Franceon A. Ford v. C.M. Offray & Son, Inc.

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Fitzpatrick, Overton and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Salem, Virginia
FRANCEON A. FORD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2637-95-3 JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
JULY 16, 1996
Cow. M. OFFRAY & SON, INC. AND
ROYAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Barbara Hudson for appellant.
Richard D. Lucas (Frank K. Friedman; Wood
Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., on brief), for
appellees.
Franceon A. Ford (claimant) appeals from a decision of the
commission denying her application for workers' compensation
benefits. She argues that the commission erred in: (1) finding
that she failed to prove that her carpal tunnel syndrome was a
compensable occupational disease, and (2) admitting documents
obtained from her doctor by the attorney for C. M. Offray & Son,
Inc. (employer) without notice to her. Because carpal tunnel
syndrome is not a compensable occupational disease, we dismiss
the case.
BACKGROUND
Claimant worked for employer for five years as a baby
blocker, a job that involved repetitive hand movements rolling
ribbon onto a machine. On November 4, 1994, Dr. Tullio L.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Coccia, claimant's treating physician, diagnosed her as suffering
from repetitive trauma syndrome/flexor tendinitis and carpal
tunnel syndrome. In a January 6, 1995 letter, Dr. Coccia stated
that claimant's condition was caused by her employment as a baby
blocker. Claimant asked whether Dr. Coccia could state that her
condition was an occupational disease, and Dr. Coccia amended the
last sentence of the letter to read as follows: "I feel that
this is definitely related to her job and is in fact an
occupational disease." Dr. Coccia dated the revised letter
January 25, 1995.
Employer's attorney contacted Dr. Coccia and asked him to
clarify his January 25, 1995 letter. In a March 30, 1995 letter
responding to the request, Dr. Coccia stated that carpal tunnel
syndrome is "not a disease process." Dr. Coccia's March 30, 1995
letter was not provided to claimant or her attorney. Employer
introduced the March 30, 1995 letter and the January 6, 1995
letter at the May 3, 1995 hearing before the deputy commissioner,
and claimant objected to the admission of the January 6, 1995
letter.
The commission denied claimant benefits, holding that she
failed to meet the threshold burden of proving that her condition
was an occupational disease.
CARPAL TUNNEL SYNDROME AS OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
After the parties filed briefs in this case, employer moved
to dismiss the case based upon the Supreme Court of Virginia's
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opinion in Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 251 Va. 186, 467 S.E.2d 795
(1996). In Stenrich Group, the Supreme Court held that "job-
related impairments resulting from cumulative trauma caused by
repetitive motion, however labeled or however defined, are, as a
matter of law, not compensable under the present provisions of
the Act." 251 Va. at 199, 467 S.E.2d at 802. Claimant concedes
that Stenrich Group controls and that her carpal tunnel syndrome
is not compensable under the Act.
ADMISSION OF DOCUMENT OBTAINED WITHOUT NOTICE TO CLAIMANT
Although claimant's carpal tunnel syndrome is not
compensable as an occupational disease, she argues that this
Court should still address the issue of whether the commission
erred in admitting documents obtained from her treating physician
by employer's attorney without notice to claimant.
"'The duty of this court as of every other judicial
tribunal, is to decide actual controversies by a judgment which
can be carried into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot
questions or abstract propositions.'" Jackson v. Marshall, 19
Va. App. 628, 635, 454 S.E.2d 23, 27 (1995) (quoting Potts v.
Mathieson Alkali Works, 165 Va. 196, 225, 181 S.E. 521, 533
(1935)). Because resolution of claimant's carpal tunnel claim
leaves nothing more to be done with this case, the issue of
whether the commission erred in considering Dr. Coccia's March
30, 1995 letter to employer's attorney is rendered moot.
Accordingly, the case is dismissed.
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Dismissed.
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