Robert Lee Brock v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Benton and Overton
Argued at Salem, Virginia
ROBERT LEE BROCK
v. Record No. 0756-94-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION*
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA DECEMBER 19, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON
Rudolph Bumgardner, III, Judge
(William E. Bobbitt, Jr., Public Defender),
for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
Thomas C. Daniel, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Robert B.
Condon, Assistant Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Robert Lee Brock (appellant) was awarded an appeal only from
his bench trial convictions by the Circuit Court of the City of
Staunton (trial court) for nine counts of attempted breaking and
entering in the nighttime. In addition, appellant was convicted
of three counts of breaking and entering and four counts of grand
larceny. Those counts arose from events that occurred at the
same area the attempted break-in counts are alleged to have
occurred. The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether the
evidence is sufficient to support the convictions for the nine
counts of attempted breaking and entering in the nighttime.
Upon familiar principles, we state the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
____________________
*Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Higginbotham v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975).
On July 30, 1993, appellant along with two accomplices, James
Adams (Adams) and James Sandy (Sandy), carried out a series of
breaking and enterings and larcenies in the City of Staunton.
Prior to trial, co-defendants Adams and Sandy entered into a plea
agreement with the Commonwealth to testify against appellant.
The evidence established that on July 30, 1993, appellant,
Adams, and Sandy broke into, and stole goods from, three separate
storage units located at a mini-warehouse storage complex owned
by Calvin VanFossen (VanFossen). The attempted breaking and
enterings are alleged to have occurred at nine other units of the
359-unit mini-warehouse complex. The evidence introduced to link
appellant to the commission of the nine alleged attempted
breaking and enterings was the testimony of the two co-defendants
Sandy and Adams, and the testimony of VanFossen.
Adams testified:
Q. Did you [load](?) items on the
truck?
A. Yeah. Then when I was doing that
[appellant] went up, was up a few doors on
the storage sheds, I don't know. Four or
five doors or something like that, doing
something. Then he said something to me
about come over here and I walked up there
and he was pulling on a lock. It appeared to
be like a big screw driver and he said that
he didn't have his key but he was trying to
find, he thought that this one was an easy
one.
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Q. This one was an easy one?
A. Yeah, that the lock was easy and he
thought he would just go ahead and take the
lock off. So then he asked me to try it. So
I tried it and it didn't come open. So he
was walking back, kept looking around,
looking at the numbers and said yeah, I'm
sure this was it and, at that point I was
like, I am confused here so I just walked
back to the truck. And at that time we just
all got back in the truck and left.
Q. Do you know how many storage sheds
[appellant] tried to get into?
A. I didn't notice. Other than that
that is all I know.
Sandy testified:
Q. I'm sorry, okay, okay, you went to
the storage buildings with the defendant
driving in his truck and you loaded up the
sofa and chair and what else?
A. If I remember correctly,
[appellant] went around to a couple other
little places there and picked up some more
stuff and I couldn't tell you which one of
the buildings it was.
Q. Do you remember how many sheds were
entered or attempted to be entered? Do you
have any idea?
A. Not exactly, no.
* * * * * * *
Q. Did you try to open some of the
sheds?
A. No sir.
Q. Who was doing that?
A. [Appellant].
Q. Was Mr. Adams helping with that?
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A. I don't know. He was out running
around too. I couldn't tell you if he was
trying to open up any or not.
Q. So you don't know how many they
tried to open?
A. No I don't.
Q. But you know they got a sofa and
chair out of one and some other items out of
another?
A. I believe so, yes sir.
Q. All right, now after that, what were
you all using, what were they using to get
in, do you know?
A. [Appellant] had a great big old long
mechanic tool. It looks like a crow bar but
it is not shaped like one. It's straight and
it's got a, like a wood handle to it. It's
like you know, you go to pull off the heads
of something onto a car, something like that.
Q. Okay. And that's what they took with
them to . . .
A. That was inside the front seat of
the truck, yeah.
Q. All right, did they take it with
them when they got out of the truck?
A. Yes sir.
VanFossen testified to what he observed when he came to work
the next morning. VanFossen said that he observed three storage
units, numbers 313, 315, and 330, where the locks had been
broken, the doors damaged, and entry gained. He said that he had
examined nine other units, numbers 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 334,
337, 338, and 339, where the doors had been damaged but entry had
not been gained. VanFossen also testified that there were 359
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units at his business and that he had previously had trouble with
"people either breaking into [his] warehouse units" or attempting
to break-in. The parties stipulated that Ernie Reed who worked
for VanFossen, and was present in court, if called to testify
would say that he had observed the same things that VanFossen
described. Matthew Bird, one of VanFossen's tenants, testified
that his rental unit was broken into on this occasion and that
same storage unit had been broken into about a month before.
