James Carroll Durrette v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Huff, Russell and Athey
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
JAMES CARROLL DURRETTE
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1316-18-4 JUDGE WESLEY G. RUSSELL, JR.
FEBRUARY 18, 2020
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ARLINGTON COUNTY
Louise M. DiMatteo, Judge
Helen Randolph, Assistant Public Defender II, for appellant.
Mason D. Williams, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
James Carroll Durrette was convicted by an Arlington County jury of two counts of
burglary and one count of grand larceny. One burglary was committed on September 17, 2015,
at the Dominion Arms Apartments, and the other burglary, as well as the related grand larceny,
took place on January 18, 2016, at the Cavendish, an apartment building.1 Appellant contends
that the trial court erred by admitting “evidence of an unadjudicated bad act[, a burglary that was
committed in Fairfax County,] where it failed to show the presence of a common scheme,
prejudicing the jury to infer conformity with a general bad act.” For the reasons that follow, we
affirm the judgment of the trial court.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
As of July 1, 2018, the grand larceny threshold has been raised from $200 to $500. See
2018 Va. Acts chs. 764 & 765 (amending Code § 18.2-95). The $200 threshold applies to
appellant because that was the relevant amount when he committed the larceny offense in 2016.
BACKGROUND2
Jerry Fitzgerald pled guilty in connection with burglaries and thefts at the Dominion
Arms Apartments, the River House Apartments, and the Cavendish, all located in Arlington
County. He testified that appellant was his accomplice for the offenses. Fitzgerald testified that
he and appellant broke into all three apartment complexes for the purpose of stealing money
from the value transfer machine (“VTM”) in each building.3 In the course of his testimony,
Fitzgerald provided commentary on video surveillance footage that the Commonwealth played
for the jury.
August 15, 2015 burglary at the River House Apartments
The jury was shown surveillance video of an August 15, 2015 burglary at the River
House Apartments, which are located in Arlington County. Fitzgerald testified that he pried
open a window while appellant and another accomplice, Billy Carter, remained outside. Later,
appellant and Fitzgerald returned to enter the building through the previously opened window.
The video shows Fitzgerald covering the security camera with an umbrella; Fitzgerald testified
that, while he was covering the camera, appellant broke into the VTM and stole money. The
time-stamped video shows Fitzgerald at 2:20 a.m. and, with Fitzgerald obscuring another
security camera with the umbrella, depicts two men leaving the building through a separate exit
at 2:22 a.m. Fitzgerald testified that appellant gave him a “cut” of the money taken from the
VTM.
2
“On appeal, we review the evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party in the trial court.” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236 (2016)
(quoting Bowman v. Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 494 (2015)).
3
Pertinent here, a VTM allows a resident of an apartment building to deposit cash in
exchange for credits on a laundry card, which, in turn, can be swiped to allow the resident to use
the washers and dryers at the apartment building.
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September 17, 2015 burglary at the Dominion Arms Apartments
The jury was shown surveillance video of a September 17, 2015 burglary at the
Dominion Arms Apartments, and Fitzgerald provided commentary. He identified himself and
appellant as they entered the building. Fitzgerald testified that he used a screwdriver to gain
access to the lobby. Fitzgerald covered his face with a shirt, and appellant used a black hat and
his shirt to cover most of his face, making it difficult to identify him. After entering the building,
Fitzgerald covered an interior surveillance camera with a piece of paper. Fitzgerald and
appellant left the building, but returned later. Because Fitzgerald and appellant eventually
encountered a security guard, they left the building without damaging the VTM or obtaining any
money from it.
January 18, 2016 burglary at the Cavendish
The jury was shown surveillance video of a January 18, 2016 burglary at the Cavendish.
Fitzgerald testified that on January 18, 2016, he and appellant entered the Cavendish using a
screwdriver to pry open the front door. Fitzgerald, wearing a disguise, disabled the surveillance
camera in the laundry room where the VTM was located. According to Fitzgerald, after the
camera was disabled, he and appellant used screwdrivers, prying tools, and a circular blade
grinder to break into the VTM and obtain money from it. They left the building with the money.
