Steven L. Romine v. Karen A. Romine

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Annunziata and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
STEVEN L. ROMINE
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 1356-95-1 JUDGE ROSEMARIE ANNUNZIATA
JULY 30, 1996
KAREN A. ROMINE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge
Morris H. Fine (Fine, Fine, Legum & Fine, on
brief), for appellant.
Debra C. Albiston (Cynthia E. Cordle; Kaufman &
Canoles, on brief), for appellee.
Appellant, Steven L. Romine ("husband"), appeals a decree of
the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach ("circuit court")
affirming, inter alia, the jurisdiction of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Virginia Beach
("J&DR court") to reinstate an order of spousal support in favor
of appellee, Karen A. Romine ("wife"), which the circuit court
initially entered and subsequently abated. We find that the J&DR
court lacked jurisdiction to reinstate the support order and,
therefore, reverse.
I.
Husband and wife were divorced by decree entered in the
circuit court on September 3, 1991. The decree awarded spousal
support to wife in the amount of $900 per month. The decree also
transferred to the J&DR court all matters pertaining to the
enforcement, modification, or revision of the support award.
On March 11, 1994, husband filed a petition in the circuit
court to reduce the support award on the ground that he was then
unemployed. On March 18, 1994, the parties agreed to abate
support payments beginning in April 1994. The agreement was
incorporated into a decree of the circuit court entered November
14, 1994. The November decree ordered husband to advise counsel
of his return to employment and allowed wife to petition for
reinstatement of support. The November decree did not again
transfer the matter to the J&DR court.
On December 7, 1994, wife petitioned the J&DR court to
reinstate spousal support on the ground that husband had gained
employment in June 1994. On March 16, 1995, the J&DR court
reinstated support in the amount of $900 per month effective June
1, 1994.
Husband noted his appeal, and the J&DR court set a $5,000
bond with surety, which husband failed to post. Husband
petitioned the circuit court to permit his appeal without posting
the bond. However, the circuit court entered a decree, denying
husband's motion on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
and that the J&DR court had jurisdiction to require the bond.
Implicit in the circuit court's ruling is a finding that the J&DR
court had jurisdiction to reinstate the support order.
On appeal, husband contends, inter alia, that the circuit
court's exercise of jurisdiction in entering the decree abating
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the support order divested the J&DR court of jurisdiction to act
further. We agree. 1
II.
Code § 20-79(c) grants authority to a circuit court to
transfer to a J&DR court "matters pertaining to support and
maintenance for the spouse" after the entry of a decree of
divorce. 2 A circuit court's transfer of such matters to a J&DR
1
Because we reverse on the jurisdictional issue, we decline
to address appellant's additional assignments of error.
2
Code § 20-79(c) provides, as follows:
In any suit for divorce or suit for
maintenance and support, the court may after
a hearing, pendente lite, or in any decree of
divorce a mensa et thoro, decree of divorce a
vinculo matrimonii, final decree for
maintenance and support, or subsequent decree
in such suit, transfer to the juvenile and
domestic relations district court the
enforcement of its orders pertaining to
support and maintenance for the spouse,
maintenance, support, care and custody of the
child or children. After the entry of a
decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii the
court may transfer to the juvenile and
domestic relations district court any other
matters pertaining to support and maintenance
for the spouse, maintenance, support, care
and custody of the child or children on
motion by either party, and may so transfer
such matters before the entry of such decree
on motion joined in by both parties. In the
transfer of any matters referred to herein,
the court may, upon the motion of any party,
or on its own motion, and for good cause
shown, transfer any matters covered by said
decree or decrees to any juvenile and
domestic relations district court within the
Commonwealth that constitutes a more
appropriate forum. An appeal of an order by
such juvenile and domestic relations district
court which is to enforce or modify the
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court creates concurrent jurisdiction in each court. Crabtree v.
Crabtree, 17 Va. App. 81, 86, 435 S.E.2d 883, 887 (1993). The
circuit court retains its continuing jurisdiction to modify
custody and support matters pursuant to Code §§ 20-108, -109.
See id.
However, although a circuit court retains continuing
jurisdiction following a transfer pursuant to Code § 20-79(c), it
does not follow that a J&DR court similarly retains jurisdiction
pursuant to such a transfer once the circuit court again
exercises its jurisdiction in the case. Indeed, for the
following reasons, we hold that it does not.
First, the statute does not extend continuing jurisdiction
over matters of custody and support to J&DR courts. Cf. Code
§§ 20-108, -109; Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 86, 435 S.E.2d 887
(discussing statutory authority providing for continuing
jurisdiction in the circuit court). Rather, the statutory scheme
provides the circuit courts such jurisdiction and the authority
to transfer to the J&DR courts jurisdiction over limited matters.
The J&DR court's jurisdiction exists only as a result of action
taken by a circuit court.
Second, the cessation of a J&DR court's concurrent
jurisdiction upon a circuit court's exercise of its continuing
jurisdiction is consistent with the statutory scheme. See Code
(..continued)
decree in the divorce suit shall be as
provided in § 16.1-296.
