Bobby L Monroe, Sr v. Piedmont Geriatric Hospital

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Senior Judge Hodges
BOBBY L. MONROE, SR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0969-02-2 PER CURIAM
AUGUST 27, 2002
PIEDMONT GERIATRIC HOSPITAL/
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(A. Pierre Jackson, on brief), for appellant.
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Judith
Williams Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney General;
Edward M. Macon, Senior Assistant Attorney
General; Scott John Fitzgerald, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Bobby L. Monroe, Sr. (claimant) contends the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in refusing to consider, on
review, his argument that fraud, mistake or imposition applied
to save his June 2001 Claim for Benefits alleging an April 1,
1999 accident from the bar of the applicable statute of
limitations. Upon reviewing the record and the parties' briefs,
we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Factual findings made by the commission will be upheld on appeal
if supported by credible evidence. See James v. Capitol Steel
Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).
So viewed, the evidence proved that at the November 13,
2001 hearing, claimant stipulated that he did not file his claim
for the April 1, 1999 accident within the two-year limitations
period contained in Code § 65.2-601. In addition, claimant did
not present any evidence at the hearing to justify tolling the
limitations period or supporting application of fraud, mistake
or imposition. In fact, claimant stipulated before the deputy
commissioner that he could not allege fraud, mistake, or
imposition that would justify the late filing.
On review before the full commission, claimant argued that
he filed a timely Claim for Benefits in April 1999, but was told
by his employer that the February 16, 1999 accident date was
incorrect. Claimant alleged that employer told him it did not
matter because he could not pursue a claim and his only recourse
was to seek disability retirement. Claimant asserted that he
was not aware until June 2001 that he could pursue a claim when
an associate advised him that he had a compensable claim.
In refusing to consider claimant's argument, the commission
found as follows:
The Deputy Commissioner decided this
case based on the stipulations of the
parties at the hearing. The claimant did
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not raise any allegations that the employer
misled him into not filing a timely claim.
It is clear that this information was known
to the claimant prior to the November 2001
hearing, but he did not raise it at that
hearing. The information does not meet the
standards for admission of after-discovered
evidence, and we will not consider it on
Review.
At the hearing, the employer and
claimant stipulated to various facts. Both
parties agreed that the claimant's claims
were untimely and barred by the statute of
limitations. The employer, however, agreed
to pay lifetime medical benefits relating to
the April 1, 1999, injury. Although the
claimant had the opportunity to make the
allegation he now claims on Review, the
claimant made no allegation of fraud,
mistake, or imposition that would justify
his late filing of his claims. The Deputy
Commissioner correctly ruled that the
claimant's claims were untimely and barred
by the applicable statute of limitations.
Claimant stipulated at the hearing that his June 2001 claim
was time-barred and he could not prove fraud, mistake or
imposition. He did not present any evidence at the hearing to
support the application of fraud, mistake or imposition.
Parties are bound by their stipulations. See Barrick v. Bd. of
Supervisors of Mathews County, 239 Va. 628, 631, 391 S.E.2d 318,
320 (1990). Therefore, the commission properly refused to
consider claimant's argument regarding fraud, mistake and
imposition on review.
In addition, claimant did not petition the commission to
reopen the record or to receive after-discovered evidence. Even
if he had done so, the evidence he sought to introduce existed
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in 1999 and was known to him before the hearing. Thus, it did
not qualify as after-discovered evidence. See Williams v.
People's Life Ins. Co., 19 Va. App. 530, 532, 452 S.E.2d 881,
883 (1995); Rule 3.3 of the Rules of the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Commission.
For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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