Jerome A Beale v. Commonwealth

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bumgardner, Felton and Senior Judge Overton
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
JEROME A. BEALE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1252-02-1 JUDGE WALTER S. FELTON JR.
APRIL 29, 2003
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF SUFFOLK
D. Arthur Kelsey, Judge
Felipita Athanas, Appellate Counsel
(S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender;
Public Defender Commission, on briefs), for
appellant.
Amy L. Marshall, Assistant Attorney General
(Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Jerome A. Beale was convicted by a jury of marital rape, in
violation of Code § 18.2-61(B)(i). 1 On appeal, Beale contends
the trial court erred in (1) holding that the Commonwealth's
peremptory strikes of potential jurors did not violate his
constitutional rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
1
In 2002, subsequent to Beale's conviction, Code
§ 18.2-61(B) was amended. The General Assembly deleted the
second paragraph, which read: "However, no person shall be
found guilty under this subsection unless, at the time of the
alleged offense, (i) the spouses were living separate and apart,
or (ii) the defendant caused bodily injury to the spouse by the
use of force or violence."
(1986), and (2) admitting evidence of his prior conduct arising
out of an offense of which he had been previously acquitted.
Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
I. BACKGROUND
A. OFFENSE
Jerome Beale and Alicia Smith Beale, husband and wife,
separated in May 2001. On September 1, 2001, an enraged Beale
unexpectedly appeared at Mrs. Beale's residence as she prepared
to leave with her children. When he arrived, his eyes were
bulging, he was cursing, and he demanded to know why she was
ignoring his phone calls. Mrs. Beale became frightened and
drove away. Later that day, at Beale's request, Mrs. Beale
dropped their children off at the barracks where he was living.
She then visited her cousin until 3:00 a.m.
Upon returning to her residence, Mrs. Beale was met by
Beale. He yelled and cursed at her, calling her a "bitch," a
"slut" and a "whore." He insisted on knowing where she was
earlier that evening and instructed her to get out of the car.
Beale eventually calmed down, and Mrs. Beale got out of the car.
As they entered the house, Beale "snapped." He grabbed Mrs.
Beale's arm, and led her into the master bedroom. Beale punched
and choked Mrs. Beale for twenty to thirty minutes while
repeatedly calling her vulgar names.
Beale then dragged Mrs. Beale by her hair into her son's
room. He instructed her to sit in the corner and struck her
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every time she attempted to move. At one point Beale left the
bedroom and went into the den. He found Mrs. Beale's purse and
rifled through it. While Beale rifled through her purse, Mrs.
Beale stood up and attempted an escape. Beale saw her, picked
up a stereo speaker, and threatened to "bash [her] face in" if
she moved again.
Shortly thereafter, Beale insisted that Mrs. Beale leave
with him in the car. She testified that she did not want to go
but believed he would beat her if she refused. He grabbed her
arm, led her out of the house, and put her into the rear
passenger seat of the car. Mrs. Beale asked Beale to pick up
their children, but he refused. He instead drove to a back area
of the Tidewater Community College campus. He told Mrs. Beale
to get into the front seat and threatened to beat her if she did
not obey. Beale then ordered her to remove her clothes. She
initially refused, but eventually complied to avoid further
physical harm. Mrs. Beale did not fight when Beale removed her
pants and underwear. Beale proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with Mrs. Beale without her consent.
After having sexual intercourse with her, Beale eventually
brought Mrs. Beale back to her residence. Upon arriving at the
house, Beale repeatedly asked her if she intended to call the
police. He followed Mrs. Beale inside the residence and removed
the two phones. As soon as Beale left, Mrs. Beale ran next door
and contacted the police.
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B. PRETRIAL MOTION
Prior to the trial, Beale sought through a motion in limine
to exclude evidence on related offenses arising out of the same
course of conduct. 2 The court denied the motion and found that
the conduct within the twenty-four-hour period immediately
before the alleged marital rape was relevant to (1) the state of
mind of the victim at the time the intercourse took place, (2)
the degree of force to be demonstrated in the Commonwealth's
case, and (3) Beale's assertion that the intercourse was
consensual.
C. JURY SELECTION
During jury selection, the Commonwealth used its peremptory
challenges to strike four African-American women from the
venire, Ms. Bailey, Ms. Twine, Mrs. Bowden, and Ms. Morgan.