June 30, 2016 burglary at the Woodlake Towers Apartments
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed a notice indicating that it would “move the [trial
c]ourt to admit evidence of a Fairfax burglary sharing the same modus operandi as the charged
offenses to prove the defendant’s identity.” Specifically, the Commonwealth sought permission
to introduce video surveillance and other evidence demonstrating that Fitzgerald, appellant, and
another accomplice burglarized a VTM machine on June 30, 2016, at the Woodlake Towers
Apartments in neighboring Fairfax County.
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In addition to its notice, the Commonwealth filed a memorandum asserting that evidence
of the Woodlake Towers burglary was admissible under the modus operandi exception to the
general prohibition on evidence of other criminal acts. Appellant filed a responding
memorandum, arguing that “[t]he Fairfax . . . break in shares no idiosyncratic characteristic with
the Arlington charges,” and therefore, “there exists no common modus operandi” that would
allow for the admission of the Woodlake Towers evidence.
The trial court held a hearing on the issue on March 1, 2018. The Commonwealth
reiterated its written argument that the Woodlake Towers evidence was admissible to prove
identity under the modus operandi exception; appellant argued that the crimes were not
sufficiently idiosyncratic to fall within the exception. The trial court granted the
Commonwealth’s motion from the bench, stating that the evidence was admissible because “it’s
the same modus operandi.” At no point in the proceedings below did the Commonwealth, the
appellant, or the trial court reference the “common scheme” exception to the general prohibition
on evidence of other criminal acts.
At trial, the jury was shown surveillance video of a June 30, 2016 burglary at the
Woodlake Towers Apartments. Because the surveillance camera at the Woodlake Towers
Apartments was hidden, the burglars did not cover it or take sufficient steps to mask their
identities. Fitzgerald testified and confirmed that he, appellant, and Carter committed the
burglary. The camera captured close-up images of appellant’s face as he and Fitzgerald accessed
the VTM. Fitzgerald testified that he, appellant, and Carter cut open the VTM with a circle
grinder. Fitzgerald pled guilty in Fairfax County to those offenses.
The jury convicted appellant of committing burglary at the Dominion Arms Apartments
on September 17, 2015, and committing burglary and grand larceny on January 18, 2016, at the
Cavendish. The jury was unable to reach a verdict regarding the charges that appellant
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committed burglary and grand larceny for the burglary at the River House Apartments on August
15, 2015. Accordingly, the trial court declared a mistrial as to those charges.
This appeal follows. In his sole assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court
committed reversible error by “permitting the Commonwealth to enter evidence of an
unadjudicated bad act where it failed to show the presence of a common scheme, prejudicing the
jury to infer conformity with a general bad act.” (Emphasis added).
ANALYSIS
I. Standard of Review
In general, we review a challenge to a trial court’s decision to admit evidence under the
familiar abuse of discretion standard. Massey v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 108, 138 (2016).
Our resolution of this appeal, however, turns on the interpretation and application of Rules of the
Supreme Court of Virginia. Such an inquiry presents a question of law subject to de novo
review. Minor v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 728, 738 (2016).
II. Rule 5A:12, Rule 5A:18, and the Limits of Appellate Review
One of the hallmarks of appellate review is that it is what it purports to be—a review. As
a general rule, appellate courts may consider only arguments actually made to and judgments
actually rendered by the trial court. Rules 5A:12 and 5A:18 implement this concept.
Rule 5A:12(c)(1) provides that a petition for appeal “shall list . . . the specific errors in
the rulings below–or the issue(s) on which the tribunal or court appealed from failed to rule[.]”
Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) explains that “[a]n assignment of error which does not address the findings,
rulings, or failures to rule on issues in the trial court . . . from which an appeal is taken . . . is not
sufficient.” Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) also specifies the sanction for failing to assign error to what the
trial court actually did, providing that “[i]f the assignments of error are insufficient, the petition
for appeal shall be dismissed.” Thus, we are precluded from considering appellate arguments
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that are not tied to the rulings of the trial court.4 See Coleman v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App.
618, 621 (2012).
While Rule 5A:12(c) limits an appellant to challenging what a trial court actually did,
Rule 5A:18 generally limits an appellant to arguments that he actually made. Subject to limited
exceptions not applicable here, Rule 5A:18 provides that “[n]o ruling of the trial court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling[.]” Thus, “Rule 5A:18 requires a litigant to make timely and specific
objections, so that the trial court has ‘an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issues
presented,’” Brown v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 210, 217 (2010) (emphasis added) (quoting
West v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 327, 337 (2004)), and we “will not consider an argument
on appeal which was not presented to the trial court,” Le v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 66, 73
(2015) (quoting Ohree v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 299, 308 (1998)).
Here, appellant’s assignment of error asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
“evidence of an unadjudicated bad act” under the “common scheme” exception to the general
prohibition against evidence of other criminal acts. However, the trial court did not admit any
evidence pursuant to the common scheme exception, expressly ruling that the evidence related to
the unadjudicated burglary at the Woodlake Towers Apartments was being admitted pursuant to
the modus operandi exception. Furthermore, no one—not the trial court, not the
Commonwealth, and not the appellant—referenced in any way the common scheme exception in
the proceedings below. Thus, on its face, appellant’s assignment of error challenges a ruling that
the trial court did not make with an argument that was not raised below in violation of both Rule
5A:12 and Rule 5A:18.
4
As the rule makes clear, a party also may challenge a trial court’s failure to rule on an
issue, but this presupposes that the issue was raised by a party and placed before the trial court
for a ruling.
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Appellant, while acknowledging that the trial court expressly admitted the evidence under
the modus operandi exception and did not reference the common scheme exception, argues that
it is a distinction without a difference. He contends that the phrases are “synonymous,” and
therefore, despite the facial failure of the appeal to comply with Rules 5A:12 and 5A:18, the
issue he seeks to appeal is properly before us. Accordingly, the viability of his appeal turns on
the question of whether modus operandi and common scheme are, for practical purposes, one
and the same.
III. Modus Operandi Versus Common Scheme
The most obvious similarity between modus operandi and common scheme is that both
represent exceptions to the general prohibition on the introduction of other crimes evidence in a
criminal prosecution. The general prohibition and multiple exceptions can be found in Virginia
Rule of Evidence 2:404(b), which provides, in pertinent part:
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is generally not
admissible to prove the character trait of a person in order to show
that the person acted in conformity therewith. However, if the
legitimate probative value of such proof outweighs its incidental
prejudice, such evidence is admissible if it tends to prove any
relevant fact pertaining to the offense charged, such as where it is
relevant to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, accident, or if they are
part of a common scheme or plan.
We have been called upon to address both the general prohibition and its exceptions on
many occasions. We repeatedly have listed the exceptions to the general prohibition as including
circumstances where the prior bad acts are being offered
(1) to prove motive to commit the crime charged; (2) to establish
guilty knowledge or to negate good faith; (3) to negate the
possibility of mistake or accident; (4) to show the conduct and
feeling of the accused toward his victim, or to establish their
prior relations; (5) to prove opportunity; (6) to prove identity of
the accused as the one who committed the crime where the
prior criminal acts are so distinctive as to indicate a modus
operandi; or (7) to demonstrate a common scheme or plan
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where the other crime or crimes constitute a part of a general
scheme of which the crime charged is a part.
Kenner v. Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 279, 290 (2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Quinones v.
Commonwealth, 35 Va. App. 634, 640 (2001)); see also Castillo v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App.