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§ 20-79(a); 3 Code §§ 16.1-241, -244; 4 Rochelle v. Rochelle, 225
3
Code § 20-79(a) provides, as follows:
In any case where an order has been
entered under the provisions of this chapter,
directing either party to pay any sum or sums
of money for the support of his or her
spouse, or concerning the care, custody or
maintenance of any child, or children, the
jurisdiction of the court which entered such
order shall cease and its orders become
inoperative upon the entry of a decree by the
court or the judge thereof in vacation in a
suit for divorce instituted in any circuit
court in this Commonwealth having
jurisdiction thereof, in which decree
provision is made for support and maintenance
for the spouse or concerning the care,
custody or maintenance of a child or
children, or concerning any matter provided
in a decree in the divorce proceedings in
accordance with the provisions of § 20-103.
4
Code § 16.1-241 provides, in part, as follows:
The judges of the juvenile and domestic
relations district court elected or appointed
under this law shall be conservators of the
peace within the corporate limits of the
cities and the boundaries of the counties for
which they are respectively chosen and within
one mile beyond the limits of such cities and
counties. Except as hereinafter provided,
each juvenile and domestic relations district
court shall have, within the limits of the
territory for which it is created, exclusive
original jurisdiction, and within one mile
beyond the limits of said city or county,
concurrent jurisdiction with the juvenile
court or courts of the adjoining city or
county over all cases, matters and
proceedings involving:
* * * * * * *
L. Any person who seeks spousal support
after having separated from his spouse. A
decision under this subdivision shall not be
res judicata in any subsequent action for
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(..continued)
spousal support in a circuit court. A
circuit court shall have concurrent original
jurisdiction in all causes of action under
this subdivision.
Code § 16.1-244(A) provides, in part, as follows:
Nothing contained in this law shall
deprive any other court of the concurrent
jurisdiction to determine the custody of
children upon a writ of habeas corpus under
the law, or to determine the custody,
guardianship, visitation or support of
children when such custody, guardianship,
visitation or support is incidental to the
determination of causes pending in such
courts, nor deprive a circuit court of
jurisdiction to determine spousal support in
a suit for separate maintenance. However,
when a suit for divorce has been filed in a
circuit court, in which the custody,
guardianship, visitation or support of
children of the parties or spousal support is
raised by the pleadings and a hearing is set
by the circuit court on any such issue for a
date certain to be heard within twenty-one
days of the filing, the juvenile and domestic
relations district courts shall be divested
of the right to enter any further decrees or
orders; such matters shall be determined by
the circuit court unless both parties agreed
to a referral to the juvenile court. Upon a
showing of need to continue any preliminary
protective order issued by the juvenile and
domestic relations district court, the
circuit court shall grant a hearing to the
parties as a preferential matter on the court
docket. Nothing in this section shall
deprive a circuit court of the authority to
refer any such case to a commissioner for a
hearing or shall deprive the juvenile and
domestic relations district courts of the
jurisdiction to enforce its valid orders
prior to the entry of a conflicting order of
any circuit court for any period during which
the order was in effect or to temporarily
place a child in the custody of any person
when that child has been adjudicated abused,
neglected, in need of services or delinquent
subsequent to the order of any circuit court.
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Va. 387, 391-92, 302 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1983); Martin v. Bales, 7 Va.
App. 141, 145, 371 S.E.2d 823, 825-26 (1988). As these
provisions demonstrate, the jurisdiction that a J&DR court shares
concurrently with a circuit court terminates, as a matter of law,
upon the circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction. There is no
authority supporting the proposition that a J&DR court's
jurisdiction does not similarly terminate when its jurisdiction
is obtained pursuant to Code § 20-79(c).
Third, a circuit court's assumption of jurisdiction after
transfer to a J&DR court conclusively determines that the matter
will be litigated in a court of record. It follows that the
circuit court intends to preclude the J&DR court from acting on
that issue. See Crabtree, 17 Va. App. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887.
Finally, the cessation of a J&DR court's jurisdiction under
such circumstances is consistent with the policy considerations
underlying the relevant statutes. See id. at 86-87, 435 S.E.2d
at 887. These considerations include the legislative intent that
the circuit courts retain full jurisdictional power as provided
by statute, notwithstanding the concurrent jurisdiction of the
J&DR court. See id. at 86, 435 S.E.2d at 887. To effectively
implement that legislative intent, the circuit court's
jurisdiction must, of necessity, encompass the power not only to
reinstate a case earlier transferred to a J&DR court and
adjudicate all relevant issues, see id. at 87, 435 S.E.2d at 887,
but also the power to decide which court is the more appropriate
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forum for any necessary review, modification, and enforcement of
its orders resolving the new issues. Any divestment of a circuit
court's jurisdictional power to address and decide matters
properly before it must emanate not from the parties or the J&DR
court, but by act of the circuit court pursuant to Code
§ 20-79(c), with specific reference to the matters to be
transferred. To invest in a J&DR court the power to review,
modify, or enforce orders of a circuit court in the absence of
such a mandate would undermine the structure and authority of
judicial process.
Accordingly, we hold that a circuit court's assumption of
jurisdiction over a support matter subsequent to its transfer
pursuant to Code § 20-79(c) divests a J&DR court of
jurisdiction. 5 Thus, the J&DR court in this case had no
jurisdiction to reinstate the support order which the circuit
court had previously abated.
For the foregoing reasons, the decree of the circuit court
is reversed and the order of the J&DR court vacated.
Reversed and vacated.
5
A circuit court may, of course, retransfer the case
pursuant to Code § 20-79(c).
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