Milton J. Hodges v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MILTON J. HODGES
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0622-99-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
MARCH 28, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALBEMARLE COUNTY
Paul M. Peatross, Jr., Judge
Pamela R. Johnson for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
On appeal from his conviction of grand larceny, in
violation of Code § 18.2-95, Milton J. Hodges contends that the
evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, because the
Commonwealth did not prove the value of the stolen goods. We
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Where the sufficiency of the evidence
is challenged after conviction, it is our
duty to consider it in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth and give it
all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. We should affirm the judgment
unless it appears from the evidence that the
judgment is plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Higginbotham v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534,
537 (1975).
Hodges worked as a temporary employee for Robinson, Farmer,
Cox and Associates from October 27, 1997 through December 12,
1997. Sometime during the week following termination of his
employment, someone at the firm realized that a Dell P100 laptop
computer, a Dell P75 laptop computer, a Canon bubble jet
printer, and a satchel were missing. The firm notified the
police.
While questioning Hodges, the police noticed a Dell
computer in his possession. After obtaining a search warrant,
they recovered from his apartment one of the missing computers.
They also found a missing nylon bag in his bedroom and the
missing satchel in his car. The next day, the police found the
missing printer at the home of Hodges' friend John Rea.
Hodges contends that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction, because the Commonwealth did not prove
that the value of the stolen items exceeded two hundred dollars.
See Code § 18.2-95.
"Proof that an article has some value is sufficient to
warrant a conviction of petit larceny, but where the value of
the thing stolen determines the grade of the offense, the value
must be alleged and the Commonwealth must prove the value to be
the statutory amount." Wright v. Commonwealth, 196 Va. 132,
139, 82 S.E.2d 603, 607 (1954). The value of an object of
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larceny is the fair market value at the time and place of the
theft. See, e.g., Dunn v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 704, 705, 284
S.E.2d 792, 792 (1981). The fair market value can be proven by
either direct or circumstantial evidence, so long as the
evidence is sufficient to allow the trier of fact to
"intelligently and fairly estimate with reasonable certainty"
the value of the item at the time of the loss. Gertler v.
Bowling, 202 Va. 213, 216, 116 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1960). See also
Veney v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 805, 806-07, 188 S.E.2d 80, 81-82
(1972).
To prove grand larceny, the Commonwealth was required to
prove that the items stolen had a value of $200 or more. See
Code § 18.2-95.
The Commonwealth introduced expert testimony from John
Black, a pawn shop owner experienced in buying and selling used
computers. During direct examination, the Commonwealth gave
Black the age and specifications of the two stolen computers. 1
Based upon that information, Black consulted a recognized
reference book providing wholesale and retail prices for
computers. He testified that the Dell P100 had a fair market
value of $350 and the Dell P75 had a fair market value of
between $250 and $275.
1
Black was asked what specific information he would need in
pricing the computer equipment. The Commonwealth offered
evidence as to the make, model, manufacturer, age, and last
known working condition and features of the computers.
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Hodges argues that Black's testimony was insufficient
because Black had not personally examined the computers. He
argues further that Black's assessment of values assumed that
the computers were operable at the time of the larceny.
"However, 'it is generally held that evidence of value a
reasonable time prior and subsequent to the [larceny] is
admissible, its weight being for the trier of fact.'" Lester v.
Commonwealth, 30 Va. App. 495, 505, 518 S.E.2d 318, 322 (1999)
(citation omitted). The evidence showed that the computers were
in use immediately prior to the larceny; that Hodges offered his
friends use of the computers, implying that they were operable
after the larceny; and that the computers were operable when
they were recovered.
The value of the computers was a question of fact to be
resolved by the jury. Its verdict will not be disturbed on
appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.
See Cable v. Commonwealth, 243 Va. 236, 239, 415 S.E.2d 218, 220
(1992). We find that Black's testimony, along with the
circumstantial evidence of the computers' condition before,
during, and after the theft, supports the conviction.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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