Leslie Boyd v. Harold L. Boyd

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
LESLIE BOYD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1515-95-2 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
MARCH 26, 1996
HAROLD L. BOYD
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY
J. Peyton Farmer, Judge
Nicholas A. Pappas (Nicholas A. Pappas & Associates,
on briefs), for appellant.
John A. Nere, Jr. for appellee.
Leslie Boyd (wife) appeals the trial court's final decree of
divorce, in which the court refused to make an equitable
distribution award or reserve continuing jurisdiction over the
matter. Wife contends that the trial court was required to rule
on the issue of equitable distribution when she requested such in
her bill of complaint and proposed decree. Because wife's
argument is procedurally defaulted, we may not consider it on
appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court's decision.
Wife filed a bill of complaint for divorce from Harold Boyd
(husband) on January 18, 1995, in the Circuit Court of
Spotsylvania County. In her bill of complaint, wife requested
equitable distribution of the couple's property pursuant to Code
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
§ 20-107.3. Husband also requested equitable distribution of the
couple's property in his cross-bill. At a pendente lite hearing
on March 6, 1995, the trial court noted that the parties had been
separated for over one year and suggested that all remaining
issues be resolved and a final decree of divorce be submitted to
the trial court by June 5, 1995. On April 6, 1995, husband's
attorney arranged for depositions of husband and his sister; the
deponents offered information concerning the parties' marital
property.
At a June 9, 1995 hearing, wife presented the trial court
with a proposed decree (sketch order) containing a provision
which (1) reserved for future adjudication and hearing the issue
of equitable distribution and (2) reserved to the trial court
continuing jurisdiction over this matter. At the same hearing,
husband presented a proposed decree which made no mention of
equitable distribution. While the trial court considered a
number of issues at the hearing, neither party broached the issue
of equitable distribution. After the trial court decided to
adopt husband's proposed decree, wife did not object on the
grounds that the trial court was required to equitably distribute
the marital property. Wife now appeals the trial court's final
order to this Court.
We hold that Rule 5A:18 procedurally bars this Court from
considering wife's argument on appeal. See, e.g., Jacques v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991).
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Furthermore, this case does not meet the "ends of justice
exception" to Rule 5A:18. See, e.g., Mounce v. Commonwealth, 4
Va. App. 433, 436, 357 S.E.2d 742, 744 (1987).
The statement of facts in the record reveals that at the
trial court's hearing, wife presented her proposed decree to the
court but presented no evidence relating to property ownership.
The trial court therefore lacked a basis to equitably distribute
the property at the hearing. Wife did not request additional
time to present such evidence, if such time were needed.
Furthermore, wife did not make any specific argument concerning
equitable distribution at the hearing or at any time during the
pendency of the suit. The trial court, which considered a number
of issues at the hearing, including child custody and support,
may have validly assumed, in the absence of anything to indicate
otherwise, that the parties had resolved all property issues and
had dropped their original requests for equitable distribution.
Again, we note that at no time did wife object to the entry of
husband's proposed decree on the grounds that the trial court was
required to make an equitable distribution of marital property.
In light of these factors, Rule 5A:18 limits our review of
this issue, as wife did not "state the basis for an objection
with sufficient specificity to enable the trial judge to consider
the issue intelligently." Head v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 163,
167, 348 S.E.2d 423, 426 (1986). As we have said, a trial court
"is not required to search for objections which counsel have not
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discovered." Darnell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 948, 952-53,
408 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1991).
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision.
Affirmed.
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