David Knott v. Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, AtLee and Senior Judge Annunziata
UNPUBLISHED
Argued by teleconference
DAVID KNOTT
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1016-18-4 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY
MAY 12, 2020
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SHENANDOAH COUNTY
Clifford L. Athey, Jr., Judge
Peter K. McDermott, Senior Assistant Public Defender, for
appellant.
A. Anne Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
David Knott was convicted in a bench trial of unlawful wounding, pursuant to Code
§ 18.2-51, and destruction of property greater than $1,000, pursuant to Code § 18.2-137. On
appeal, Knott alleges that the trial court erred in holding that Code § 18.2-137(B) is a general
intent crime. We agree.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this is an unpublished opinion that carries no precedential value and the parties
are fully conversant with the record, we recite only the facts relevant to our analysis. David
Knott was tried in a bench trial for unlawful wounding and felony destruction of property and
convicted of both.1 The destruction of property charge stems from an incident in which an ATV
Knott was driving struck the victim’s truck, causing more than $1,000 of damage.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
The unlawful wounding conviction is not before us on appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Knott argues that “[t]he trial court erred in holding that intentional felony
property damage (Va. Code Section 18.2-137(B)) is a general intent crime.” We agree.
At the outset, we note that the Commonwealth argues that Knott’s argument is barred by
Rule 5A:18. Specifically, the Commonwealth argues that “Knott never raised a specific intent
argument concerning the required mens rea for the offense before the trial court.” We disagree
with the Commonwealth’s characterization of what is required for preservation under Rule
5A:18. Rule 5A:18 states, “No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
reversal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling.”
Knott repeatedly argued before the trial court that the Commonwealth was required but
failed to prove that Knott intentionally damaged the truck. At the end of the Commonwealth’s
case, Knott made a motion to strike, arguing, among other things, that the property damage
charge should be dismissed because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the damage was
intentional—arguing that the evidence was insufficient because it showed that Knott accidentally
backed into the victim’s truck. The trial court even clarified, “So . . . it seems to me that the
argument here does play out in terms of whether or not for the Court’s consideration these
matters were intentional or accidental acts.” Defense responded, “Yes sir.” In his renewed
motion to strike, Knott argued, “Again, it’s an accident, there’s no intentional destruction here.”
Then, in closing arguments, Knott argued, “With regards to the destruction of property. There
are several different stories as to how this happened, but not one of them points to this being an
intentional action by David Knott beyond a reasonable doubt.” Accordingly, Knott repeatedly
argued that the Commonwealth failed to prove the specific intent required for an intentional
property damage conviction. Knott’s objections were stated “with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling” and were clearly understood by the trial court. See Rule 5A:18; Taylor v.
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Mar. Overseas Corp., 224 Va. 562, 566 (1983) (holding that issue was preserved for appeal
because “[t]here can be no doubt the trial court understood . . . counsel’s objection”). Therefore,
Knott’s argument was properly preserved.
With respect to the merits of Knott’s claim, we note that “[o]n appeal, we review the
evidence in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial
court.” Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 236 (2016) (quoting Bowman v.
Commonwealth, 290 Va. 492, 494 (2015)). “Viewing the record through this evidentiary prism
requires us to ‘discard the evidence of the accused in conflict with that of the Commonwealth,
and regard as true all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all fair
inferences to be drawn therefrom.’” Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 323-24 (2018)
(quoting Vasquez, 291 Va. at 236).
Furthermore, “[a] trial court’s determination of matters within its own discretion [like
which is the applicable legal standard] is reversible on appeal only for abuse of that discretion
. . . and a trial court’s decision will not be set aside unless plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.” Goldhamer v. Cohen, 31 Va. App. 728, 734-35 (2000) (quoting Farley v. Farley, 9
Va. App. 326, 328 (1990)). A trial court, “by definition abuses its discretion when it makes an
error of law.” Shooltz v. Shooltz, 27 Va. App. 264, 271 (1998) (quoting Koon v. United States,
518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)).
Pursuant to Code § 18.2-137, it is a Class 6 felony to “intentionally” “destroy[], deface[],
damage[] . . . any property, real or personal, not his own” valued at $1,000 or more. If any such
acts are done “unlawfully,” and the damage is less than $1,000, it is deemed a Class 3
misdemeanor. Code § 18.2-137.
In finding Knott guilty of Code § 18.2-137, the trial court relied on Crowder v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 382, 384 (1993). Apparently unaware of its subsequent history,
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the Commonwealth presented Crowder to the trial court to support the assertion that it was not
required to prove that the damage to the truck was done intentionally. According to Crowder,
and the Commonwealth in this case, “Criminal responsibility under the [destruction of property]
statute attaches when property is damaged or destroyed during the commission of an unlawful
act, which includes the performance of a lawful act in a criminally negligent manner.” Id.
Therefore, the Commonwealth argued that the damage to the truck caused by Knott, in itself, was
sufficient to prove that he violated Code § 18.2-137.
In Scott v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 35, 47-48 (2011), however, this Court noted that
since Crowder was decided, the General Assembly had amended Code § 18.2-137 to require that
felony criminal property destruction be done intentionally. This Court noted,
Code § 18.2-137(B) does not criminalize the mere performance of
a volitional act conducted in a criminally negligent manner that
happens to damage the property of another. A plain reading of the
statute, with due consideration to the words used and their context
in the overall statutory scheme, assures us that the legislature
intended this reading when it amended Code § 18.2-137 in 1999.
Id. at 49-50. Accordingly, the holding in Crowder has been superseded by statute as explained in
Scott.2
Despite the amendment to Code § 18.2-137 and our holding in Scott, the trial court
nevertheless relied on Crowder to find that there was sufficient evidence to convict Knott of
intentional destruction of property, without a finding of intentionality. The trial court
specifically found that Code § 18.2-137(B) only requires a finding of “general intent” to sustain a
conviction and that “you [the Commonwealth] don’t have to prove it intentionally happened.” It
is well settled that application of an erroneous legal standard ipso facto constitutes an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., Bomar v. Bomar, 45 Va. App. 229, 236 (2005); Mina v. Mina, 45 Va. App.
2
On appeal, both parties agree that specific intent is required.
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215, 222 (2005); Lanzalotti v. Lanzalotti, 41 Va. App. 550, 554 (2003). Accordingly, we must
reverse and remand.3
III. CONCLUSION
Because the trial court applied the wrong legal standard to determine whether the
evidence was sufficient to convict Knott of destruction of property, the destruction of property
conviction is reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so
advised.
Reversed and remanded.
3
The Commonwealth argues on appeal that this Court should affirm despite the legal
error because the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to prove that Knott intentionally damaged
the truck. We disagree. For us to so conclude, the record must contain a factual finding by the
trial court supporting the conclusion that the damage was intentionally inflicted. It is well settled
that appellate courts “are bound by the trial court’s factual findings unless those findings are
plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 665, 670
(2010). Thus, we conclude that further factual findings are necessary, and we decline to consider
whether the evidence was sufficient to prove an intentional destruction. See Blackman v.
Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 633, 642-43 (2005) (“[A]n appellee may argue for the first time on
appeal any legal ground in support of a judgment so long as it does not require new factual
determinations.”).
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