Charles Edward Crawford, Jr. v. Commonwealth of VA

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Humphreys and Clements
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CHARLES EDWARD CRAWFORD, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0172-00-4 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
NOVEMBER 14, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Stanley P. Klein, Judge
Crystal A. Meleen (Office of the Public
Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Virginia B. Theisen, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Charles Edward Crawford, Jr. appeals his conviction by a
jury of aggravated sexual battery, second or subsequent offense.
He argues that the trial court erred in admitting a record of a
prior conviction for aggravated sexual battery because: (1) its
admission in the guilt/innocence phase of his trial violated his
due process rights and deprived him of a fair trial; and (2) it
was not sufficiently linked to Crawford as to be material and
relevant. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and affirm
his conviction.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
In Brown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 56, 59, 307 S.E.2d 239,
241 (1983), the Supreme Court of Virginia held that "[d]ue
process does not require that an accused be given a bifurcated
trial when he is charged under a statute authorizing enhanced
punishment for repeating offenders."
In Medici v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 223, 532 S.E.2d 28(2000), the Supreme Court recently affirmed this principle in
the context of the Commonwealth's bifurcated trial procedure.
In Medici, as here, the trial court instructed the jury that the
record of prior conviction "should be considered . . . only for
proof . . . of a prior conviction, and not as proof that
[Crawford] committed the offense for which he is charged." Id.
at 229, 532 S.E.2d at 31-32. Furthermore, "[u]nless the record
shows the contrary [we] presume that the jury followed an
explicit cautionary instruction promptly given." LeVasseur v.
Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983).
Crawford also contends that the record of prior conviction
should not have been admitted because it was not sufficiently
linked to him. Specifically, the record of conviction of
aggravated sexual battery admitted by the trial court reflected
the name of "Charles Edward Crawford" rather than "Charles
Edward Crawford, Jr.".
At trial, Detective Bibeault testified that he arrested
Crawford on a warrant that contained certain identifying
information, including a date of birth. He further testified
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that after advising Crawford of his Miranda rights, Crawford
admitted that he had previously been convicted of aggravated
sexual battery. Finally, Bibeault testified that after
verifying the identifying information with Crawford, he obtained
a certified copy of a record of conviction from the Circuit
Court of the City of Alexandria, which indicated that a Charles
Edward Crawford, with a date of birth consistent with that of
appellant, was convicted of aggravated sexual battery on May 23,
1991.
We first note that "[t]he admissibility of evidence is
within the broad discretion of the trial court, and a ruling
will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of
discretion." Jones v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 30, 44, 526
S.E.2d 281, 288 (2000) (citation omitted). "Identity of names
carries with it a presumption of identity of person, the
strength of which will vary according to the
circumstances. . . . Courts in many other jurisdictions have
held that identity of the name of a defendant and the name of a
person previously convicted is prima facie evidence of identity
of person and, absent contrary evidence, supports a finding of
such identity." Cook v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 225, 230, 372
S.E.2d 780, 783 (1988) (citations omitted).
Here, the conviction record bore Crawford's name and date
of birth; it simply lacked the suffix "Jr." "Junior is no part
of a person's name." O'Bannon v. Saunders, 65 Va. (24 Gratt)
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138, 146 (1873) (citation omitted). It is "a mere descriptio
personna" which can be likened to other descriptive additions as
"'attorney at law,' or 'president of a rail-road company,' or
'resident of the County of Culpepper.'" Id. See also Basset v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 844, 855, 284 S.E.2d 844, 851 (1981). As
the Commonwealth points out, Crawford himself omitted the
suffix, "Jr." when he signed the Miranda rights form.
Based on this record, we find no error in the admission of
the record of prior conviction.
Affirmed.
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