Derrick Lashawn Wright v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Russell, Friedman and Callins
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Salem, Virginia
DERRICK LASHAWN WRIGHT
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0566-21-3 JUDGE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR.
MAY 10, 2022
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY
David V. Williams, Judge
Heath L. Sabin (Sabin Law Office, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,1
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Following a bench trial, the Henry County Circuit Court convicted appellant, Derrick
Lashawn Wright, of three counts of distribution of a Schedule I or II controlled substance, second or
subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, Wright asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial and erred in finding the evidence sufficient
to support the convictions. For the following reasons, we disagree and affirm his convictions.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
Jason S. Miyares succeeded Mark R. Herring as Attorney General on January 15, 2022.
BACKGROUND2
In the summer of 2018, Patrick Golden was working as a paid confidential informant for the
Henry County Sheriff’s Office. On July 20, July 26, and August 1, Golden met with investigators
from the sheriff’s office to assist with controlled purchases of cocaine from an individual known to
him as “Big D,” who was later identified as Wright. Golden had known “Big D” for “a couple of
years.” Henry Oakes also was working as a confidential informant for the sheriff’s office and
served as Golden’s driver for each controlled buy.
Each controlled purchase followed the same procedure. Golden and Oakes first met with
the investigators at an agreed meeting place. Oakes testified that his sole purpose was to drive
Golden to each controlled buy and drive him back. The investigators searched Golden, Oakes, and
Oakes’ car to confirm that no contraband was present. Golden was outfitted with a recording device
and given buy money. Investigators then followed Oakes and Golden to Southland Drive and
watched the feed from Golden’s recording device in real time. Because Southland Drive is a
dead-end street, the investigators did not follow Oakes and Golden onto that road, but “pick[ed]
back up behind them” when they left Southland Drive and returned to the meet location. Each time,
Golden gave the purchased cocaine and his recording device to the investigators who again searched
Golden, Oakes, and Oakes’ car for contraband. Oakes never left his car, did not see Wright on any
occasion, and did not see the cocaine Golden purchased.
Before the first purchase on July 20, 2018, Henry County Sheriff’s Investigator Brummitt
searched Golden’s “outer clothing” and his shoes, but he did not “search inside [Golden’s]
clothing,” or look “inside his underwear or down low in his crotch.” Brummitt also searched
Oakes. Oakes then drove Golden to Wright’s house on Southland Drive, where Golden then
2
“In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, we recite the facts in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Bryant v. Commonwealth, 70
Va. App. 697, 702 (2019).
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entered Wright’s home, bought the drugs, and left. The transaction was captured on Golden’s
recording device; the recording depicted a man with facial hair selling cocaine to Golden. No one
else was present during the transaction. At trial, the trial court viewed the recording and Golden
identified Wright as the person who sold him the cocaine.
To make the July 26, 2018 purchase, Golden called Wright and ordered “a ball,” which
Golden explained was an “eight ball of cocaine.” Golden confirmed that Wright’s phone number
was the number he called, and he recognized Wright’s voice as they spoke. The phone call was
made in the investigators’ presence and recorded, and the recording was played at trial. After
Golden ordered the cocaine, Brummitt searched his “outer clothing garments” and his shoes. He
also searched Oakes. Oakes then drove Golden to Southland Drive and parked “right behind
[Wright’s] vehicle” on the street. Golden left Oakes’ car and got into Wright’s car. Golden
purchased the cocaine from Wright and then returned to Oakes’ car. A recording of the transaction
was captured on Golden’s recording device and played at trial. Wright is not depicted in the
recording, but Golden identified him as the person who sold him the cocaine on that occasion.
The third and final purchase occurred on August 1, 2018. Before meeting with the
investigators, Golden communicated with Wright via “text messages and calls, that day.” After
Golden arranged to purchase cocaine, Investigator Foley searched him, “start[ing] at the head and
work[ing] [his] way to the feet.” Foley turned Golden’s pockets “inside out,” and he searched “all
outer clothing and socks and shoes.” Foley searched Oakes in the same manner. Oakes then drove
Golden to Southland Drive and parked on the street. Golden entered Wright’s vehicle and
purchased an “eight ball” of cocaine. The transaction was recorded and played at trial. The video
shows Wright selling cocaine to Golden. Golden confirmed that Wright was the person on the
video selling him the cocaine.
