Goodwill Industries, etc. v. Faye H. Easley

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Annunziata
Argued at Salem, Virginia
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF DANVILLE
AND HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS
INSURANCE CO. MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
v. Record No. 1547-95-3 JULY 23, 1996
FAYE H. EASLEY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Martha White Medley (Daniel, Vaughan, Medley &
Smitherman, on brief), for appellants.
Barbara Hudson for appellee.
The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Faye H. Easley
reimbursement for medical treatment rendered on July 1, 1993, and
denied reimbursement for medical treatment rendered on June 19,
1992 and January 25, 1993. Goodwill Industries of Danville
contends that res judicata bars reimbursement for the July 1,
1993 medical treatment. We affirm the award.
The evidence proved that Easley was employed as a
comptroller by Goodwill in 1989. When hired, she informed
Goodwill that she suffered from spina bifida, a congenital low
back condition. On April 18, 1990, a doorknob struck Easley's
lower back at work and herniated a disk at L5-S1 that aggravated
her spina bifida. Goodwill reported the injury to the commission
but did not forward a memorandum of agreement to the commission.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
No award was entered.
On January 9, 1992, a worker at Goodwill engaged in
horseplay and grabbed Easley by her arm and leg. That incident
injured Easley's back and caused her to experience "pain in the
[left] low back radiating into the buttocks, down the posterior
part of the [left] leg." A medical report diagnosed
"[e]xacerbation of L5-S1 radiculopathy [with] known disc disease
& spina bifida." Easley missed time from work and was released
to work full-time beginning April 6, 1992.
Easley filed an application for benefits on September 15,
1992. As its defense, Goodwill contended (1) that no injury by
accident arose out of and in the course of employment, (2) that
Easley's disability resulted from a pre-existing condition, (3)
that no causal connection existed between the period of
disability and the incident, (4) that medical records failed to
connect the disability with Easley's employment, (5) that Easley
failed to market her residual capacity, and (6) that Easley
settled with the co-worker to the prejudice of Goodwill.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the deputy commissioner
found that Easley suffered an injury by accident that arose out
of and in the course of employment, that Goodwill pressured
Easley into accepting a $500 settlement from the co-worker, and
that Easley had adequately marketed her residual capacity. The
deputy commissioner awarded Easley temporary total disability for
8.2 days and ordered Goodwill to pay for any medical treatment
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Easley received relating to the January 1992 injury.
Both parties filed applications for review. Easley
contended that she was entitled to compensation for additional
periods of disability. Goodwill contended that Easley's injury
did not arise out of employment and that her settlement with the
employee who caused the injury barred a claim against Goodwill.
In its December 13, 1993 opinion, the commission found that
Easley's settlement agreement with her co-worker was encouraged
and acquiesced in by her supervisor and that the co-worker was
not an "other party" described in Code § 65.2-309. The
commission also found that the medical records at the hearing did
not prove that the treatment Easley received subsequent to April
6, 1992, resulted from her January 1992 injury. The commission
relied in part upon a report from Dr. Joel M. Singer which
attributed Easley's absence from work since September 1992 to "a
recurrence of her original injury from 4/18/90." Thus, the
commission affirmed completely the deputy commissioner's rulings.
Goodwill's insurer later refused to pay for medical
treatment rendered to Easley on June 19, 1992, January 21, 1993,
and July 1, 1993. Easley filed an application seeking to compel
payment for the three unreimbursed medical bills, for pain
medication, and attorneys' fees. She contended that the award of
medical benefits entitled her to recover for medical expenses
related to the January 1992 injury. Acknowledging that the award
of benefits entitled Easley to medical treatments related to the
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January 1992 incident, the deputy commissioner ruled that because
the medical treatments were rendered after April 6, 1992, they
were not causally related to the compensable disability and
Easley was not entitled to recover.
The commission reversed, in part, the deputy commissioner's
decision. The commission found that the evidence related the
July 1, 1993 medical bill to the January 9, 1992 injury. The
commission also found that at the previous evidentiary hearing
the June 19, 1992 and January 25, 1993 bills were at issue and
found to be unrelated to the January 1992 injury. The commission
reaffirmed that its earlier award entitled Easley to recover for
any future medical expenses that were related to treatment for
the January 1992 injury.
We hold that the commission's award is consistent with its
prior review opinion and is not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata. In its initial review opinion, the commission held
that the limited period of compensation awarded by the deputy
commissioner was correct and affirmed that award in every aspect,
including the deputy commissioner's ruling that Goodwill was
"responsible for the reasonable cost of medical care, if any
there be, related to the claimant's accident of January 9, 1992."
The commission's initial decision resolved the issues of
Easley's period of disability and found that Easley was not
disabled from work for the period April 6, 1992 through the date
of her application, i.e. September 15, 1992. That decision did
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not bar the prospect of any future medical treatment that was
proved to be related to the January 1992 injury.
At the initial evidentiary hearing the medical expenses for
June 19, 1992 and January 25, 1993 were proved, and the
commission implicitly found that the medical treatment rendered
on these two dates did not relate to Easley's January 9, 1992
injury. Easley did not appeal from that ruling. Thus, res
judicata barred her claim in this proceeding for reimbursement
for medical treatment evidenced by the June 19 and January 25
reports. See K & L Trucking Co. v. Thurber, 1 Va. App. 213, 219,
337 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1985)("the decisions of the Commission or
its deputy commissioners from which no party seeks timely review
are binding upon the Commission"). The commission's decision so
holds.
The commission's initial award did not address, however, the
medical treatment provided to Easley on July 1, 1993. Both the
application and the deputy commissioner's decision predated the
doctor's visit on July 1, 1993. No evidence at the initial
hearing concerned the July 1, 1993 medical care and the basis for
the treatment.
The record of the current proceeding contains credible
evidence that the July 1, 1993 medical report was related to
Easley's January 1992 injury. "It lies within the commission's
authority to determine the facts and the weight of the evidence,
and its findings in that regard, when supported by credible
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evidence, will not be disturbed on appeal." Rose v. Red's Hitch
& Trailer Services, 11 Va. App. 55, 60, 396 S.E.2d 392, 395
(1990). Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision that
the employer must reimburse Easley for the medical care provided
by Dr. Singer on July 1, 1993 and any subsequent care "related to
[her] injury of January 9, 1992."
Affirmed.
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