There was no evidence presented as to the condition of units
318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 334, 337, 338, and 339 prior to July 30,
1993, or whether the damages to the doors to those units appeared
to be recently made.
Co-defendant Adams, testifying on behalf of the
Commonwealth, described seeing appellant breaking into one of the
units not included in the nine involved in this appeal. He
described appellant as not initially being successful in his
break-in on one of the units and that appellant "was walking
back, kept looking around, looking at numbers and said 'yeah, I'm
sure this was it . . .'" thus appearing to be interested in one
particular unit. When the prosecutor attempted to solicit
testimony from Sandy and Adams, about the nine units related to
this appeal, both men denied any knowledge of appellant's attempt
to enter those units.
"An attempt to commit a crime consists of (1) the specific
intent to commit the particular crime, and (2) an ineffectual act
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done toward its commission." Bell v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App.
530, 533, 399 S.E.2d 450, 452 (1991) (quoting Lynch v.
Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 109 S.E. 427 (1921)). "Intent is a
state of mind which can be evidenced only by the words or conduct
of the person who is claimed to have entertained it." Banovitch
v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 210, 216, 83 S.E.2d 369, 373 (1954).
"An overt act is required to prove an attempted offense because
without it, there is too much uncertainty as to the accused's
actual intent." Tharrington v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 491,
493, 346 S.E.2d 337, 339 (1986). Here, there is evidence that
this appellant committed overt acts toward other units but there
is no evidence that he was the criminal agent who damaged the
nine entrances to the specific units for which he stands
convicted. While it is true that it came to the attention of the
owner and one of his employees that the nine units of the
359-unit mini storage had been damaged, there is no evidence as
to when either of these persons last observed the particular
units. Additionally, there is evidence that within approximately
thirty days prior to the discovery there had been other
break-ins. We are of opinion and hold that the evidence is
insufficient to support appellant's guilt as the criminal agent
who damaged units 318, 319, 321, 322, 323, 334, 337, 338, and
339.
The Commonwealth argues that even if we held the evidence is
insufficient, we should not consider this appeal because
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appellant at no time made a motion to strike the Commonwealth's
evidence and at his sentencing hearing, he made statements
inconsistent with statements he made at trial.
In support of its inconsistency argument, the Commonwealth
cites Beavers v. Commonwealth, 150 Va. 33, 142 S.E. 402 (1926).
The facts in that case are distinguishable from those before us.
Here appellant consistently denied any involvement with the nine
units. There was no relevant inconsistency in his testimony at
trial and at sentencing.
As the Commonwealth argues, appellant did not specifically
make any motion to strike the evidence that was based upon
insufficiency. However, in his closing argument, counsel for
appellant addressed the trial court, saying:
[M]y client is charged with a number of
attempted, attempts to break-in to, I believe
it is nine of those warehouses, Judge I don't
think the Court has heard evidence that would
in any way sufficiently tie my client to
going to the first one through the ninth one.
[Adams and Sandy] have talked about going
into a warehouse and taking some items out
but neither of them, and they then digress
into we were just kind of there and . . . I'd
ask the Court to give great weight to the
Commonwealth's witnesses in what they had to
say about attempted break-ins at a number of,
of the warehouse, the specific units.
Citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 412, 368 S.E.2d 293
(1988), the Commonwealth argues that the sufficiency of the
evidence argument cannot be considered by this Court. The
Commonwealth then properly cites a later en banc decision by this
Court in Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 476, 405 S.E.2d 1
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(1991), in which we said:
To the extent that [the case] holds that an
appeal of the sufficiency of the evidence is
barred by the failure to move to strike the
Commonwealth's evidence at the conclusion of
the defendant's evidence even if the issue is
clearly presented to the trial court by a
motion to strike at the conclusion of the
Commonwealth's evidence and in a closing
argument to a trial court, we overrule it.
Id. at 481, 405 S.E.2d at 3 (emphasis added). The Commonwealth
further argues that the sufficiency issue was not "clearly
presented" to the trial court in the closing argument and,
therefore, appellant is barred from making the sufficiency
argument in this appeal. Assuming, without deciding, that the
sufficiency argument made in closing argument was not "clearly
sufficient" to advise the trial court that appellant intended for
his argument to be a motion to strike, we hold that on this
evidence the ends of justice require that appellant's convictions
cannot be justified when the evidence does not prove that
appellant was the criminal agent.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and
appellant is dismissed from further prosecution on these charges.
Reversed and dismissed.
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