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On cross-examination, Golden repeatedly testified that he could not recall certain details of
each transaction. For example, he could not recall who he interacted with at the sheriff’s office, and
he did not recognize any of the police witnesses. He could not recall how much he was paid or how
he was compensated for his services. He could not remember Wright’s street address. Golden also
described search procedures that differed from those described by investigators. Golden conceded
that he was buying cocaine from another individual, Ja.B.,3 on Southland Drive during the same
time frame.
At the conclusion of the evidence,4 Wright moved to strike the evidence as insufficient “at
least, on the first two [indictments for the July 20, 2018 and July 26, 2018 controlled purchases] as
you can’t identify who is on the video; that the witness, we would argue, the Confidential
Informant, is very unreliable.” He also moved to strike “on the plan of the search.” Wright also
moved for a mistrial for an alleged Brady5 violation because “there was another individual on that
road who they were buying from at the same time with the same informant”; he argued that the
information about the other transactions was exculpatory evidence that the Commonwealth had not
disclosed to the defense. The trial court denied both motions.
In his closing argument, Wright contended that the evidence failed to prove he was the
person who sold Golden the cocaine. Wright argued that Golden gave inconsistent testimony and
had perjured himself. Wright also asserted that the search of Golden was “cursory” and did not
negate the possibility that Golden already had the cocaine on his person before each transaction.
The trial court found that Golden “was not the most cooperative witness” but concluded that the
3
In the course of the proceedings below, both Golden and Wright identified others who
allegedly were selling drugs on Southland Drive. Because those individuals are not charged in
this case and might deny the allegations if they were, we identify them only in abbreviated form.
4
Wright did not present any evidence at trial.
5
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to corroborate Golden’s testimony and convicted
Wright on all three charges.
Post-trial, Wright renewed his motion for a mistrial based on the alleged Brady violation.
At the post-trial hearing on the motion,6 Wright testified that other individuals who lived on
Southland Drive were involved in, or charged with, drug transactions when these offenses occurred.
Wright specifically identified Je.B. and D.L. as people who sold drugs on Southland Drive. Je.B.
also testified and confirmed that he had been charged with distributing drugs to Golden from his
Southland Drive address. Je.B. stated that, to his knowledge, D.L. had been convicted of selling
drugs from his own address on Southland Drive in 2018. The trial court denied Wright’s post-trial
motion for a mistrial. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
I. Motion for Mistrial
“The decision whether to grant a mistrial motion is a matter submitted to the circuit court’s
sound discretion.” Castillo v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 394, 445 (2019) (quoting Lewis v.
Commonwealth, 269 Va. 209, 213 (2005)). If the trial court commits an error of law, though, then
“it ‘by definition abuses its discretion.’” Warnick v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 251, 263 (2020)
(quoting Coffman v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 163, 166 (2017)). In ruling on a motion for a
mistrial, the trial court “must make an initial factual determination, in the light of all the
circumstances of the case, whether the defendant’s rights [have] been so indelibly prejudiced as to
require a new trial.” Castillo, 70 Va. App. at 445 (quoting LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va.
564, 589 (1983)). “Unless we can say as a matter of law that this determination was wrong, it will
not be disturbed on appeal.” Id. (quoting LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 589).
6
The Honorable G. Carter Greer presided over the post-trial motion.
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Wright asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial because the
Commonwealth failed to meet its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83(1963). Specifically, he argues that if the Commonwealth had disclosed the fact that Golden “was
conducting undercover buys with at least three other individuals on Southland Drive,” it is “possible
and likely that had this information been disclosed that one or more of these cases would have been
dismissed.” We disagree with the premise of Wright’s argument because Wright failed to establish
a Brady violation.
“Under Brady, ‘the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” Mercer v. Commonwealth, 66
Va. App. 139, 146 (2016) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87). There are three components to
establishing a Brady violation:
a) The evidence not disclosed to the accused must be favorable to the
accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it may be used
for impeachment; b) the evidence not disclosed must have been
withheld by the Commonwealth either willfully or inadvertently; and
c) the accused must have been prejudiced.
Garnett v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 397, 406 (2008) (quoting Workman v. Commonwealth, 272 Va.
633, 644-45 (2006)). “The accused has the burden of establishing each of these three components
to prevail on a Brady claim.” Church v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 107, 117 (2019) (quoting
Mercer, 66 Va. App. at 146). We will not disturb the trial court’s factual findings on a Brady
motion “absent clear error.” Id. at 116. “[W]e review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo.”
Id.