Beale objected that the strikes violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476
U.S. 79 (1986). Pursuant to Batson, the court requested that
the Commonwealth state the reasons for each of its strikes.
The Commonwealth stated that Ms. Bailey was struck from the
venire because "she was looking up and did not seem to be
fixated on the [j]udge." Beale's attorney responded that
inattentiveness "could be said . . . about just about every
2
Beale was previously convicted by a jury of assault and
battery for striking Mrs. Beale while in her residence that
night. He was acquitted by the same jury of the charge of
abduction with intent to defile, which also stemmed from his
conduct during the early hours of September 2, 2001.
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juror." The Commonwealth reiterated its desire for attentive
jurors. The trial court concluded that inattentiveness is a
satisfactory explanation under Batson and that Beale had not
rebutted the proffered reason as pretextual. The trial court
ruled that striking Ms. Bailey from the venire did not violate
Batson.
As to the reason Ms. Twine was struck from the venire, the
Commonwealth stated:
Ms. Twine looked down several times,
especially when [the court] [was] asking a
question as to whether any juror has any
predisposition towards the guilt or
innocence of the defendant. She looked
around, she was not fixated on [the court's]
questions and on [the court's] recitation.
It started there and it seemed to go through
the recitation at various intervals.
Beale's attorney argued that he did not notice the alleged
inattentiveness. In addition, he requested that the jurors be
brought back before the court and questioned to determine
whether they were paying attention. The court denied the
request and held that "there is no due process right to an
individual voir dire examination post-Batson request when the
proffered reason for the strike is demeanor and
inattentiveness."
Regarding the reason Mrs. Bowden was struck from the
venire, the Commonwealth explained:
Throughout the proceedings she was the least
attentive juror. At various times she had
her eyes closed through many of the
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questions. When I asked questions, when Mr.
Parnell asked questions, and when the
[c]ourt was going through the directions.
In addition, she sighed when [the court]
[was] specifically asking about any
knowledge about the case from the press.
Her lack of attentiveness went way beyond
the first two. But it was enough that I
noted three or four places when her eyes
were simply closed during the time that
anyone was talking.
Beale's attorney noted that Mrs. Bowden was the third
African-American female that the Commonwealth was claiming to be
inattentive. He again stated that he failed to notice any
inattentiveness. The trial judge noted that he too "did not
notice attentive [sic] or lack of attentiveness," but that he
"wasn't looking for it the way [the parties] were looking for
it." The court denied the motion as to Mrs. Bowden and found
that the Commonwealth's explanation for striking her was proper
under Batson.
The Commonwealth's fourth peremptory strike, Ms. Morgan, is
not a subject of this appeal. 3
II. BATSON CHALLENGE
We first consider whether the trial court erred in holding
that the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes of potential jurors
3
The Commonwealth struck Ms. Morgan based on a 1976 charge
of larceny. The Commonwealth planned to impeach one of Beale's
witnesses based on a larceny conviction from the same time
period. The Commonwealth felt that if it impeached or attacked
the witness on the larceny conviction that Ms. Morgan might be
biased.
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did not violate Beale's constitutional rights under Batson.
Beale contends that the trial court failed to make a finding
that the reasons offered by the Commonwealth for its peremptory
strikes were race-neutral. We find no error in the trial
court's determination that the strikes were race-neutral and
that there was no discriminatory intent in the Commonwealth's
peremptory strikes.
A. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Equal Protection Clause precludes a prosecutor from
excluding otherwise qualified and unbiased potential jurors
solely on the basis of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84.
Under Batson,
[t]he defendant must make a prima facie
showing that the prosecutor has exercised
peremptory strikes on the basis of race.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409, 111
S. Ct. 1364, 1370, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991).
If this showing is made, the burden shifts
to the prosecutor to articulate a racially
neutral explanation for striking the jurors
in question. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106
S. Ct. at 1722-23. If the court determines
that the proffered reasons are race-neutral,
the defendant should be afforded an
opportunity to show why the reasons, even
though facially race-neutral, are merely
pretextual and that the challenged strikes
were based on race. United States v. Joe,
928 F.2d 99, 103 (4th Cir. 1991). But,
ultimately, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has carried his burden
of proving purposeful discrimination.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1724.
