Melissa Hoffler v. Daniel Hoffler

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Overton, Senior Judges Hodges and Baker
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
MELISSA HOFFLER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0587-98-1 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
NOVEMBER 17, 1998
DANIEL HOFFLER
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF NORTHAMPTON COUNTY
Robert B. Cromwell, Jr., Judge Designate
James A. Evans (Dinsmore, Evans & Bryant, on
brief), for appellant.
Moody E. Stallings, Jr. (Kevin E.
Martingayle; Stallings & Richardson, P.C., on
brief), for appellee.
Melissa Hoffler (wife) appeals her final decree of divorce
from Daniel Hoffler (husband). She contends the trial court
erroneously interpreted their pre-nuptial and separation
agreements to remove husband's obligation to pay wife a $100,000
property settlement. Because we agree with wife, the trial
court's decree denying her that payment is reversed and remanded.
Husband and wife signed a pre-nuptial agreement on April 21,
1992. The agreement provided that in the event of divorce,
husband would pay wife a lump sum property settlement of
$100,000. The parties were married on June 26, 1992 and had two
children during the marriage. Husband filed for divorce alleging
adultery and separation on December 9, 1997.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
After the separation, when both parties were represented by
counsel, they began negotiating a separation agreement. That
agreement was finally signed on December 30, 1997. It is the
confluence of the pre-nuptial and the separation agreements that
forms the basis of this appeal.
The separation agreement states:
[T]he Pre-nuptial agreement dated April 21,
1992 is a valid binding agreement of both
parties and that the terms of said agreement
are to remain in effect except as otherwise
modified herein, said modifications being
necessary due to additional circumstances of
the children born of the parties and modified
for no other reason . . . .
Many areas addressed by the pre-nuptial agreement were altered.
One such alteration provided for wife's post-divorce residence.
Under the separation agreement, "Husband will pay the costs of
purchasing the Wife a new residence, up to $300,000 and he is to
receive a copy of the sales contract and closing statement."
On January 23, 1998, the trial court conducted an ore tenus
hearing to determine the intent of the parties regarding the two
agreements. Wife and her former attorney, Mona Flax, argued that
the $100,000 property settlement was separate from the $300,000
owed for a residence. However, Ms. Flax also testified that she
and husband's attorneys had agreed the $300,000 was inclusive of
the $100,000. Upon questioning from the trial judge, Ms. Flax
admitted that she understood the $100,000 was part of, not in
addition to, the $300,000. This intent is embodied nowhere in
the terms of the contract.
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Husband and his attorneys testified they intended the
$300,000 to "bump up" the $100,000 from the pre-nuptial. The
trial court ruled the agreements were unambiguous and that the
settlement agreement's $300,000 "supplanted" the $100,000
provided for in the pre-nuptial agreement. The trial court
issued its decree of divorce on February 13, 1998.
"In Virginia property settlement agreements are contracts
subject to the same rules of formation, validity, and
construction as other contracts." Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App.
510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986). Because our examination of
the agreements is a matter of law, we are not bound by the trial
court's interpretation. See Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11,
15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985) (citing Wilson v. Holyfield, 227
Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)). "Where the agreement
is plain and unambiguous in its terms, the rights of the parties
are to be determined from the terms of the agreement and the
court may not impose an obligation not found in the agreement
itself." Jones v. Jones, 19 Va. App. 265, 268-69, 450 S.E.2d
762, 764 (1994). We may look only to the plain meaning of the
agreements; disregarding any beliefs the parties or their lawyers
may hold regarding their interpretation. An examination of the
two contracts reveals they are unambiguous and, when read
together, do not support the trial court's decree.
The pre-nuptial agreement unambiguously entitled wife to
$100,000 as a lump sum property settlement. The settlement
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agreement, which modified but did not replace the pre-nuptial
agreement, failed to exterminate this property settlement
provision. In a new paragraph, under the heading "Marital
Residence," husband agreed to pay wife "up to $300,000" for a new
home for herself and the children. These two, separate
provisions were not connected to each other in any manner. There
is no indication that the former was waived as the latter was
created. Therefore, the only rational interpretation to be made
is that husband has agreed to make both payments.
"No matter how inartfully the terms of the agreement may
have been originally drawn, we cannot now make a new contract for
the parties. We can only construe the terms as written." Smith
v. Smith, 15 Va. App. 371, 376, 423 S.E.2d 851, 854 (1992)
(citing Smith, 3 Va. App. at 516, 351 S.E.2d at 597). We
construe the terms of these agreements to entitle wife to a lump
sum property settlement payment of $100,000 and an additional
amount up to $300,000 for the purchase of a home in accordance
with the terms of the settlement agreement. The trial court's
interpretation, to the extent it conflicts with ours, was error.
That portion of the parties' decree of divorce which
addresses wife's lump sum property settlement is reversed and
remanded to the trial court with instructions for modification
not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed and remanded.
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