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Wright relies on the fact that the Commonwealth did not disclose that Golden was
conducting undercover buys with other individuals on Southland Drive.7 It is well established that
the Commonwealth does not violate Brady by failing to disclose information the “substance” of
which is already “known to the defense.” Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 302-03 (1999).
Additionally, “Brady is not violated, as a matter of law, when impeachment evidence is made
‘available to [a] defendant[] during trial’ if the defendant has ‘sufficient time to make use of [it] at
trial.’” Church, 71 Va. App. at 119-20 (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tuma,
285 Va. 629, 635 (2013)).
It is apparent from the record that Wright knew, prior to trial, that Golden had purchased
narcotics from others on Southland Drive during the relevant time frame. In fact, he used that
information during his cross-examination of Golden, who admitted that he had been buying drugs
from Ja.B. on Southland Drive at the time of the instant offenses. Wright also alluded to the
information while cross-examining Brummitt, asking him if Golden was working with other
suspects on Southland Drive. Wright then used the evidence, including Golden’s admission that he
had purchased drugs from another on Southland Drive, in arguing his hypothesis that someone else
had sold Golden the cocaine. Wright also referenced this information in his first motion for a
mistrial. Thus, notwithstanding his assertions to the contrary, Wright clearly was aware of
information he claims the Commonwealth failed to disclose and he actually made use of it at trial.
With respect to Je.B. and D.L., we conclude that the record fails to show Wright could not
have obtained their names before trial through the exercise of diligence. “[W]here the exculpatory
information is not only available to the defendant but also lies in a source where a reasonable
defendant would have looked, a defendant is not entitled to the benefit of the Brady doctrine.”
7
We assume, without deciding, that the information allegedly withheld from Wright was
favorable to his defense as potential impeachment evidence. Thus, we limit our analysis to the
remaining Brady requirements.
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Epperly v. Booker, 997 F.2d 1, 10 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 901 F.2d 378,
381 (4th Cir. 1990)). That is, a Brady challenge will not succeed where the evidence is “‘available
from other sources’ through the efforts of ‘a diligent defense attorney’ through discovery,
independent expert testimony, or cross-examination . . . .” Id. at 9 (emphasis added) (quoting
Wilson, 901 F.2d at 380). See also Castillo v. Johnson, 141 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Under
Brady, the prosecution has no obligation to produce evidence or information already known to the
defendant, or that could be obtained through the defendant’s exercise of reasonable diligence.”).
This principle applies because the “limited purpose of the Brady rule is ‘to assure that [the
defendant] will not be denied access to exculpatory [or impeachment] evidence known to the
government but unknown to him.’” Tuma, 285 Va. at 635 (emphasis and alterations in original)
(quoting Lugo v. Munoz, 682 F.2d 7, 10 (1st Cir. 1982)). Here, soon after trial, by identifying
them at his post-trial hearing, Wright demonstrated he had the ability to discover the names of
Je.B. and D.L. without the assistance of the Commonwealth. Consequently, because the record
shows that Wright had the means to obtain (and, in fact, did obtain) the purportedly favorable
information without the assistance of the Commonwealth, he has not established an entitlement to
the relief he seeks.
Wright further claims he was prejudiced because, if the information regarding other dealers
on Southland Drive had been disclosed, the case “might have turned out different.” Prejudice
ensues “within the meaning of Brady when there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Cain,
565 U.S. 73, 75 (2012)). Guided by this principle, we find that there was not a reasonable
probability of a different result because Wright actually used similar information at trial to no effect.
After considering Wright’s argument in the context of Golden’s admissions at trial, the trial court
found it unavailing. Cf. Deville v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 754, 757 (2006) (“Prejudice cannot
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be shown where, as here, ‘the trial judge was the trier of fact and, upon learning of the undisclosed
information,’ rules unequivocally that the impeachment evidence ‘would have had no impact’ on
the factfinding underlying the defendant’s conviction.” (quoting Stroik v. State, 671 A.2d 1335,
1340 (Del. 1996))). Given the similarity between the information that Wright claims was withheld
and the information he actually used as impeachment evidence at trial, we conclude that there is not
“a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Tuma, 285 Va. at 635 (quoting Smith, 565 U.S. at 75).
In sum, because Wright failed to show that the Commonwealth suppressed otherwise
unavailable information favorable to his defense or that he suffered any prejudice, we find no error
in the trial court’s denial of Wright’s mistrial motion.