James v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 459, 461-62, 442 S.E.2d 396, 398
(1994). A trial court's decision on the ultimate question of
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discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact that is
accorded great deference on appeal and will not be disturbed
unless clearly erroneous. Barksdale v. Commonwealth, 17
Va. App. 456, 460, 438 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1993) (citing Hernandez
v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 368 (1991)).
B. PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF DISCRIMINATION
In the present case, the Commonwealth exercised its
peremptory strikes to remove four African-American females from
the venire. Beale objected to and challenged the strikes,
contending the women were purposefully removed on the grounds of
their race. 4 Pursuant to Batson, Beale was required to make a
prima facie showing that the Commonwealth made the peremptory
strikes on the basis of race. However, that showing did not
occur. Immediately upon Beale's objection, the trial judge
requested the Commonwealth to articulate the reasons for the
strikes.
Although the trial court did not explicitly make a finding
that the prima facie case had been established, "often the
actual sequence of events at trial merges the separate
procedural steps" incidental to a Batson challenge and analysis.
James, 247 Va. at 462, 442 S.E.2d at 398. This "[c]onsolidation
of various steps does not invalidate the process as long as the
4
Beale did not pursue the issue of gender as grounds for
attacking the Commonwealth's peremptory strikes of the four
African-American women. Therefore we will not address that
issue on appeal.
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consolidation does not adversely impact the rights of any
party." Id. Both Beale and the Commonwealth were afforded the
opportunity to explain their respective positions and address
arguments forwarded by the opposing party. Neither party's
rights were adversely affected by the trial judge's decision to
combine separate steps of the Batson process.
C. RACIALLY NEUTRAL EXPLANATION
"'In evaluating the race-neutrality of an attorney's
explanation, a court must determine whether, assuming the
proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the
challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of
law.'" Barksdale, 17 Va. App. at 459, 438 S.E.2d at 763(quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359). "If the explanation is
constitutionally acceptable, the 'decisive question' before the
trial judge then becomes 'whether counsel's . . . explanation
. . . should be believed.'" Robertson v. Commonwealth, 18
Va. App. 635, 639, 445 S.E.2d 713, 715 (1994) (quoting
Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365). Once that has been settled, there
seems nothing left to review. Id. (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S.
at 367).
In the instant case, the Commonwealth presented the trial
court with ample evidence for it to make a finding that each of
the peremptory strikes exercised by the Commonwealth against the
three African-American potential jurors was race-neutral. The
Commonwealth identified varied and specific behavior on the part
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of each stricken juror that was indicative of inattentiveness.
In Robertson, we held that "[m]anifestly, disinterested jurors
should be identified and removed whenever possible, irrespective
of race or gender." Id. at 640, 445 S.E.2d at 716.
Inattentiveness is a valid race-neutral reason for a peremptory
strike.
In explaining its reasons for striking each of the three
women, the Commonwealth explained first that Ms. Bailey "was
looking up and did not seem to be fixated on the [j]udge."
Ms. Twine, on the other hand, "looked down several times" and
was looking around during the court's questions and recitation.
Finally, the Commonwealth explained that Mrs. Bowden had her
eyes closed through many of the court's questions and "she
sighed when [the court] [was] specifically asking about any
knowledge about the case from the press."
For each of the stricken jurors, the trial court made a
sufficient finding that the Commonwealth's reason for striking
the juror was race-neutral. In addressing the peremptory strike
of Ms. Bailey, the trial court made the finding that
assertions of inattentive demeanor and other
demeanor observations which reflect that a
potential juror is not concentrating or
paying attention are satisfactory
explanations under Batson unless there is
some way to rebut the proffered reason is
pretextual, so I'd deny the motion, and
finding none, I will deny the motion with
respect to Ms. Bailey.
(Emphasis added).
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Regarding Ms. Twine, the trial court found that "[it]
should assume in the absence of any rebutting evidence that it
was an appropriate strike, so I'll deny the Batson."
(Emphasis added).
Finally, with regards to Mrs. Bowden, the trial court found
that "the explanation given is a proper proffered explanation
under the Batson precedent, and the response is not sufficient
to render it . . . a pretextual reason." (Emphasis added).
