E.2d 328, 339 (1988).
Crawley v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 372, 375, 512 S.E.2d 169,
170-71 (1999).
It is uncontroverted that appellant drove the assailants to
the scene and drove them away after the completion of the robbery.
It is uncontroverted that appellant attempted to evade the police
and, in fact, stopped his car and fled from the police. "Flight
following the commission of a crime is evidence of guilt, and the
jury may be so instructed." Clagett v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 79,
93, 472 S.E.2d 263, 271 (1996) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
519 U.S. 1122 (1997).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
appellant's evasive action in speeding away from the police and
his flight from his car was for the purpose of concealing his
identity as a principal in the second degree. The trial court
rejected appellant's explanation for his flight.
Appellant further denied being chased by Armstrong and denied
being blocked in by the bystanders. "'In its role of judging
witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to disbelieve the
self-serving testimony of the accused and to conclude that the
accused is lying to conceal his guilt.'" Snow v. Commonwealth, 33
Va. App. 766, 774, 537 S.E.2d 6, 10 (2000) (quoting Marable v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 505, 509-10, 500 S.E.2d 233, 235 (1998)
(citations omitted)).
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Further, the trial court could reasonably infer that
appellant knew of the robbery and that he parked his vehicle in
the bay adjacent to Armstrong's location to conceal his presence
and to enable his associates to approach Armstrong without
detection.
The trial court properly concluded that appellant, as the
driver of the vehicle, assisted the two assailants in committing
the offenses. For these reasons, finding the evidence sufficient
to convict appellant, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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