Gary Fredrick Lovell, s/k/a Gary Frederick Lovell v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Salem, Virginia
GARY FREDRICK LOVELL, S/K/A
GARY FREDERICK LOVELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 2402-04-3 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
DECEMBER 20, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON
Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge
Robert T. Garnett, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the Public
Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Eugene Murphy, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Judith Williams
Jagdmann, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Gary Fredrick Lovell (“Lovell”) appeals his conviction of driving while under the
influence after having been declared a habitual offender, in violation of Code §§ 18.2-266 and
46.2-357. Lovell argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to strike a juror for cause
after that juror indicated that he could not decide the case in a fair and impartial manner. For the
following reasons, we disagree and affirm the judgment below.
On appeal, we must defer to a trial court’s ruling on the issue of whether to retain or
excuse a prospective juror for cause. Barrett v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 823, 826, 553 S.E.2d
731, 732 (2001). Although we note the maxim that “[i]f the juror does not stand indifferent to
the cause, he is not competent,” Spangler v. Ashwell, 116 Va. 992, 996-97, 83 S.E. 930, 931
(1914), we also recognize that, having seen and heard the responses of the venire, trial courts are
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. Moreover,
as this opinion has no precedential value, we recite only those facts necessary to our holding.
in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror would be prevented from, or
impaired in, performing the duties of a juror. Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115-16,
546 S.E.2d 446, 451 (2001). Therefore, the trial court’s ruling on whether to strike a juror for
cause “will not be disturbed on appeal unless there has been manifest error amounting to an
abuse of discretion.” Barrett, 262 Va. at 826, 553 S.E.2d at 732.
I. Question Not Properly Preserved for Appeal
Lovell initially contends the trial judge impermissibly bolstered the impartiality of Paul
Hatcher, a member of the venire, through the use of leading questions. However, we need not
consider the merits of this issue because it is not properly before us.
Clearly, Lovell preserved his objection to the trial judge’s failure to strike Hatcher for
cause based upon Hatcher’s “waffling.” However, he did not object to the trial judge’s use of
allegedly leading questions. And, because Lovell presents this argument for the first time on
appeal, we cannot consider it. See Rule 5A:18; see also Bell v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 172,
196, 563 S.E.2d 695, 711 (2002) (finding that, because appellant did not object to the trial
judge’s rehabilitation of potential jurors by asking leading questions, Rule 5:25 barred
consideration of the issue on appeal).
II. Whether the Trial Judge Abused His Discretion By Failing to Strike
Juror Hatcher for Cause
Lovell also argues that the trial judge abused his discretion by failing to strike Hatcher for
cause, reasoning that Hatcher’s responses to questions during voir dire indicated he had “strong
feelings” that would prevent him from fairly performing his duties as a juror. We disagree.
The standard to be applied by the trial court in determining
whether to retain a venireman on the jury panel is whether his
answers during voir dire examination indicate to the court
something that would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his
instructions and his oath.
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Eaton v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 236, 246, 397 S.E.2d 385, 391 (1990) (citing Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 549, 364 S.E.2d 483, 486
(1988)) (internal citations omitted). Although it is true that “if there be a reasonable doubt
whether the juror [is impartial], that doubt is sufficient to insure his exclusion,” Bradbury v.
Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 176, 180, 578 S.E.2d 93, 95 (2003), it is also true that a juror’s
entire voir dire, not isolated portions, must be considered when evaluating a juror’s impartiality,
Mackall v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 240, 252, 372 S.E.2d 759, 767 (1988); Wise v.
Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 325, 337 S.E.2d 715, 717 (1985); Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth,
223 Va. 615, 628, 292 S.E.2d 798, 805 (1982).
Lovell contends that the trial court abused its discretion because Hatcher’s “strong
feelings” conclusively demonstrated his inability to decide the case on a fair and impartial basis.
Lovell notes that, when asked by counsel if he could put aside those feelings to fairly judge a
case involving a DUI and habitual offender, he stated, “I don’t know.”
However, in response to several other questions posed by trial counsel and by the trial
court, Hatcher indicated that he could, in fact, decide the case without prejudice. Clearly, at one
point, Hatcher expressed some reservations about his ability to decide the case impartially.
However, this Court must review the entire voir dire process, not just Hatcher’s response to an
isolated question. The trial judge had the opportunity to witness Hatcher’s testimony and
demeanor, both in response to the court’s questioning and in response to questioning by counsel.
Because Hatcher ultimately indicated that he could be impartial, the trial judge’s failure to strike
him for cause does not amount to an abuse of discretion. See Mackall, 236 Va. at 252, 372
S.E.2d at 767.
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For these reasons, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to
strike Hatcher for cause, and, therefore, we affirm Lovell’s convictions.
Affirmed.
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