Based on varied descriptions of inattentiveness articulated
to the trial court, and the insufficient response by Beale to
render the explanations pretextual, the trial court properly
determined the explanations to be race-neutral.
D. PIERCING THE RACE-NEUTRAL REASON
Beale attempted to pierce the Commonwealth's racially
neutral reason for the peremptory strikes by stating that he had
not observed any inattentiveness from the three jurors. He also
argued that if they had exhibited any signs that they were not
paying attention, it is likely that white members of the venire
had appeared equally inattentive. However, Beale did not
present any evidence of inattentiveness of other potential
jurors. Beale requested that the court allow questioning of the
venire to determine whether the challenged jurors were paying
attention. However, the trial judge denied the request, and
Beale has conceded that additional voir dire would be
procedurally incorrect.
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The trial court is uniquely able to assess the genuineness
of prosecutors' justifications of their peremptory strikes and
to determine whether an underlying discriminatory motivation
exists. Finding no clear error in the record before us, we will
affirm the judgment of the trial court. Winfield v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 446, 453, 404 S.E.2d 398, 402 (1991),
aff'd en banc, 14 Va. App. 1049, 421 S.E.2d 468 (1992).
III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND PRIOR BAD ACTS
We next consider whether the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of Beale's conduct prior to the marital rape, evidence
previously admitted in the trial of an offense of which he was
acquitted by a jury. Beale contends that the Commonwealth is
precluded from introducing evidence of his acts prior to the
marital rape on the grounds of collateral estoppel. We find no
error.
A. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Beale asserts that the trial court erred in admitting
evidence used in the prior trial because the jury acquitted him
of abduction with the intent to defile. We disagree.
It is "'usually impossible to determine with any precision
upon what basis the [fact finder] reached a verdict in a
criminal case,' leaving the defense of collateral estoppel
available to an accused only in 'a rare situation.'" Ramadan v.
Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 708, 714-15, 508 S.E.2d 357, 360
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(1998) (quoting Jones v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 231, 233, 228
S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (1976)). "'The party seeking the protection
of collateral estoppel carries the burden of showing that the
verdict in the prior action necessarily decided the precise
issue he now seeks to preclude.'" Id. at 714, 508 S.E.2d at 360
(quoting Rogers v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 337, 341, 362 S.E.2d
752, 754 (1987)).
Beale concedes that the jury in the previous trial could
have reached an acquittal on either the element of force or of
the intent to defile. He cannot say with specificity which
issue was decided.
Where a previous judgment of acquittal was
based upon a general verdict, as is usually
the case, this [realistic and rational]
approach requires a court to "examine the
record of a prior proceeding, taking into
account the pleadings, evidence, charge, and
other relevant matter, and conclude whether
a rational jury could have grounded its
verdict upon an issue other than that which
the defendant seeks to foreclose from
consideration."
Jones, 217 Va. at 233, 228 S.E.2d at 129 (quoting Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
The burden is on Beale to provide this Court with a record
that supports his claim of error. Kerr v. Commonwealth, 35
Va. App. 149, 151, 543 S.E.2d 612, 613 (2001). Since Beale
failed to prove that the prior proceeding necessarily decided
the issue he seeks to foreclose, we find that collateral
estoppel did not bar the admission of the evidence regarding
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Beale's conduct during the period leading up to the marital
rape.
B. PRIOR BAD ACTS
The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
allowed the jury to hear evidence of Beale's conduct that
occurred prior to the marital rape. As a general rule, evidence
that shows or tends to show crimes or other bad acts committed
by the accused is inadmissible for the purpose of proving that
the accused committed the particular crime charged. Kirkpatrick
v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970).
"[Evidence of prior crimes] merely show[s] that [an accused] has
the propensity to commit the crime [charged] and this inference
has been held error because it reverses his presumption of
innocence." Spence v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1040, 1045, 407
S.E.2d 916, 918 (1991) (citing Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225 Va.
497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983)). Its admissibility is
error.