II. Sufficiency of the evidence
Wright challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that Golden’s testimony was
“wholly incredible” and not to be believed. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he
judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it.’” Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018) (alteration in
original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 327 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he
Court does not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 228 (2018) (alteration in original)
(quoting Pijor v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 502, 512 (2017)). “Rather, the relevant question is, upon
review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, whether any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting
Pijor, 294 Va. at 512). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not
permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions
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reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)
(quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 273, 288 (2017)).
Wright asserts that Golden cannot be believed as a matter of law. Wright argues that
Golden’s trial testimony as to each of the transactions was “deliberately vague and evasive and
essentially deceptive.” Wright emphasizes Golden’s inability to recall which officers he worked
with. He also notes that Golden was evasive about what payment or compensation he received,
could not provide Wright’s street address, and described a search procedure that differed from the
investigators’ descriptions. Wright argues that, in fact, Golden’s “favorite answer to just about
every question on cross-examination was I don’t recall.” Additionally, Wright contends that the
pre-purchase search procedures were cursory because investigators did not check inside Golden’s
clothing or do “a full body search checking all clothing or body parts.” He finds it significant that
Oakes did not see the purchased cocaine after each transaction.
Determining witness credibility “is within the exclusive province of the [fact finder], which
has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses as they testify.” Dalton v.
Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (quoting Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300,
304 (1993)). “[T]he trier of fact is free to believe or disbelieve, in whole or in part, the testimony of
any witness.” Rams v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 12, 38 (2019) (citing Carosi v.
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 545, 554-55 (2010)). “The fact that a witness makes inconsistent
statements in regard to the subject matter under investigation does not render his testimony nugatory
or unworthy of belief.” Swanson v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 376, 378 (1989). “Testimony may
be contradictory or contain inconsistencies without rising to the level of being inherently incredible
as a matter of law.” Kelley v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 617, 626 (2019). “Consequently, . . .
‘[p]otential inconsistencies in testimony are resolved by the fact finder,’ not the appellate court.” Id.(second alteration in original) (quoting Towler v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 292 (2011)).
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Although the trial court found that Golden was “not the most cooperative witness,” it
nevertheless credited his testimony that Wright sold him cocaine on the three occasions in question.
“When the law says that it is for triers of the facts to judge the credibility of a witness, the issue is
not a matter of degree.” Towler, 59 Va. App. at 291 (quoting Swanson, 8 Va. App. at 379).
Accordingly, we defer to the trial court’s credibility determination on appeal.
Moreover, video and other evidence corroborated Golden’s testimony. Wright concedes he
is the individual depicted on the video in the third transaction. The recording of the first transaction
captures an individual with facial hair similar to Wright. Golden, who had known Wright for “a
couple of years,” spoke with Wright over the phone before the second transaction; he recognized
Wright’s phone number and his voice. That phone call was recorded and played at trial. Golden
also communicated with Wright via text and phone calls before the third drug transaction. After
searching Golden, Oakes, and the car, investigators followed Golden to Southland Drive on all three
occasions and watched each transaction in real time. All three recordings show money being
exchanged for an item that ultimately was determined to be cocaine. Investigators then followed
Golden and Oakes back to the meeting place and collected the contraband. Golden identified
Wright as the person who sold him the cocaine on all three occasions.
The fact that Oakes did not see the drugs after each transaction is not material to the
outcome of this case. His only role was to drive Golden to Southland Drive and back. It is also of
no moment that Golden described a search procedure that differed from that described by the
investigators. Wright drew out these inconsistencies at trial and argued their importance in his
motion to strike. “It is the prerogative of the trier of fact ‘to resolve conflicts in the testimony.’”
Sierra v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 770, 776 (2012) (quoting Brown v. Commonwealth, 56
Va. App. 178, 185 (2010)). Moreover, “if reasonably fairminded men may differ as to the
conclusions of fact to be drawn from the evidence, or if the conclusion is dependent upon the weight
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to be given the testimony, in all such cases the verdict of the [fact finder] is final and conclusive and
cannot be disturbed” on appeal. Shumate v. Mitchell, 296 Va. 532, 550 (2018) (quoting Gilliam v.
Immel, 293 Va. 18, 24 (2017)).
The totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Wright sold cocaine to
Golden on July 20, July 26, and August 1, 2018. The trial court accepted Golden’s testimony and
the supporting evidence as true, and we do not disturb that finding on appeal.
CONCLUSION
Because Wright failed to prove a Brady violation occurred, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Wright’s motion for a mistrial. We further hold that the evidence, viewed
through the appropriate lens on appeal, was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Wright
distributed cocaine as charged. For these reasons, we affirm the convictions.
Affirmed.
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