Regina Jenkins v. City Newport News Dept. Soc Svc.

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Felton and Senior Judge Willis
REGINA JENKINS
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0428-03-1 PER CURIAM
SEPTEMBER 2, 2003
CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Randolph T. West, Judge
(Stephen A. Hudgins, on brief), for
appellant.
(Kim Van Horn Gutterman, Assistant City
Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
Regina Jenkins (mother) appeals the February 7, 2003 order
of the trial court terminating her residual parental rights with
respect to her daughter, Lexus Emma Jenkins. The trial court
determined, by clear and convincing evidence, that mother,
without good cause, failed to provide or substantially plan for
the child's future for a period of six months after her
placement in foster care as required by Code § 16.1-283(C)(1);
that mother, without good cause, has been unwilling or unable to
substantially remedy the conditions which led to the child's
foster care placement within a reasonable period of time in
accordance with Code § 16.1-283(C)(2); and that, under Code
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
§ 16.1-283(E)(i), mother's residual parental rights to a sibling
have previously been terminated. The trial court concluded that
termination of mother's residual parental rights served the
child's best interests and ordered that Newport News Department
of Social Services (NNDSS) had authority to place the child for
adoption.
Mother argues that the evidence does not support the trial
court's finding that termination served the child's best
interests. Specifically, she argues that NNDSS did not present
sufficient evidence to prove that she failed to substantially
remedy the causes which led to the child's placement in foster
care, that she failed to plan for the child's future, and that
termination served Lexus's best interests because of the prior
termination of mother's rights to a sibling. Upon reviewing the
record and the parties' briefs, we conclude that this appeal is
without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of
the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
Background
On appeal, we view the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to NNDSS, the prevailing
party below. See McGuire v. McGuire, 10 Va. App. 248, 250, 391
S.E.2d 344, 346 (1990). So viewed, the evidence proved that on
January 28, 2002, mother gave birth to Lexus while incarcerated
pending a grand larceny charge. At the time of her
incarceration in December 2001, mother was eight months
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pregnant. For the first eight months of her pregnancy, mother
continued to feed her twenty-year drug addiction with cocaine
and alcohol. Mother's drug use stopped only after this most
recent arrest and imprisonment.
Mother arranged for Lexus to live with Tracy Evans, a
family friend, while mother remained in jail. On February 9,
2002, mother posted bond and obtained her release. The
following day, mother attended a doctor's appointment with Evans
and Lexus concerning Lexus's medical condition. The examining
physician concluded that Lexus suffered from acid reflux and
proscribed appropriate medication. Days after the appointment,
mother went to NNDSS seeking help with Lexus's medication.
Sally Richie, an intake worker in the NNDSS Emergency
Medication Program, met with mother to discuss her situation.
Mother informed Richie of her recent release from prison.
Mother explained that after her release, she took Lexus and
moved into her sister's apartment but that they were being
evicted. Mother told Richie that she did not have a job and
that she had other children in foster care. Richie alerted
Child Protective Services (CPS) to the situation.
Kim Taylor, a CPS employee, learned through her
investigation that mother had five other children in government
custody and that her rights to three of the children were
terminated in 1999. Taylor knew that Lexus suffered from
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certain medical conditions and that NNDSS provided mother with
money to check on Lexus' medical care.
Taylor tried to locate mother and Lexus. The search
started with Tracy Evans, the family friend who cared for Lexus
during mother's incarceration. Evans did not know mother's
current whereabouts. After a four-day search, Taylor located
the child at the home of mother's sister and took Lexus into
custody. Taylor placed Lexus with foster parents on February
21, 2002. At the time of her placement, Lexus suffered from
severe diaper rash and was later diagnosed with pneumonia in
both lungs.
In April 2002, mother was convicted on the grand larceny
charge and received a suspended sentence based on successful
completion of the Youth Challenge Program for Women. Mother
entered the program in October. She is expected to complete the
program sometime in 2004. Mother has not seen Lexus since her
conviction and incarceration and cannot visit Lexus at the NNDSS
offices.
On May 31, 2002, George Flood, the NNDSS social worker
assigned to handle Lexus's case, filed a petition for
termination of residual parental rights in the Newport News
Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court (JDR court). The
petition asked that the court grant NNDSS legal custody of
Lexus. On November 26, 2002, the JDR court entered an order
terminating mother's residual parental rights in Lexus pursuant
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to Code § 16.1-283(E)(i). Mother appealed the order to the
circuit court. On February 7, 2003, the circuit court heard
from all three social workers involved in the case as well as
from mother and concluded that termination of mother's residual
parental rights served Lexus' best interests.
Analysis
Mother contends that the trial court erroneously terminated
her residual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283. She
claims that the evidence did not support the conclusion that
termination of her rights served her child's best interests.
When considering termination of a parent's residual rights
to a child, "the paramount consideration of a trial court is the
child's best interests." Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human
Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). On
review, "[a] trial court is presumed to have thoroughly weighed
all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and
made its determination based on the child's best interests."
Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 329, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795
(1990). "The trial court's judgment, when based on evidence
heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it." Logan, 13 Va. App. at
128, 409 S.E.2d at 463.
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Code § 16.1-283(E)(i)
The pertinent part of Code § 16.1-283(E) provides that
[t]he residual parental rights of a parent
or parents of a child who is in the custody
of a local board or licensed child-placing
agency may be terminated by the court if the
court finds, based upon clear and convincing
evidence, that it is in the best interests
of the child and that (i) the residual
parental rights of the parent regarding a
sibling of the child have previously been
involuntarily terminated . . . .
At trial, the evidence proved that the JDR court
involuntarily terminated mother's rights to three of her
children on August 30, 1999.
NNDSS removed Lexus from her mother and placed her with a
foster family on February 21, 2002, less than a month after her
birth. Flood testified that her foster parents are attentive
and anxious for the opportunity to adopt her. He stated that
Lexus is thriving in her new environment and receiving all
necessary medical care.
The record supports the decision of the trial court to
terminate mother's parental rights to Lexus under Code
§ 16.1-283(E)(i). NNDSS presented evidence of the previous
termination proceedings. The trial court concluded that
termination of mother's residual parental rights served Lexus's
best interests. Given mother's history and current
circumstances, coupled with the bright prospects for Lexus's
future, that decision is not plainly wrong or without evidence
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to support it and will not be disturbed on appeal. See Logan,
13 Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463.
Code § 16.1-283(C)
Mother claims that the trial court erred in determining
that it was in Lexus's best interests to terminate mother's
residual parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C) because
mother failed to plan for the child's future and failed to
substantially remedy the causes which led to the child's
placement in foster care. She argues that NNDSS did not offer
any services to mother and did not present evidence that mother
failed to remedy the conditions that required Lexus's placement
in foster care.
Given our determination that the trial court did not err in
terminating mother's parental rights pursuant to Code
§ 16.1-283(E)(i), we need not address this issue.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the trial court's decision
to terminate mother's residual parental rights.
Affirmed.
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