"'There are, however, well-established exceptions to the
general rule.'" Mughrabi v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 538, 545,
567 S.E.2d 542, 545 (2002) (quoting Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240
Va. 26, 34, 393 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1990)). "'If the evidence of
other conduct is connected with the present offense, or tends to
prove any element or fact in issue at trial, it should be
admitted, whether or not it tends to show the defendant guilty
of another crime.'" Parnell v. Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 342,
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348, 423 S.E.2d 834, 838 (1992) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth,
228 Va. 519, 527, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1984)).
Beale's prior conduct was clearly interwoven with the crime
of marital rape. During the time period leading up to the
marital rape, Beale at all times asserted control over Mrs.
Beale. He repeatedly hit her when she tried to escape. He
grabbed her arm, pulled her to the car, and placed her in the
back seat. Beale drove Mrs. Beale to a place she did not wish
to go and threatened physical violence to get her into the front
seat, where the marital rape occurred.
In addition to this conduct being interwoven with the
crime, the evidence of Beale's prior acts of repeated violence
against Mrs. Beale, within the twenty-four hours leading up to
the time of the marital rape, and his asportation of her against
her will to a secluded area bears on Mrs. Beale's state of mind
and the likelihood that sexual intercourse was not consensual.
In Morse v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App. 627, 440 S.E.2d 145(1994), Morse was charged with marital sexual assault. Mrs.
Morse testified at trial about eight to twelve incidents over an
unspecified period of time when Morse acted violently towards
her in demanding sexual intercourse. He objected to the
admission of the testimony, arguing that the testimony offered
in that instance lacked specificity in detail and adequate
proximity in time to the crime charged. The trial court
overruled his objection and allowed the testimony into evidence.
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On appeal, this Court held that the accused's prior threats and
violence towards his wife "tend[ed] to prove that the
intercourse in question was accomplished by conduct that was
tantamount to a present threat of force by [the accused] against
[his wife]." Id. at 632, 440 S.E.2d at 148.
Beale's beating and forcible taking of Mrs. Beale against
her will to a remote area is analogous to the conduct in Morse.
However, in this case the temporal nexus between Beale's
violence and the commission of the marital rape is closer.
Here, the violence occurred within hours of the sexual
intercourse, as opposed to weeks before. See Collins v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 223, 230, 307 S.E.2d 884, 888 (1983)
(remoteness in time is a consideration for determining probative
value of the other bad acts). Beale's conduct leading up to the
intercourse tended to prove that he used a present threat of
force against his wife to consummate an act of non-consensual
intercourse.
Beale's prior bad acts were also important in establishing
his state of mind toward Mrs. Beale. In Sutphin v.
Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 245, 337 S.E.2d 897, 899 (1985),
we held that evidence of prior crimes or bad acts may be
admissible "to show the conduct and feeling of the accused
towards his victim, or to establish their prior
relations . . . ." In the case at bar, Beale's conduct just
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hours before the sexual intercourse tends to prove his animus
toward Mrs. Beale at the time of the marital rape.
"'"The admissibility of evidence is within the broad
discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be
disturbed on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion."'"
Ricks v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 330, 334, 573 S.E.2d 266, 268
(2002) (quoting Summerlin v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 288, 293,
557 S.E.2d 731, 734 (2002) (quoting Blain v. Commonwealth, 7
Va. App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988))). The trial judge
did not abuse his discretion when he allowed the jury to hear
evidence of Beale's prior conduct leading up to the marital
rape. That evidence was closely related to the offense charged.
Further, it tended to prove (1) the state of mind of the victim
at the time the intercourse took place, (2) the degree of force
to be demonstrated in the Commonwealth's case, (3) that it was
less likely that the sexual intercourse was consensual, and (4)
Beale's state of mind. 5 An accused is not entitled "to have the
evidence 'sanitized' so as to deny the jury knowledge of all but
the immediate crime for which he is on trial." Jones v.
5
Although the trial judge stated he would give a cautionary
instruction on this issue to the jury, Beale had the
responsibility of submitting the jury instruction to the court.
He failed to do so. "The court was not required to give such an
instruction sua sponte." Manetta v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 123,
127 n.2, 340 S.E.2d 828, 830 n.2 (1986) (though trial judge
offered to give a limiting instruction, Manetta made no such
request for tactical reasons).
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Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 30, 41, 526 S.E.2d 281, 286 (2000)
(quoting Scott, 228 Va. at 526-27, 323 S.E.2d at 577).
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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