Elizabeth H. Lewis v. Hamburger Hamlet

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Willis, Frank and Clements
ELIZABETH H. LEWIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 2351-00-4 PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 6, 2001
HAMBURGER HAMLET, INC. AND
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE COMPANY
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Hilia Elizabeth Lewis, pro se, on brief).
(Heather K. Bardot; Trichilo, Bancroft,
McGavin, Horvath & Judkins, P.C., on brief),
for appellees.
Elizabeth H. Lewis (claimant) contends that the Workers'
Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) her June 22,
1999 claim seeking an award of temporary total disability
("TTD") benefits and permanent partial disability ("PPD")
benefits was barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (2) her
June 22, 1999 claim for reimbursement of medical expenses
related to medical treatment of her right shoulder and back was
barred by the doctrine of res judicata; (3) she failed to prove
that any treatment she may have received for her right ankle was
causally related to her compensable September 23, 1992 injury by
accident; and (4) she was not entitled to tuition reimbursement.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we
conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we
summarily affirm the commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27.
I. and II. Res Judicata
Res judicata applies "where there is a valid, personal
judgment obtained by a defendant on the merits of an action.
The judgment bars relitigation of the same cause of action, or
any part thereof which could have been litigated between the
same parties and their privies." K & L Trucking Co. v. Thurber,
1 Va. App. 213, 219, 337 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1985).
In a July 1, 1994 opinion, Deputy Commissioner Cummins Doan
found that claimant's shoulder problems were not causally
related to her compensable injury by accident. The deputy
commissioner also found that claimant was not disabled from
November 15, 1992 to May 21, 1993 and from June 6, 1993 and
continuing. That opinion was affirmed by the commission and
this Court. Likewise, in a May 15, 1997 opinion, Deputy
Commissioner Cummins found that any claim for additional TTD
benefits due to problems related to claimant's shoulders and
back, for various periods through January 3, 1997, was
time-barred by Code § 65.2-708, as the claim was filed well
beyond two years from the last date for which compensation was
paid pursuant to an award. The deputy commissioner also ruled
that any medical treatment related to claimant's shoulders and
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her back was not causally related to her compensable injury by
accident. The commission affirmed that opinion.
At the hearing held on April 5, 2000, on claimant's June
22, 1999 claim, she sought TTD benefits from September 23, 1992
through November 1992; from May 1993 through March 1996; and
from January 1999 to present, PPD benefits, and medical benefits
related to her right shoulder and lower back. Because valid
final judgments existed prior to the April 5, 2000 hearing,
finding that claimant's back condition after December 1994 and
her shoulder problems were not causally related to her
compensable injury by accident and that any further wage claims
related to those conditions were time-barred by Code § 65.2-708,
the commission did not err in ruling that claimant could not
seek to relitigate those issues. Thus, the commission properly
denied claimant's June 22, 1999 claim for TTD, PPD, and medical
expenses related to her right shoulder and back as barred by the
doctrine of res judicata.
III. Right Ankle Medical Treatment
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained her burden of proof, the commission's findings are
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binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's
Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
In ruling that claimant failed to prove that she was
entitled to reimbursement for medical expenses related to
treatment of her right ankle, the commission affirmed the deputy
commissioner's opinion, in which she found as follows:
[T]he right ankle complaints for which the
claimant now seeks treatment are unrelated
to the injury by accident. It appears from
the medical evidence that, until her most
recent treatment, the claimant sought no
treatment for right ankle complaints since
November 1992. We find that entirely too
much time has elapsed for there to be any
reasonable causal nexus between the injury
by accident and her present right ankle
complaints. Therefore, we conclude that the
right ankle complaints and treatment are
unrelated and unnecessary.
The commission's findings are amply supported by the
record. In light of the more than seven-year gap between
claimant's compensable injury by accident and the treatment for
the right ankle condition, we cannot say as a matter of law that
claimant's evidence sustained her burden of proof.
IV. Tuition Reimbursement
The Act does not provide for tuition reimbursement where a
claimant alleges that he or she has been required to drop
classes due to pain caused by an industrial injury.
Accordingly, the commission did not err in denying claimant's
request for tuition reimbursement under these circumstances.
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For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.
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