Kimberly Maul, s/k/a Kimberly Rose Maul v. Franklin County Department of Social Services

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judge Alston, Senior Judge Coleman and Retired Judge Hodges
UNPUBLISHED
KIMBERLY MAUL, S/K/A
KIMBERLY ROSE MAUL
MEMORANDUM OPINION
v. Record No. 0817-13-3 PER CURIAM
DECEMBER 10, 2013
FRANKLIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT
OF SOCIAL SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
William N. Alexander, II, Judge
(Melissa P. Keen; Furrow & Keen, P.C., on brief), for appellant.
Appellant submitting on brief.
(Carolyn H. Furrow; Deanna P. Stone, Guardian ad litem for the
infant children; Rhodes, Ferguson & Stone, Ltd., on brief), for
appellee. Appellee and Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
Kimberly Maul, appellant, appeals the order terminating her residual parental rights to her
three children. Appellant contends that the trial court erred by finding the Department met its
burden of proof that the abuse and neglect suffered by the children presented a serious and
substantial threat, that the conditions which resulted in such neglect or abuse could not be corrected
or eliminated, and that termination of her residual parental rights was in the best interests of the
children. Upon review of the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that the trial court did not
err. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
When addressing matters concerning the custody and care of a child,
this Court’s paramount consideration is the child’s best interests. On
appeal, we presume that the trial court thoroughly weighed all the

Retired Judge William H. Hodges took part in the consideration of this case by
designation pursuant to Code § 17.1-400(D).

Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
evidence, considered the statutory requirements, and made its
determination based on the child’s best interests. The trial court is
vested with broad discretion in making decisions “necessary to guard
and to foster a child’s best interests.” We will not disturb a trial
court’s factual findings on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
evidence to support them.
Brown v. Spotsylvania Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 43 Va. App. 205, 211, 597 S.E.2d 214, 217 (2004)
(quoting Farley v. Farley, 9 Va. App. 326, 328, 387 S.E.2d 794, 795 (1990)) (citations omitted).
“Furthermore, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and
its evidence is afforded all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.” Logan v. Fairfax
Cnty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991).
In May 2011, appellant was unable to care for and shelter her three minor children. Joevany
Rodriguez, the father of the children, was in prison in Pennsylvania. Appellant and the children
were homeless and could no longer stay in the shelter in which they had been residing. Appellant
requested that the children be removed from her care. The parents had a history of drug abuse,
violence, and abandonment. Both appellant and father had been incarcerated, both used drugs, and
father would beat the children in appellant’s absence.
The oldest child came into care with seventeen cavities. The middle child was out of
control, threatening family members and others, was exhibiting psychotic behaviors, and was on
anti-psychotic medication. The youngest child was in the best physical condition. All children
were behind in their immunizations.
By July 2011, appellant was ordered to, inter alia, complete psychological and substance
abuse evaluations, attend parent, psychological, and substance abuse counseling, maintain
employment and housing, and cooperate with the Department, with the goal of returning the
children to her care. Although she completed the psychological evaluation, appellant missed several
appointments and lost the privilege to obtain additional services with Piedmont Community
Services. On different occasions, appellant tested positive for marijuana, cocaine, and barbiturates.
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Although she was able to obtain housing for a period of time, appellant became homeless again in
May 2012. In July of 2012, appellant reported she had moved to Florida and provided the
Department with an address. However, the Department was unable to reach her at that address and
appellant discontinued all contact with the Department. Appellant missed all court appearances
after the Department filed for termination in May 2012, and her whereabouts remain unknown.
Notably, the children have been thriving in foster care. The children are healthy and have
resolved many behavioral problems (e.g., the middle child who no longer requires anti-psychotic
medication).
Appellant contends the Department failed to show that the abuse and neglect presented a
serious and substantial threat to the children’s health and development and that the conditions could
not be substantially remedied as required by Code § 16.1-283(B). Appellant also asserts the
Department did not establish it was in the best interests of the children to terminate her residual
parental rights. See id. We disagree.
While appellant was able to obtain housing for a period of time, she failed to maintain it and
returned to a homeless women’s shelter. Appellant tested positive for illegal substances and could
not maintain employment. She did not complete any course of psychological, parenting, or
substance abuse counseling and continually missed appointments. After an unsupervised visit with
the children, the children’s behavior deteriorated. The trial court reasonably found appellant would
not and could not remedy the conditions that led to foster care and that appellant abandoned her
children once she relocated and discontinued all contact with the Department. The evidence
supports the trial court’s conclusions that the children’s health, safety, and development were
threatened, that appellant was not able to correct or eliminate the problems that led to foster care
placement, and that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate appellant’s residual parental
rights. “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
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find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his or [or her] responsibilities.”
Kaywood v. Halifax Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 10 Va. App. 535, 540, 394 S.E.2d 492, 495 (1990).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by terminating appellant’s residual parental rights to
all three children. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s ruling is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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