Crystal Faye Ward v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Athey and Chaney
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
CRYSTAL FAYE WARD
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1419-21-1 JUDGE VERNIDA R. CHANEY
JULY 26, 2022
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Gary A. Mills, Judge
(Christopher T. Voltin; Goff Voltin, PLLC, on brief), for appellant. Appellant
submitting on brief.
Stephen J. Sovinsky, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court for the City of Newport News (“trial court”)
convicted Crystal Faye Ward (“Ward”) of unlawful wounding in violation of Code § 18.2-51.1 On
appeal, Ward contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to strike because the
testimony of the complaining witness and “her biased daughter” is insufficient to support the
conviction. For the following reasons, this Court affirms the trial court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be stated in the
light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v. Commonwealth,
295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381 (2016)).
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
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Ward was originally charged with malicious wounding, but the trial court convicted her
of the lesser-included offense of unlawful wounding.
On December 19, 2020, Ward drove to the workplace of her friend, Delois Young
(“Young”), to allow Young to check her car for Young’s missing identification (“ID”) and bank
cards. Young believed the cards fell out of her purse while she was in Ward’s car the day before.
Young sent Ward a message stating that she intended to file charges against Ward for stealing her
ID and bank cards if Ward did not return them.
While Young inspected the passenger side of Ward’s car and Ward sat in the driver’s seat,
Young noticed Ward holding what appeared to be Young’s ID. Young walked to the driver’s side
of the car, stood between the open driver’s side door and the driver’s seat, and told Ward, “Crystal,
that looks like my ID.” Then Young reached into the car to grab her ID out of Ward’s hand. Ward
told Young that she did not have her ID. Then, while “cussing,” Ward put the car in reverse and
dragged Young for about twenty feet. Before Ward drove away, leaving Young on the ground,
Ward said, “Reach again, bitch.”
Young’s adult daughter witnessed the incident between Ward and Young, and she drove
Young to the hospital after Ward drove away. Young testified that the incident caused her to suffer
an injury to her shoulder and broken ribs. No medical records were introduced in evidence.
Ward testified that when Young searched her car for Young’s ID, her car was stopped with
the gear in reverse, and her foot hit the gas when Young hit her four or five times in the back of the
head with her fist. Ward denied calling Young any names. Ward testified that she told Young,
“Don’t hit me again.” Then Ward shut the car door and drove directly to the magistrate’s office
while calling 911. Officer Grey testified that Ward reported that someone hit her before she backed
up her car, dragged them with her vehicle, and drove away. Subsequently, when the police arrested
Ward, they found Young’s ID on Ward and returned it to Young.
The trial court denied Ward’s motions to strike. The trial court found that the interaction
between Ward and Young was heated and contentious, but Ward’s conduct was not malicious. The
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trial court found that Ward used the car as a weapon and wounded Young, and this wounding was
unlawful whether or not Young struck Ward as Ward alleged. The trial court found that the
evidence was sufficient to prove the lesser-included offense of unlawful wounding, but the court
withheld a finding of guilt until the sentencing hearing. The trial court asked counsel for the parties
to consult and consider alternative resolutions. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court pronounced
its finding that Ward was guilty of unlawful wounding.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
On appellate review of a criminal conviction, this Court “consider[s] the evidence and all
reasonable inferences flowing from that evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Pooler v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 214, 218
(2019) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 439, 442 (2007) (en banc)). We
“discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and regard as
true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021) (emphasis added) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 324 (2018)).
“When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is
presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support
it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting
Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does not ask itself
whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id.(alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018)). “Rather, the
relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting
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Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193 (2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the
conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion
might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72
Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).
“The appellate court defers to the trial court’s findings regarding the credibility of the
witnesses and the inferences to be drawn ‘from basic facts to ultimate facts’ unless no rational trier
of fact could have made such findings.” Bagley v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 1, 26 (2021) (citing
Davis v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 485, 500 (2015) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979))).
B. Proof of Unlawful Wounding
Ward alleges that the trial court improperly convicted her based on the “contradictory” and
“biased” testimony of Young and her daughter. This Court holds that the trial court did not err.
“The credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact
finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Gerald, 295 Va. at
486 (quoting Elliott v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 457, 462 (2009)). This Court defers to a trial
court’s credibility determinations unless the evidence is inherently incredible. See id. at 486-87.
Evidence is “inherently incredible” if it is “so manifestly false that reasonable men ought not to
believe it” or it is “shown to be false by objects or things as to the existence and meaning of which
reasonable men should not differ.” Id. at 487 (quoting Juniper v. Commonwealth, 271 Va. 362, 415
(2006)). Although Young had some issues with her recollection and the testimony of Young and
her daughter was not entirely consistent, their material testimony was not so manifestly false nor so
contrary to human experience as to render it unworthy of belief. There is no basis in the record to
find the testimony of Young and her daughter to be inherently incredible.
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Ward also contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain her conviction for unlawful
wounding because she was acting out of self-preservation, not unlawfully. Ward argues that Young
subjected her to “a barrage of blows” and that she necessarily “accelerated in reverse in an attempt
to flee Young’s onslaught.” Ward contends that because her conduct amounted to lawful
self-defense, the evidence does not support her conviction for unlawful wounding.
Assuming without deciding that Ward’s self-defense argument is encompassed within her
assignment of error, this Court finds that the evidence supports the trial court’s finding of guilt. The
trial court found that whether or not Young struck Ward, Ward acted unlawfully in dragging Young
twenty feet with her car. “[T]he amount of force used to defend oneself must not be excessive and
must be reasonable in relation to the perceived threat.” Foster v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 380,
383 (1991) (citing Diffendal v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 417, 421 (1989)). The “issues regarding
the reasonableness of the force used, the reasonableness of the perceived threat and whether [the
defendant] was without fault in the incident” are factual issues for the fact-finder to resolve. Id. at
384. On review of the totality of the evidence, this Court concludes that a rational fact-finder could
find that Ward’s use of her car to drag Young on the ground for twenty feet constituted excessive
force in response to the alleged threat posed by Young. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to
support Ward’s conviction for unlawful wounding.
III. CONCLUSION
The evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Ward unlawfully wounded Young.
Accordingly, this Court affirms Ward’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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