C&S Sovran Corp. v. Sally Stevens

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Benton and Coleman
C & S SOVRAN CORPORATION
AND
PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS MEMORANDUM OPINION *
ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY PER CURIAM
JUNE 11, 1996
v. Record No. 2933-95-3
SALLY STEVENS
FROM THE VIRGINIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Monica L. Taylor; Ronnie L. Clay; Gentry,
Locke, Rakes & Moore, on briefs), for
appellants.
(Ginger J. Largen; J. D. Morefield;
Morefield, Kendrick, Hess & Largen, on
brief), for appellee.
C & S Sovran and its insurer (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "employer") contend that the Workers' Compensation
Commission erred in finding that (1) a June 18, 1993 letter
constituted a timely claim for benefits related to Sally Stevens'
right shoulder condition; and (2) Stevens did not unreasonably
discontinue her efforts to market her residual work capacity
between December 23, 1993 and January 5, 1994. Upon reviewing
the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this
appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I. Statute of Limitations
The facts are not in dispute. On July 17, 1991, while
working for employer as a senior teller, Stevens sustained a
compensable injury by accident. On February 6, 1992, the
commission received a memorandum of agreement signed by Stevens
and employer. The memorandum of agreement showed that Stevens
had sustained a cervical sprain on July 17, 1991. During the
spring of 1992, after the parties had executed the memorandum of
agreement, Stevens developed right shoulder symptoms. On June
18, 1993, the commission received a letter from Stevens' counsel,
which noted the accident date and counsel's representation. In
the letter, Stevens' counsel informed the commission that no
award had been entered regarding Stevens' July 17, 1991 injury by
accident. Stevens' counsel wrote:With this situation in mind,
please treat this letter as a request for hearing for the
implementation of weekly Workers' Compensation benefits
commencing on July 17, 1991, payment of all unpaid bills which
are causally related to treatment for injuries sustained in the
subject accident, reimbursement for all reimbursable mileage to
date, and such other and further relief as Ms. Stevens may be
entitled to under the Act. Obviously, with the time frame in
mind, it is imperative that an award order be entered in this
claim.
The commission entered an award on June 24, 1993 based upon the
memorandum of agreement.
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Based upon these undisputed facts, the commission found that
the June 18, 1993 letter, filed with the commission approximately
one month before the two-year limitations period expired, was
sufficiently broad to constitute a claim for Stevens' right
shoulder condition. Accordingly, the commission held that the
two-year limitations period did not bar it from considering
Stevens' claim for benefits related to her right shoulder
condition.
A claim for an employee's right to compensation must be
filed with the commission within two years from the date of the
accident. Code § 65.2-601. "Such a claim must identify the
employer, the date of the accident, the location of the accident,
and the injuries suffered. Also, it must 'fairly apprise the
commission that a claim [is] being made.'" Cheski v. Arlington
County Public Schools, 16 Va. App. 936, 938, 434 S.E.2d 353, 355
(1993) (quoting Trammel Crow Co. v. Redmond, 12 Va. App. 610,
614, 405 S.E.2d 632, 634 (1991)). There is no dispute that the
June 18, 1993 letter identified the employer and the date of
Stevens' accident. Employer contends that the letter did not
constitute a "claim" for benefits related to Stevens' right
shoulder condition because it did not state the exact injuries
Stevens sustained in the accident or the location of the
accident. We disagree.
In the June 18, 1993 letter, Stevens made it clear that she
sought an award of benefits for "all unpaid bills which are
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causally related to treatment for injuries sustained in the
subject accident." This statement was broad enough to include a
claim for benefits related to Stevens' right shoulder condition.
The medical records, known to employer, clearly established that
Stevens sustained a right shoulder injury as a result of the
accident. Moreover, her treatment for this condition occurred
well before the two-year limitations period expired. The fact
that Stevens did not specify the location of her accident was not
fatal to her claim. A memorandum of agreement had already been
signed by employer agreeing to the compensability of Stevens'
accident. In this case, unlike Shawley v. Shea-Ball Constr. Co.,
216 Va. 442, 219 S.E.2d 849 (1975), the intent of Code § 65.2-601
was fulfilled. Stevens timely filed a claim for benefits related
to all injuries arising out of her July 17, 1991 accident,
employer knew of the location and occurrence of Stevens' accident
before the June 18, 1993 letter, and employer knew of Stevens'
medical treatment for her right shoulder condition, which
occurred prior to the expiration of the two-year limitations
period.
The June 18, 1993 letter constituted a timely claim for all
injuries causally related to Stevens' July 17, 1991 accident,
including her right shoulder condition. The evidence showed that
the commission and employer were fully apprised that Stevens was
making such a claim. Accordingly, the commission did not err in
finding that the two-year limitations period did not bar it from
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considering Stevens' claim for benefits related to her right
shoulder condition.
II. Marketing
There is no dispute that Stevens adequately marketed her
residual work capacity through December 23, 1993. It was
undisputed that the hearing commenced on January 5, 1994, and
that two major holidays occurred between December 23, 1993 and
January 5, 1994. Based upon these facts, the commission ruled
that it was not unreasonable for Stevens to discontinue her
marketing efforts during this short period of time. We agree.
This case is controlled by our holding in Holly Farms v. Carter,
15 Va. App. 29, 422 S.E.2d 165 (1992). Contrary to employer's
assertions on appeal, there is no evidence that Stevens did not
intend to resume her marketing efforts after the January 5, 1994
hearing.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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