Westvaco Corporation v. Carl Edward Linkenhoker, Sr

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
WESTVACO CORPORATION
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1104-96-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
DECEMBER 31, 1996
CARL EDWARD LINKENHOKER, SR.
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Kathryn Spruill Lingle (Midkiff & Hiner,
P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Gary Wheeler Kendall (Edmund R. Michie;
Michie, Hamlett, Lowry, Rasmussen & Tweel,
P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Westvaco Corporation (employer) appeals from a decision of
the Workers' Compensation Commission (commission) awarding
medical benefits to Carl Edward Linkenhoker, Sr. (claimant) and
finding that his claim was not barred under the statute of
limitations. Employer contends that the commission erred in
ruling that the doctrine of imposition prevents employer from
asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to claimant's
claim. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
I.
FACTS
On March 3, 1993, claimant, a journeyman machinist with
employer, injured his back in a work-related accident. During
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
the two years following the accident, employer treated claimant's
injury as compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act).
Although claimant missed no work as a result of his accident, he
required numerous medical examinations and treatments for his
injury. At least some of his appointments were arranged through
the employer's medical department and all were paid for by
employer through its workers' compensation insurance. Employer
also compensated claimant for his milage to and from medical
appointments. However, claimant testified that employer never
told him that it would file a worker's compensation claim on his
behalf. Although employer treated claimant's injury as
compensable under the Act, the record indicates that it did not
file a memorandum of agreement with the commission regarding
claimant's claim.
Employer filed its first notice of the accident with the
commission, a minor injury report, on July 24, 1993. This report
indicates that as of July 24, claimant's total medical costs
totaled $844. After this date, claimant saw doctors five times
in 1994 and once in 1995. Employer filed its first report of
accident on September 22, 1995.
The record reflects that claimant filed an unrelated claim
for asbestosis in 1992 and that the commission mailed claimant a
notification letter and pamphlet advising him of the requirement
that he file a claim. Claimant testified that he did not recall
receiving any notices or pamphlets from the commission until
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June, 1995.
In July, 1995, employer informed claimant that it would no
longer pay any medical expenses related to his back injury, and
on July 10, 1995, claimant filed an application for hearing with
the commission. After a deputy commissioner denied claimant's
claim because it was barred by the statute of limitations, the
full commission reversed and awarded medical benefits to claimant
for his back injury. Regarding the timeliness of claimant's
claim, the commission held that the doctrine of imposition tolled
the bar of the statute of limitations over the claim because
employer did not file a memorandum of agreement after accepting
the claim as compensable and did not comply with the commission's
reporting requirements.
II.
DOCTRINE OF IMPOSITION
Employer contends that the commission erred when it held
that employer was barred from asserting that the two year statute
of limitations of Code § 65.2-601 barred claimant's claim because
employer had imposed upon claimant. We agree.
"Within the principles established by statutes and the
decisions construing them, the commission has 'jurisdiction to do
full and complete justice in every case.' From that principle
has developed the concept known as 'imposition,' which empowers
the commission in appropriate cases to render decisions based
upon justice shown by the total circumstances even though no
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fraud, mistake or concealment has been shown." Odom v. Red
Lobster, 20 Va. App. 228, 234, 456 S.E.2d 140, 143 (1995)
(quoting Avon Products, Inc. v. Ross, 14 Va. App. 1, 7, 415
S.E.2d 225, 228 (1992)). When applying the doctrine of
imposition, "[t]he issue is whether under the totality of the
circumstances shown, the actions of the employer and its carrier
created an imposition on the commission and the claimant which
empowered the commission [to] 'do full and complete justice.'"
Avon, 14 Va. App. at 8, 415 S.E.2d at 229.
We hold that this is not a case in which the commission was
empowered to exercise its jurisdiction beyond the expiration of
the two year limitations period. Although employer neither
complied with the commission's reporting requirements nor filed a
memorandum of agreement after accepting claimant's claim as
required by Code § 65.2-701, these actions by themselves do not
necessarily constitute a de jure case of imposition. Odom, 20
Va. App. at 235, 456 S.E.2d at 143 (stating that whether
imposition has occurred is determined by the totality of the
circumstances and not bright line rules). Instead, circumstances
other than the employer's acts contributed to the untimely filing
of claimant's claim. The record indicates that claimant had
prior experience with the workers' compensation system and was
aware before the expiration of the limitations period that the
procedure for securing benefits involved filing a claim with the
commission. In 1992, claimant hired his current attorney and
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filed a claim with the commission for asbestosis. Significantly,
claimant testified that employer never told him that it had filed
a claim for his 1993 injury on his behalf. Thus, claimant's
failure to file a claim before the expiration of the statute of
limitations was the result of his own failure to act rather than
being caused by any actions of employer. Because claimant was
aware of the existence of procedural requirements necessary to
preserve his claim and because he had a prior relationship with
an attorney familiar with the Act, we cannot say that the current
statutory bar of claimant's claim was caused by the employer
imposing upon the commission or upon the claimant. See Butler v.
City of Virginia Beach, 22 Va. App. 601, 605, 471 S.E.2d 830, 832
(1996).
In light of the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision
of the commission.
Reversed.
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