394, 415 (2019) (same); Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 24 Va. App. 220, 224 (1997) (same);
Morse v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 631-32 (1994) (same); Lafon v. Commonwealth, 17
Va. App. 411, 417 (1993) (same); Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 245-46 (1985)
(same).
That we repeatedly have listed modus operandi and common scheme as separately
numbered items in the list of exceptions demonstrates that the concepts are not the same, but
rather, constitute distinct exceptions to the general prohibition on the admission of other crimes
evidence. If they were the same, there would have been no need to list and number them
separately. Such a conclusion also flows from the separation of the two by the coordinating
conjunction “or” in those listings; if they were the same, no such separation would be necessary.
See Smoot v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 495, 501 (2002) (recognizing that “phrases separated
by a comma and the disjunctive ‘or,’ are independent”); Parker-Smith v. Sto Corp., 262 Va. 432,
439 (2001) (recognizing that the separation of items in a statutory list by commas and the
conjunction “or” meant those items represented “different things” (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)); Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 266, 271 (2005) (recognizing that
terms separated by the “disjunctive ‘or’” indicates that the terms are distinct).
Our conclusion that they are distinct exceptions is not based solely on numbering and
rules of grammar. We previously discussed the substantive difference between the two
exceptions in Henderson v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 125 (1987). We explained that the
common scheme exception applies
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where the other crime or crimes constitute a part of a general
scheme of which a crime charged is part[ and] is appropriate where
a prior criminal act or acts tend to show a system or uniform plan
from which motive, criminal intent or knowledge may be inferred.
Allowing evidence of other crimes to show motive, intent or
knowledge recognizes that the more often a person commits a
similar incident with similar results, the more likely it is that the
result was intended.
Id. at 128 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We contrasted this with the modus
operandi exception used to prove a criminal agent’s identity, which we explained was “based on
a different principle.” Id. Specifically, the modus operandi exception is premised upon “the
probability that a person who performs one act is the person who also performed another
distinctively similar act. For this probability to exist the criminal acts must be so distinctive as to
indicate a modus operandi.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). From these
distinctions, we concluded that the exceptions were substantively different. Id. at 129.
Our consistent conclusion that the two exceptions are different is fatal to appellant’s
appeal.5 Because they are different, appellant’s assignment of error that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence under the common scheme exception violates Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) in that it
5
Despite our having consistently treated the exceptions as different and distinct,
appellant argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Scott v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 636
(2007), requires us to conclude that the exceptions are synonymous. We find appellant’s reliance
on Scott misplaced. The issue in Scott was not the admission of evidence under one of the
“other crimes” exceptions, but rather, was the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to “define[] the
term ‘common scheme or plan’ in the context of Rule 3A:6(b)” regarding joinder of offenses for
trial. Id. at 644-45. In crafting a definition of “common scheme or plan” for purposes of the
joinder rule, the Supreme Court analogized to evidence of other crimes cases referencing both
the common scheme and modus operandi exceptions. Id. at 645. The fact that the Supreme
Court analogized to such cases does not render “common scheme” and “modus operandi”
identical or synonymous for all purposes. This is borne out by Scott itself, wherein the Supreme
Court, having analogized to other crimes evidence cases for both the definition of common
scheme and common plan, “observe[d] that the terms ‘common scheme’ and ‘common plan’ are
not synonymous.” Id. In short, although concepts may be related sufficiently that they may be
better understood by analogy to one another, drawing such an analogy does not render the
concepts identical or synonymous. Accordingly, the distinctions we previously have drawn
between the common scheme and modus operandi exceptions remain valid after Scott.
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does not address the ruling of the trial court, which was that the evidence was admissible under
the modus operandi exception. Furthermore, because the arguments made in the trial court were
addressed to the modus operandi exception and no one mentioned the common scheme
exception, appellant’s appellate arguments related to the common scheme exception were not
raised in trial court as required by Rule 5A:18. As a result, the issue appellant raises on appeal is
not properly before us. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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